



Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

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17 August 1990

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OAU's Salim on Iraqi Invasion, Principles

*EA1408205890 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service
in Swahili 1700 GMT 14 Aug 90*

[Text] Comrade Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU secretary general, today gave a press conference at the Kilimanjaro Hotel, where newsmen had an opportunity to ask him various questions. In the process of answering the questions, Comrade Salim talked about issues relating to Liberia, South Africa, and the multiparty political system. Comrade Salim also told the newsmen about the OAU stand on the Gulf situation:

[Begin Salim recording] The OAU issued a statement immediately after the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces. Our pronouncement clearly stresses the following [word indistinct]: Firstly, we condemn the Kuwaiti invasion and we want the Iraqi forces to be removed from Kuwait. It is for this reason that we welcome the decision by the Security Council, which wants Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait.

Why did we do so? This is a fundamental question. Of the 51 countries of Africa, perhaps 80 percent of them are very tiny countries. Some countries in Africa have a population of about 70,000 or 80,000. There are countries in Africa whose population is 1,000,000. There are very tiny countries in Africa. If you establish the basis of giving way to the strong, where do you end up? It is therefore a crucial issue.

There are international norms which we as African countries believe in. We must advocate them; and we advocate them not because of the interests of our friends, our brothers in the Gulf, but for the interests of Africans themselves. We cannot, as Africans, agree to establish a principle of interfering in another country, invading a country, grabbing a country and annexing it, making it part of your country, and then keeping quiet. If you start this and accept it, you have problems. That is our stand.

Secondly, (?we are not) making a statement, but I want to point this out. We are very worried about what is happening [words indistinct] and we would like a peaceful solution to be found. We would have liked to

have had a solution through the Security Council and through the UN—a solution that will save us from the scourge of war. Because we should not be mistaken: If there are problems in the Gulf, those problems will have destructive effects on the whole world, destructive effects reaching our countries. So what we are praying for is a solution. But the solution must value and recognize the rights of each country in that area to have its independence and to have its borders guarded in accordance with the UN Charter and also in accordance with the Charter of the OAU. [end recording]

Defends ECOWAS Action in Liberia

*AB1608120390 Paris AFP in French 1044 GMT
15 Aug 90*

[Text] Dar es Salaam, 14 August (AFP)—Yesterday, the OAU secretary general, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, strongly defended the decision to send an African intervention force to Liberia to try to end the civil war, stating that the time had come for Africa to solve its problems by itself. "We cannot let our brothers die in Liberia under the pretext that the fighting in that country is an internal affair," Mr. Salim declared in Dar es Salaam. He told the press that the force of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will halt the bloodbath in that country.

Following the outbreak of the Liberian conflict, the OAU has decided to strengthen its unit of military advisers, he said, in order to face up to similar situations elsewhere on the continent. "It is important for African governments to create small, well-trained units within their armed forces which could be mobilized within a peace-keeping force in case of need," he added. The various components of the intervention force to Liberia (ECOMOG), grouped together in the Sierra Leonean capital, are still waiting for the green light to intervene in Liberia. (According to military sources in Freetown, they could leave before Thursday [16 Aug] or Friday. Only 800 Ghanaians and 105 Gambians are ready to leave, while 360 Sierra Leoneans are undergoing "tactical training." Guinea has sent 500 soldiers, but the same sources could not confirm their arrival in Freetown. As for the Nigerians, who Nigerian national television says number 900, it was not known yesterday whether they would assemble in Freetown or would be deployed in Liberia from other points in Sierra Leonean territory.)

Chad**Habre Receives Al-Talhi, Al-Qadhdhafi Message***AB1608112090 Ndjamenia Domestic Service in French 0530 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] Yesterday, the head of state received a Libyan emissary at the Presidential Palace. He was Jadallah 'Azzuz al-Talhi, the secretary of the People's External Liaison and International Cooperation Bureau. Following the meeting, the Libyan official said that he came to deliver a message from al-Qadhdhafi to the president of the Republic [words indistinct]. He pointed out that the message was on bilateral relations.

Asked about the deliberations of the Chad-Libya joint commission, the Libyan emissary said that the [word indistinct] of the meeting were followed and hoped that the two sides will soon meet again in Tripoli.

Congo**President Announce Release of Political Prisoners***AB1508091990 Paris AFP in English 2351 GMT 14 Aug 90*

[Text] Brazzaville, Aug 15 (AFP)—Congoese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso late Tuesday [14 Aug] announced the release of all political prisoners, including former President Joachim Yhombi Opango, on the eve of Congo's 30th anniversary of independence from France. In an address to the nation, General Sassou-Nguesso said leaders of a suspected plot to overthrow the government last July were also being released.

It was not immediately known how many people were actually being freed. Gen. Sassou-Nguesso early last month said he was prepared to pardon former President Gen. Yhombi Opango and several other prisoners, suspected accomplices in a foiled coup attempt in 1987. The former president, three army officers and an undisclosed number of civilians had been held without trial for three years in connection with the coup attempt. Their release was expected for August 15, the independence anniversary date.

In his speech to the nation Tuesday, Gen. Sassou-Nguesso also announced the release of Claude Ernest Ndalla, a co-founder of the ruling Congoese Workers Party, who had been sentenced in 1984 for having taken part in a series of bomb attacks in 1982. Mr. Ndalla had at first been sentenced to death, but later had the sentence commuted to hard labor for life. Gen. Sassou-Nguesso said all those implicated in the 1982 bomb attacks were also being released.

He concluded his televised address with a pledge to move towards reforms for a [words indistinct]. Those

reforms would come about following a process that was both "calm and responsible," he said.

Detainees Dismissed From Army*AB1608223090 Paris AFP in French 1208 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] Brazzaville, 15 Aug (AFP)—Eight officers of the Congoese Army, suspected of having been involved in coup plots, have been excluded from the Army, according to a decree issued by the Congoese head of state, informed sources in Brazzaville disclosed yesterday. These officers, who have never been tried nor convicted, were freed on 14 August as part of clemency measures decided by the Congoese president on the occasion of the country's 30th independence anniversary.

According to Congoese authorities, Colonel Eboundit, Commandant Obambo, and Captains Elenga, Ondze, and Iloki were arrested in 1987 after a plot alleged to have been masterminded by former President Joachim Yhombi Opango, who was also freed on Tuesday [14 Aug], was uncovered.

The other officers include Colonel Ngouango, Lieutenant Colonel Lomane, and Commandant Ngayo, who were alleged to have been involved in a plot uncovered last month. The supposed leaders of that plot, according to the authorities, were Messrs. Celestin Nkoua, a journalist, and Clemer. Mierassa, a former member of the Central Committee of the Congoese Labor Party (PCT—the single party).

Gabon**National Assembly Dissolved; Campaigns Start***AB1608200690 Dakar PANA in English 1345 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Text] Libreville, 16 Aug (AGP-GAB/PANA)—The Gabonese prime minister, Casimir Oye-Mba, on Wednesday [15 Aug] presided over the closing ceremony of the country's National Assembly which has lasted five years and six months. The assembly should normally have wound up business in February 1990. However, its life was prolonged for a six-month period (April-August 1990) to facilitate the holding of the national conference that paved the path to multipartyism, a transitional government, and democratic institutions in Gabon.

During those six months, Gabonese deputies drew up a provisional constitution, debated on the country's security and adopted the 1990 budget. A new national assembly is expected to be inaugurated after the legislative elections due to be held in September 1990. Election campaigns started officially all over Gabon on Thursday in preparation for a two-round poll, the second of which takes place on 23 September.

Kenya

Papers Call for Labor Minister's Resignation

AB1608130590 Nairobi KTN Television in English
0500 GMT 16 Aug 90

[From the press review]

[Text] THE NATION leads with the report recounting the last words spoken by the late Bishop Alexander Muge before the accident that killed him. This was recounted by one of the bishop's colleagues who was traveling with him at the time of the accident. Davis Omanyoo, an education coordinator with the CPK [Church of the Province of Kenya] church, recounted the events from his hospital bed.

Meanwhile, Labor Minister Peter Okondo seems to be in a spot of trouble. All the papers report calls for his resignation and the headline in THE NATION reads: Resign, Mark Too Tells Okondo. The same story is the lead in THE KENYA TIMES. The call came from Nandi District KANU [Kenya African National Union] chairman Mark Too, and he also wants Okondo to apologize to Kenyans for the senseless remarks he made just before the death of Alexander Muge. THE STANDARD carries this on its back page.

All the papers report that President Daniel arap Moi has sent a message of condolence to the wife and family of the late Bishop Muge. The president said it was unfortunate that Bishop Muge would not have a chance to participate with other Kenyans in the implementation of the recommendations made to the KANU review committee. Bishop Muge made his presentations to the committee just a few days before his death.

THE KENYA TIMES quotes the widow of the late bishop, Helima Muge, as saying her husband had [a] premonition of his death. And another report says the driver of the lorry which was involved in the accident with Bishop Muge's car has been arrested and appeared in an Eldoret court yesterday charged with causing the bishop's death by reckless driving. This story is also carried by THE NATION and THE STANDARD. Nicanoli Omukoba denied the charge and was remanded in custody.

Other news in THE TIMES says the burial of Bishop Muge will be held on Thursday [16 Aug]. The body was airlifted and brought to Nairobi yesterday for preparation.

THE NATION reports that CPK Bishop David Gitari yesterday called for an inquest into the death of Bishop Muge. And THE "NATION" editorial is also on the death of Bishop Muge and calls on Kenyans to mourn in peace, which Muge always prayed for.

Somalia

Patriotic Movement's Usman on Military Activities

AB1508124290 London BBC World Service in English
1615 GMT 13 Aug 90

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] One of the rebel groups fighting the Government of Somalia's President Siad Barre said it has been making some headway lately. The Somali Patriotic Movement or SPM operates mainly in the western part of the country near the border with Kenya and Ethiopia. So Elizabeth Ohene asked Mohamed Jadj Usman, the SPM's representative in London, where exactly the latest military activity had been taking place?

[Begin recording] [Usman] Exactly we are fighting in five regions, Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Getho, Okol, and Ndaib.

[Ohene] And what, according to you, has been happening there?

[Usman] End of last month and early this month we, the SPM forces, captured (Bilet Okaine) and they killed several soldiers and took all the weapons that was there. And also they attacked again in Npok region and in [names indistinct] they killed a lot of soldiers and they took lots of weapons.

[Ohene] So, all these towns that you say you have attacked, are you controlling them now? Are your forces running these towns?

[Usman] Yes, actually all the towns—majority of them—no one is controlling. When the SPM soldiers capture the towns, civilians always asked them to leave, because civilians are always afraid of attacks from government and air force. They remember when the northern SNM [Somali National Movement] were fighting against Mboro and what the government air force did. So now civilians argue that SNM and SPM leave and ask them [to] go back again into your bush. [end recording]

Tanzania

Nyerere Urges One-Party System Be Continued

EA1608125390 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service
in Swahili 1000 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Dar es Salaam—Mwalimu Nyerere, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi [CCM] chairman, has urged us to continue with the one-party democratic system without feeling any shame or seeking excuses from anybody. The CCM chairman said this during the official party congress, which opened in Dar es Salaam today. He was addressing delegates to the congress from various parts of Tanzania.

Mwalimu Nyerere said that it would be demeaning to drop the one-party system and follow the current changes or satisfy capitalist demands simply in order to secure aid. He

said that if Tanzania decides to follow the multiparty system and then later finds the system not suitable, it will be embarrassing to revert to one-party democracy. He therefore urged citizens to give themselves enough time to study the multiparty system instead of hastily making decisions which, he said, could bring about divisions and turmoil.

The party chairman stressed that the party should continue to ensure that the basic needs of all the people are catered for and secured. He said that the aim must continue to be that of uplifting everybody's living standards, and that everyone should be given basic educational and medical services.

Mandela, De Klerk Meet To Discuss Violence

*MB1608150590 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1455 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Text] Pretoria Aug 16 SAPA—State President F. W. de Klerk and African National Congress [ANC] Deputy President Nelson Mandela on Thursday [16 Aug] morning held discussions on the state of unrest and violence in the country.

"The discussions covered various aspects of the present state of unrest and violence in certain areas, as well as steps to curb it," according to a statement from the state president's office.

Mr. de Klerk was assisted by Justice Minister Mr. Kobie Coetsee and Law and Order Minister Mr. Adriaan Vlok; while Mr. Mandela was accompanied by Mr. Pallo Jordan and Mr. Aziz Pahad.

"The state president also indicated his intention of holding further discussions on this matter in the wider context and of taking action," said his office.

A statement "in this regard will be issued in due course."

President Says State Not Allied With ANC

*MB1608090190 Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY
in English 15 Aug 90 p 2*

[By Mike Robertson]

[Text] Antananarivo—President F.W. de Klerk said yesterday that government was co-operating with the ANC [African National Congress] but was not in a political alliance with the organisation.

He said at a media conference in Iavoloha Palace after meeting Madagascar's President Didier Ratsiraka that government had not yet entered into substantive negotiations with the ANC.

Any suggestion that ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela was to be given a Cabinet post was speculation.

De Klerk said a certain understanding on matters discussed at meetings between the two parties had been reached.

"There is co-operation to bring violence to an end. There is a joint commitment to work together to bring stability to SA [South Africa]. There is a joint commitment to open up channels of communication. Yes, there is co-operation, but not a political alliance."

There were fundamental differences between the NP [National Party] and the ANC. "We are strongly anti-communist, while the ANC is in a formal alliance with the SA Communist Party." There were also strong disagreements on economic policy, although the ANC had recently displayed a greater degree of flexibility on this matter.

In the process of working together in the quest for a peaceful solution, government and the ANC were growing closer.

Asked whether he had built up a personal friendship with Mandela, de Klerk said the ANC leader was a man of integrity who was interesting and intelligent.

Peter Delmar reports that the joint ANC/government steering committee met yesterday for the first time since last week's Pretoria summit after which the ANC suspended hostilities.

Sources on both sides said last night the process of implementing decisions embodied in the Pretoria Minute remained firmly on track. It was understood proposals were swapped on settling up joint structures emanating from the Pretoria Minute, and that both sides would discuss these internally before the next meeting.

Hecklers, Tear Gas Disrupt De Klerk Meeting

*MB1608192290 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1909 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Ken Daniels report]

[Text] Vryheid, 16 Aug (SAPA)—Pandemonium broke out at a meeting due to be addressed by State President F. W. de Klerk on Thursday [16 August] night when a teargas cannister was thrown into the hall as a group of about 100 rightwing hecklers were being forced out by police.

The group of people, believed to be supporters of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), began chanting as President de Klerk began his address and prevented him from continuing.

Mr. de Klerk appealed to the chairman of the meeting, local National Party [NP] MP Jurie Mentz, to have the rowdy section of the crowd expelled from the meeting. A police colonel made several requests for the hecklers to leave but they linked arms and continued to sing and chant slogans such as "Boerestaat", "Noord Natal", and "Huis Toe".

Mr. de Klerk then asked all members who wished the meeting to continue to leave the hall so they would be spared any unpleasantness.

About 100 people remained in the Vryheid Centenary Hall and a police cordon closed in around them. Police using dogs and batons pushed the crowd towards the door using minimum force. As the last few left the hall a teargas cannister was fired into the hall and everyone then fled.

About 3000 people left the hall and were milling around outside, with handkerchiefs and tissues pressed to their faces, waiting for the all clear to be given and for the meeting to recommence. Speakers were adamant the meeting would go ahead as planned.

NP information officer Renier Schoeman said the "trouble makers" were an AWB squad which had been specially bussed into the area for the event.

Further on Vryheid

MB1708044690 Johannesburg SAPA in English
2148 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Vryheid, 16 Aug (SAPA)—State President F.W. de Klerk was forced to give a speech outdoors in Vryheid on Thursday [16 Aug] night after rightwingers disrupted his meeting at Vryheid's Centenary Hall and threw teargas into the hall. A public address system was erected outside the hall and Mr. de Klerk addressed a crowd of about 2,000.

"Our eyes may be burning and noses running but we will not be scared off or intimidated by anyone," he said.

He said the behaviour of those who disrupted the meeting was a disgrace to the whites of South Africa. He said he held the leader of the opposition Conservative Party [CP], Dr. Andries Treurnicht, responsible and called on him to publically distance himself from the actions of the about 100 people who disrupted the meeting.

"Is Dr. Treurnicht willing to support this kind of behavior? It is time the people of South Africa know where they stand when they support the CP."

Soon after being forced to leave the hall, the rightwingers held a meeting on a nearby field at which the old Transvaal Republic's Vierkleur flag was held aloft.

They were addressed by a well-known Herstigte Nasionale Party member, Mr. Kosie Erasmus, who said Thursday night had been the start of a massive resistance campaign against the "leftist" government.

Police Col. J. Schoeman said the use of teargas in the hall was being investigated, but no arrests had been made.

Minister Botha Interviewed on Foreign Relations

MB1608104290 Johannesburg Television Service
in Afrikaans 1835 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Interview with Foreign Minister Pik Botha by South African Broadcasting Corporation [SABC] political correspondent Clarence Keyter; Arrie Rossouw, political correspondent for BEELD; and Max du Preez, editor of VRYE WEEKBLAD; in SABC's Johannesburg studio 15 August—live or recorded]

[Text] [Keyter] Good evening and welcome to this part of tonight's program. It is our privilege to welcome Mr. Pik Botha, minister of foreign affairs. Good evening Mr. Botha. The two members of our panel are Arrie Rossouw, political correspondent of the BEELD newspaper, and Mr. Max du Preez, editor of the VRYE WEEKBLAD newspaper. Welcome to you. Mr. Botha, if I may

begin with your visit to Madagascar yesterday: Financially speaking, is it not the type of search for African initiatives that costs South Africa more than it can afford at this moment?

[Botha] I cannot understand what you mean by that statement.

[Keyter] A project was announced that South Africa will be involved in. It costs money to visit these countries while there are serious social duties in South Africa requiring attention.

[Botha] Do you mean that we should not visit these countries? As far as the cost is concerned it was a relatively cheap flight. To be honest, it is the first time that I am hearing the argument that we should not visit countries where we should be furthering our interests, developing our trade, a country en route to the Far East where we can gain landing rights, merely because of the costs of an aircraft to gain access to this opportunity. In any event, it was an introductory flight for South African Airways. I sincerely hope that your argument does not revolve around that point.

[Keyter] Do any of you want to follow up on that point?

[Rossouw] Minister Botha, is it possible that we have too many expectations from African country's with these initiatives; promising an extraordinary amount of assistance and that we would not be able to afford?

[Botha] It is possible and for that reason we should guard against it. I think we are always honest and straightforward about the circumstances, but circumstances do change. In our besieged and isolated condition the temptation is probably great to pretend that one is not limited, merely to encourage relations with other countries. Propaganda is even attached to a mere visit from another country. In the old days when Mr. Vorster visited one or two countries, nothing really came of those visits, but the very fact that he went was seen as a breakthrough in those limited and isolated times. Such a danger exists, but there is no danger if you explain the basis for such a visit before you actually visit the country. Preparations for this type of visit do not take place overnight. It is planned through months of negotiation on the purpose of the visit and the agenda. In this new era that we are entering we have to concentrate on what I term, mutual interests. We must serve each other's interests and this will be the norm.

[Du Preez] Minister Botha, can I move to a less happier part of the world, namely, the war in the Persian Gulf. I want to ask you specifically, after studying the statement you have handed out concerning this: Do you support the international sanctions against Iraq?

[Botha] We meet our requirements in relation to the charter of the UN organizations.

[Du Preez] I presume that the reason for not advocating sanctions openly towards Iraq, is that they have not yet paid us for the G 5's [artillery piece] that we have sold to them.

[Botha] No, I do not have any knowledge of that. At present we have no outstanding contracts that should be met. As far as South Africa is concerned we support the spirit of the decision taken by the UN. The point is that it is irrelevant for us. To be entirely honest, we do not have anything to do with it. We have issued a statement, we have criticized the incident severely and South Africa will not do anything that will be regarded as going against the United Nations decision.

[Du Preez] What about the weapons that we have sold to Iraq? Are there still contracts binding in terms of ammunition deliveries and in terms of service of weaponry?

[Botha] With all due respect, that is not my territory. It is my colleague's territory and the government does have policy regarding the disclosure of such information. I hope that you will understand this.

[Keyter] Let us return to the Africa initiatives, Mr. Botha. The impression is created that isolation and sanctions are almost something of the past. Is that really the case or are we fooling ourselves?

[Botha] No. One should test what is happening. There is no bluff regarding President de Klerk's visit to Europe. It follows that there can be no bluff in the reaction from all the heads of state that he has visited, unless they of course, have been fooling us all this time. There can also be no bluff in the events in Madagascar yesterday where President Ratsiraka told the world openly that he wants to establish trade links with South Africa. We can take this further; General Obasanjo's visit and the report of the UN group that visited. It was the most positive report that South Africa has ever received since the establishment of the UN. I think that enough has happened in the world and in Africa as far as visits to South Africa is concerned, even visits by President de Klerk to Africa to explain that the whole situation has changed.

[Keyter] How far do South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa actually extend?

[Botha] We can, as far as Africa is concerned, talk in terms of countries we may visit with ease and comfort—that is a norm, and according to that we can visit nearly all of them today, but there are some which, with respect, I would not want to visit. But that is not a problem, the problem is no longer to visit. The problem now is how to handle the visits, that has become the problem: To handle the traffic, the traffic has increased enormously.

[Keyter] Arrie?

[Rossouw] Minister, at the moment it would appear as if, among the 11 southern African states with whom we would like to have good relations, it is now only Zimbabwe which is slightly negative toward relations with

South Africa. Where do we stand with Zimbabwe? Are you hopeful, is it the next target?

[Botha] Yes, you see.... To begin with, I am very glad you are already referring to 11, and not ten. The moment we say Zimbabwe is our next target, in the sense that we want better relations there, by doing that one awakens counterproductive elements. So, if you do not mind, I would prefer to express it differently, namely that we and Zimbabwe should both strive to improve our bilateral relations. Still, I do believe the geographical reality, namely that we are neighbors, we import goods from each other on a very large scale, trade is expanding, in all other areas we need each other. I am very hopeful that, as we make progress internally, that we will convince Zimbabwe that the process of change is irreversible, and our relations will improve. And I have reason to believe that it is already improving.

[Du Preez] Mr. Botha, the diplomats and observers in general are, I think, very impressed with your department's record in terms of foreign affairs. I think there was one discordant note in these circles, and that was your announcement to diplomats and ambassadors about the so-called 'Red Plot,' which turned out not to be such a 'Red Plot' after all. Now, I am not trying to suggest that you were telling lies, but the suspicion does exist that the advisors, the people who informed you and President de Klerk, provided you with incorrect and exaggerated information. How do you see that problem; where did it lead to, and is something being done to ensure that you and the state president are provided with better, more first-hand information?

[Botha] I am very glad you asked that question, since there were so many inaccurate reports on this. In the first instance, my meeting with the ambassadors was a confidential one. That is always the case: A discussion between a foreign minister—not only myself, any foreign minister—and foreign ministers, is a confidential discussion. They also want it that way, they require it to be like that. Those ambassadors will never be happy if I tell the press what questions they asked me during the meeting. They will be the last to want me to tell the press what they told me, and what their remarks were. That is not done; one cannot, I think you will understand that one cannot handle diplomacy like that, especially not between a government and the representatives of other governments who are accredited by you. There must, after all, be a situation of mutual trust.

That is the first point, but I do not want to hide behind that. I never told them that which the press says I told them. So in this instance, the press had the wrong information. To me it was never an issue to try and prove or disprove that Mr. Slovo was, for instance present at that meeting. To me it was not important. What was important to me, was the possibility—the possibility that there could have been a secret agenda. And it is not only I who say so. Everybody who studied the documents said so. President de Klerk, who also

studied the documents, without somebody interpreting it for him, also said so, also came to the same conclusion?

[Du Preez] Were those documents not doctored?

[Botha] No, no. Those documents are authentic, that is not being disputed. We read excerpts from them during discussions with members of the ANC, and they did not dispute it. So what I did with the ambassadors was not to get them all excited about a 'Red Plot.' What I told them that day, in confidence—I will reveal a little bit about it—was that the talks between ourselves and the ANC are of vital importance; we would like to do everything in our power to avoid that they be shipwrecked.

What happened here, is that if weapon caches are again discovered on a big scale, or on any scale—what impression would that create among the public? Then you will have the public pressuring the government, saying one cannot negotiate with people who are still doing that kind of thing, because you cannot trust them. And from my point of view, those documents created, at least *prima facie*, a breach of faith. And that breach of faith had to be rectified before the talks could take place, and President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela did in fact succeed in that.

But that is all that was discussed between myself and the ambassadors that day: I told them that what was at issue for me was the breach of faith, the lack of trust which is so essential when one is busy negotiating. I told them that I was not interested in charges, in arrests. I wanted to know whether the person who was sitting at a table with me, looking me in the eye—whether he was talking the truth, can I believe him? Or, as he is talking with me, is he thinking of ways to hide the arms, so he can start fighting again the day after tomorrow? It is essential that we should not have those kind of thoughts when we are talking.

[Keyter] Mr. Botha, you are speaking now of foreign diplomats to South Africa. Let us return quickly to the greater international world. Governmental representatives have been visiting Eastern Europe frequently: the Soviet Union, Hungary, et cetera. How far is South Africa from real diplomatic ties with the East Bloc countries and has America missed the boat?

[Botha] The term diplomatic ties has become a very broad, almost vague concept in the era that we are living in now. It is not interpreted in the same way that it was 800 years ago, with the old kings and the old kingdoms, when all sorts of rules were laid down regarding diplomatic notes, cards, forms of address and communication et cetera. These days, for practical reasons, you can meet all the requirements formerly prescribed for diplomatic representation without actually calling it that. For example, you can open an office in a country and appoint someone to head that office. You and that country arrange for him to have full diplomatic immunity, full diplomatic facilities, and the office functions, for all practical purposes, precisely like one enjoying full diplomatic status.

[Keyter] So you are saying there is already contact between more than just South Africa and Hungary, for example?

[Botha] Yes. We have already begun with visits to Poland. I don't think that is a secret. As you also know, I've had a visit from the Romanian foreign minister. There have been fairly many visits between ourselves and other central European states. By the way, they do not like being called East Bloc states. They say they are central European states.

But to return to your remark about the United States: No, they have not missed the boat. Our government sees the United States—particularly now, in the light of the trouble in the Middle East—as the most important single Western state in the world. The United States can now act firmly because it no longer has great powers like Russia or Beijing, Red China, to oppose or threaten it in this matter. To South Africa the United States is just as important as it is to the European powers.

[Rossouw] Mr. Botha, this initiative in East Europe also applies, to a degree, to Africa. So let me return to the question: What is in it for South Africa, apart from us being able to say these people now have more open contact with us, or new contacts which did not exist in the past. What is in it for South Africa, in terms of exchange of technology?

[Botha] Are you referring to the East Europeans, Central Europeans?

[Rossouw] Yes, as well as Africa.

[Botha] In Africa, as I have already said, we have to look at our priorities. My main goal now is to concentrate on southern Africa, because we already have the interconnected infrastructure: railways, ports, air traffic, telecommunications; because we are in close proximity to each other; because, for the most part, our region has some of the most vital minerals in the world. In addition, with South Africa's relatively well developed technology, we are in the best position to stimulate development in the region. This is stated, in so many words, in the Dublin declaration by the 12 European countries. They say that South Africa can provide the stimulus in this region for the growth of the whole of southern Africa.

So we will have to examine our priorities and concentrate more on southern Africa without, of course, being condescending towards the rest of Africa.

[Keyter] Our time is running out. I would just like to redirect the discussion. As senior cabinet minister, Mr. Botha, as well as a member of the negotiation team, there are some questions we would like to ask you on matters domestic. Max has something to ask you.

[Du Preez] Minister, I would like to follow up on an earlier reply. You referred to the 'Red Plot' and said you had not sought arrests. Yet there were indeed some arrests. A senior African National Congress [ANC] member, Mr. Mac Maharaj, and a few others are at

present in prison. Last night on television I was watching a senior Conservative Party MP. My blood curled when I listened to the kind of things he was saying about violence in Welkom in particular. In my view, it would seem as though Mr. Maharaj and the other 10 who are being detained without a hearing have said and done much less than is the case at the moment in the right wing camp. The question arises: Does the government fear the right wing? Why, over the years, do we have a situation in which a person on the left, or in the black community, who merely say the wrong thing and they land in prison for a very long time, while the rhetoric we hear from the right has recently become unbelievable, with no action being taken against them.

[Botha] Let me just correct you. I did not say I had not sought arrests. I said when I spoke to the diplomats I told them that my main concern was not arrests, but rather a breach in confidence. Second, I can assure you that Mr. Maharaj was arrested on the strength of facts presented by my colleague, very firm reasons. Both the president and his colleagues as well as Minister Vlok are determined that Mr. Maharaj appear in open court as soon as possible.

As for the program you mention: I did not see it, but I accept your judgment, because some of the things the right wing are saying are just as unacceptable to me. The problem is, however, that while the ANC and the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] and others say the same things, that is not what they are arrested for. In this country one has first to commit a deed which is a prima face crime before one can be arrested.

[Du Preez] A call to violence?

[Botha] That depends. The ANC continues to say the armed struggle continues. [preceding four words in English]

[Du Preez] But they say if the negotiations....

[Keyter, interrupting] I have to interrupt there, or else we will overrun our time. Mr. Botha, sorry for cutting you short. We would like to thank you for giving us your time and for being prepared to join us. Thanks also to Arrie and Max, and good night.

Vlok, Mandela Meet to 'Diffuse' Violence

MB1608193690 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1920 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Johannesburg, 16 Aug (SAPA)—Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok and the regional divisional commander of police, Maj.-Gen. Johan Swart, met ANC [African National Congress] Deputy President Nelson Mandela and a delegation of Sowetans on Thursday [16 Aug] night in the strife-torn township in an effort to diffuse the violence that has broken out in the area.

Law and Order spokesman Brig. Leon Mellett told SAPA Mr. Vlok and the others discussed the ongoing violence and the problems surrounding finding an end to the bloodshed.

He added there was no plan for any release or statement to be made following the meeting in the tense township, where at least nine people died and 113 were injured in the day's fighting mainly between Zulus and Xhosas.

Agree on 'Peace Forum'

MB1708043690 Johannesburg SAPA in English
2155 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Johannesburg, 16 Aug (SAPA)—Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok and ANC [African National Congress] Deputy President Nelson Mandela agreed at an emergency meeting in Soweto on Thursday [16 Aug] night to immediately establish a "Peace Forum" aimed at resolving the escalating violence in black townships on the Witwatersrand.

Addressing a joint press conference at the Protea Police Station in Soweto, both Mr. Vlok and Mr. Mandela made urgent appeals for calm, especially in Soweto.

The Peace Forum, comprising representatives of the police, the ANC and all other parties involved in the violence, will meet on Friday morning at the Protea Police Station to begin discussions to bring an end to the carnage which has swept through townships around Johannesburg over the past week, leaving more than 150 people dead.

According to Col. Steve van Rooyen, a law and order spokesman and member of the police working group liaising with the ANC, the forum will have two objectives: to end the violence and to find out what caused it.

"After very candid discussions between Minister Vlok and Mr. Mandela it was decided and agreed to by both parties that as a matter of urgency a forum would be initiated representative of all parties concerned.

"They will be meeting tomorrow morning and, as soon as is humanly possible, the forum will try to resolve the issue of violence, especially in Soweto," Col. Van Rooyen said.

The SA Police [SAP] delegation at Friday's meeting will be headed by Maj. Gen. Johan Swart, the commissioner of police for Soweto.

Col. Van Rooyen said Gen. Swart asked Mr. Mandela at Thursday night's emergency meeting for the names of the ANC members who would be participating in the forum. The commissioner also gave the ANC deputy president the names of the police participants.

Col. Van Rooyen stressed the Peace Forum would not only be concerned with resolving the violence in Soweto, but would also appoint committees in those areas where violence reared its head.

"But now our priority is Soweto. Our mission must be to create peace throughout South Africa."

If need be Mr. Vlok would personally get involved in the forum, Col. Van Rooyen said.

Asked if he believed the forum would solve the violence, Col. Van Rooyen said:

"I am very optimistic. If we weren't optimistic we wouldn't be here tonight. This forum must work, there is no alternative."

NP Issues Bulletin in Response to CP Claims

*MB1608090590 Johannesburg THE CITIZEN
in English 15 Aug 90 p 11*

[By Brian Stuart]

[Text] Cape Town—The National Party [NP] has sent a bulletin to all its Cabinet Ministers. MPs and Members of the President's Council, giving the party's reply to Conservative Party claims that it has no mandate for its reform initiatives.

CP members, who have obtained copies of the bulletin, claimed yesterday it proved that CP speeches are "hurting" the NP.

A spokesman said yesterday that the 18-page bulletin was put out by the NP's Federal Information Service, and signed by Dr. Stoffel van der Merwe, Minister of Education and of Development Aid, who is chairman of the service.

Dr. van der Merwe has acknowledged the contents of the bulletin. "It was intended as an internal document. But the CP has told so many untruths and talked so much rubbish that we have set out a few facts for our members to bear in mind," he told THE CITIZEN.

The covering note said the main attack of the CP against the NP was the claim that the government was not acting in terms of the mandate of September 6.

The bulletin concentrates on four aspects of CP claims:

Negotiation with the ANC [African National Congress].

Lifting of restrictions on certain political organisations.

The destruction of White community life.

The repeal of the Separate Amenities Act.

Regarding talks with the ANC, the bulletin quotes from the published NP Action Plan: "Details must be worked out in a process of negotiation preceded by intensive talks with the leaders of all the different groups willing to participate peacefully in a search for fair and practical solutions."

ANC Deputy President Mr Nelson Mandela had talked with former State President P.W. Botha in July 1989, and had committed himself to creating a climate of

peace—this opened the way for talks by the government with him and with the ANC.

The bulletin stressed that these were talks aimed at removing obstacles to negotiation—and not negotiations about a constitutional future. "By a process of dialogue a commitment by the ANC to a peaceful process was obtained."

On the lifting of restrictions, the bulletin said the NP did not seek a mandate for this action, but nor did it commit itself not to take such action. The NP had not sought a mandate before placing the restrictions on these organisations.

Soon after the September election, communism crumbled in Eastern Europe. This made communism no longer credible in South Africa, and cut off the supply of money and weapons to the ANC and the SA [South Africa] Communist Party from that source.

Replying to claims that the NP was "destroying White community life," the bulletin said the party had specifically obtained a mandate to take certain steps.

The Action Plan said: "Discrimination between groups or against individuals based on race, colour, sex, religion or group affiliation, is unacceptable. Where discrimination still exists, it must be eliminated in an orderly fashion."

The bulletin said: "The steps the government has taken since the election, in so far as they affect White community life, are in all respects within the framework of the mandate."

Dealing with the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act—due to become effective on October 15—the bulletin quoted the Action Plan as saying that all forms of differentiation between individuals and groups was unacceptable and had to be eliminated.

ANC Makes 'Urgent Plea' For End to Violence

*MB1708054690 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0500 GMT 17 Aug 90*

[Text] The ANC [African National Congress] has made an urgent plea for an end to violence throughout South Africa.

A statement issued by the organization in Johannesburg blamed what it called misguided individuals who had infiltrated the communities and hostels for urging people to fight. It said these individuals were spreading rumors that one section of the community was planning to attack another. They had taken it upon themselves to divide the people along ethnic lines.

The statement said violence among the people had reached alarming proportions, adding that lives were being lost by the hundreds. The ANC wanted to know why blacks were butchering one another.

The statement was issued hours after an announcement by the Office of the State President revealing that Mr. F. W. de Klerk and Mr. Nelson Mandela had met in Pretoria to discuss the violence in black towns.

Coverage of Situation in Violence-Torn Soweto

Zulus Fighting Xhosas

MB1608181090 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1733 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Johannesburg Aug 16 SAPA—The death toll in Soweto's factional violence has risen to six with at least 99 people injured since the unrest began early on Thursday [16 Aug] in South Africa's largest township, police confirmed. Soweto Police Liaison Officer Capt. M. J. Ngobeni told SAPA the sixth victim of the violence died while undergoing an emergency operation at Baragwanath Hospital.

The outbreak of violence between Zulu and Xhosa factions in Soweto seems to be a spillover of the 2-1/2 day rampage through East Rand townships of Thokoza, Vosloorus and Katlehong which left almost 150 people dead and more than 500 injured, according to official statistics. Police fired teargas at a group of more than 600 at Soweto's Nhlazane hostel after a mob had tried set fire to the dwellings late on Thursday.

Fire damage to the buildings was minimal and the group dispersed after a teargas volley was fired. Capt. Ngobeni told SAPA he reported the situation as being "quiet right now but it is, as you can expect, tense" and police were keeping a close watch on developments there.

Soweto was awash with rumours on Wednesday night of impending attacks by both Zulu-based Inkatha and the ANC [African National Congress]-sympathetic Xhosas and violence in the sprawling township erupted with an early morning clash Thursday at Nhlazane station which left four people dead and almost 50 injured.

Police spent most of Thursday battling mobs in Soweto as the factional strifespread. "Several times they fired shots and threw petrol bombs at the police. Police fired back with guns," Soweto Police spokesman Col. Tiennie Halgryn told SAPA. He said one of the incidents occurred at Merafe hostel but no one was injured. Col. Halgryn also said sporadic fighting was continuing between bands of rival factions clashing over tribal and political differences.

"All over small fights between factions are taking place. The police are on the scene. We quickly drive them away every time they gather."

Police on Thursday afternoon averted a clash between Jabulani residents and hostel dwellers.

A group of youths armed with sticks and sharp weapons had spilled over to Baloni Road near a bridge over a railway line where fighting broke out early on Thursday morning. On the other side of the bridge, earlier declared

by Inkatha and MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] leaders as a no-go area, armed Nhlazane hostel inmates moved, apparently to confront the youths. Police arrived at the scene and fired teargas for more than five minutes and the mobs dispersed.

Shortly before dark a group of youths stopped a yellow truck, believed to belong to Transnet, and it was set alight in Dlamini, Radio 702's Des Latham told SAPA on his return from a day monitoring the Soweto unrest. He said the driver was pulled out before the group poured petrol over the vehicle and set fire to it. Police arrived and the group ran off.

By nightfall, Soweto was reported to be quiet but tense with groups of people continuing to congregate in the township. There was a heavy police presence. Small units of police continued to patrol Jabulani and the area near the Nhlazane Hostel.

Baragwanath Hospital spokesman Mrs. Annette Clear told SAPA shortly after 7pm that 101 people were treated at the hospital as a result of the fighting. Of these 37 were treated for bullet wounds. Another 12 people were taken to (?Hallbrow) Hospital where nine were treated and discharged. Of the 101 people treated at Baragwanath, 26 people had been admitted by 7pm. Mrs. Clear confirmed what police had told SAPA that one of the injured died while undergoing an operation. Of the injured was in critical condition and about 10 were regarded as serious. [Sentence as received] She said most of those injured were men, but some women and children had been treated.

A person, who would only give his name as Leonard, who witnessed the incident at Nhlazane station, gave the following account of the attack:

"I was on a train on my way to work this morning. As the train moved from Merafe railway station towards Nhlazane station passengers were told to get out of the train. A mob gathered on the platform, stopped the train and told passengers to disembark because at Nhlazane station fighting was taking place. We were informed people from the hostel had killed some people. As we stood outside we saw people engaged in a fight. People who had disembarked from the train were forcing the hostel dwellers back to the compound.

"We forced them up to the hostel. As we were about to enter the hostel, police arrived. They started shooting us with teargas. Police were between us and our enemies. We wanted to get right inside the hostel but police refused to let us go in," he said.

The outbreak of some of the worst violence the Witwatersrand has ever seen led to an urgent meeting between State President F. W. de Klerk and ANC Deputy President Nelson Mandela on Thursday. The meeting was called in an effort to curb the escalation of violence and further meetings in this regard are planned.

Reports from Wednesday's "war zone" on the East Rand on Thursday said the area was still in the midst of an uneasy peace. Police confiscated a number of weapons in the area on Thursday.

Renewed Clashes

*MB1708085690 Umtata Capital Radio in English
0800 GMT 17 Aug 90*

[Text] There have been reports of renewed clashes in the Soweto suburbs of Orlando West and Dube. These are among the more up-market areas of Soweto. Dube is the suburb for the richer Soweto residents. Orlando West is where ANC [African National Congress] leaders Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu live. The extent of the trouble is not known at this stage.

Casualty Update

*MB1708093490 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0900 GMT 17 Aug 90*

[Text] The death toll in clashes between Zulus and Xhosas in Soweto has risen to 21 with the discovery of three bodies at a cemetery at Nancefield. About 200 people have been injured in the violence.

The liaison officer for the police in the city, Colonel Tiennie Halgryn, says that the situation is calm but tense. He said that the police were still in contact with representatives of the warring groups to set a date for peace talks.

Journalists Barred From Entry

*MB1608151590 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in Afrikaans 1400 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Text] Five people have died so far in factional fighting in Soweto, following the discovery of another body at the Mapetla hostel. At least 85 people have been injured in the fighting, which has spread from residential areas on the East Rand to Soweto. Sporadic fighting is still occurring in the area.

A police spokesman, Colonel Tienie Halgryn, says journalists have been prohibited from entering unrest areas because their presence exacerbates the situation. Col. Halgryn says earlier reports that thousands of fugitives have sought assistance at the Kliptown police station, are incorrect. He says only 70 residents of a squatter camp have asked for help at the police station after hearing rumors about an attack being planned on the camp. These rumors appear to be false.

Talks Held With Factions

*MB1608120690 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 1100 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Text] A representative of the police in Soweto, Colonel Gert Goosen, has held talks with warring factions in the Jabulani area of Soweto, in an attempt to defuse violence.

A police spokesman, Colonel Tienie Halgryn, said representatives of the groups had agreed to try to convince mobs gathered in the vicinity of the Jabulani and (Maraki) hostels to disperse and go home.

Sporadic fighting is continuing between rival groups in Soweto, and already four people have been killed in the violence. Fifty-five people have been injured so far.

Early this morning 31 people were injured, nine seriously, in a fight at the Inhlazani railway station. A spokesman for the police in Soweto, Col. Tienie Halgryn, told our Johannesburg news staff that the fighting had been short-lived because the police, supported by a helicopter, had moved in quickly to stop the fighting and to disarm those involved.

The police in Soweto fired on a crowd attacking a hostel accommodating Inkatha supporters near Marefe Station after being attacked. Col. Halgryn said that shots were fired at the police and petrol bombs thrown at their vehicles when they intervened in the attack by ANC [African National Congress] supporters on Inkatha members. The mob dispersed after the police opened fire. No casualties have been reported.

Thousands of people sought refuge at the police station at neighboring Kliptown. In Eldorado Park, south of Soweto, two schools were deserted by pupils who fled in fear of an attack on the schools. Col. Halgryn said the police had not found any evidence of a planned attack.

Col. Halgryn said the warring factions had erected barricades in the streets, and a 10-ton truck was set alight at the Tladi training center. Several people were arrested. He said that the police were in control of the situation.

On the East Rand 206 casualties have been treated at the Natalspruit hospital near Alberton since Tuesday [14 Aug] evening. One-hundred-and-forty-three people have been killed in the violence in the area.

The head of the police division of public relations on the Witwatersrand, Colonel Frans Malherbe, said the situation on the East Rand was quiet, and that the police were still disarming people. He said Inkatha was to hold a meeting at the stadium at Thokozela this morning.

Meanwhile there have been no further incidents of violence at Sebokeng near Vereeniging since delegates of Inkatha and the ANC held talks on ending the violence.

'Thousands' of Inkatha Members

*MB1708101890 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0931 GMT 17 Aug 90*

[Text] Johannesburg, 17 Aug (SAPA)—Renewed fighting erupted between hostel inmates and residents of central western Jabavu, Soweto, on Friday [17 Aug] morning, according to a civic leader.

Activist Audrey Coleman, of the Detainees Aid Centre, told SAPA an unidentified civic leader telephoned to say

thousands of heavily-armed Inkatha members from the Inhlazane Hostel were battling residents.

The battle appeared to centre around a bridge that separates the two warring factions. The bridge was declared a no-go area on Thursday after spontaneous peace talks.

Mrs. Coleman said newsmen were apparently ordered out the township.

A resident reached by telephone said police had fired teargas to stop the fighting. His house is only metres from the bridge over a railway track that was the scene of Thursday morning violence. Police could not confirm the report.

ANC's Motlana Interviewed on Township Violence

MB1708095690 London BBC World Service in English
0635 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Caroline Dempster report from the "Network Africa" program]

[Text] There have been violent, bloody, and frightening few days in Johannesburg corridor townships of the East Rand and Soweto. Running battles between groups for and against the Zulu leader of Inkatha, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, have left more than 140 people dead and dozens injured in the worse outbreak of violence since 1985 when a state of emergency was first imposed in South Africa.

The reasons for the conflict are unclear but have been portrayed as an intertribal clash between Zulu supporters of Gatsha Buthelezi and Xhosa supporters of ANC [African National Congress] deputy leader Nelson Mandela.

I called up Dr. Nthato Motlana, honorary president of the Soweto Civic Association, to ask him if this was accurate.

[Begin recording] [Motlana] No, one can say most definitely that it isn't. In fact this strife which began in Natal a few years back, was Zulu on Zulu. The Zulus, we were told, supported Inkatha and those who did not, who supported the UDF [United Democratic Front], COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions], or the Mass Democratic Front, and therefore to suggest that this is intertribal strife, is absolutely false. [sentence as heard]

[Dempster] What then would you say is at the heart of this?

[Motlana] It seems to me and I speak as a prejudiced observer, since I am myself a member of the ANC, the mass of the people in this country supports the ANC.

We do not need to engage in acts of violence to convince or to persuade our people to belong or to join the ANC. It could be that the fact that the Government of South Africa is seen to be negotiating with the ANC and that

several that several formations, the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization], Inkatha have been marginalized and left on the sideline and that therefore they could be arguing but in order to make our voices heard, we need to do something. I do not know. I am just speculating.

[Dempster] If, as you say, it is primarily socioeconomic reasons that underly this violence, what then is the hope for curtailing it. What then is the hope of bringing some end to it to prevent it spiraling and getting out of control?

[Motlana] Let's go back to 1960 or earlier when that mad Hollander called Verwoerd started building these massive, soleless, single-sex hostels in the middle of residential areas throughout the country.

We protested vehemently that this was indeed a recipe for disaster. Men need the civilizing influence of women [changes thought] of their wives and children and when you put thousands of men in these single-sex hostels in the midst of these communities, you are asking for trouble.

And one of the things that we have to do, is to remove these hostels and allow men to live in normal life with wives and families.

I was told that in Sebokeng for instance, the men—the Zulus who caused all the trouble were not local—but the local Zulus intermarried with the local Xhosas and Sotho people, they lived very happily with them and that those who caused all the trouble were in fact vast, vast from Natal. And so in talking about a solution, we have to look at that, that could be a long term thing that we have to do.

In the immediate and the short term, the South African Security Forces who are seen to be on the side of the evil doers, must do what we as taxpayers pay them to do, namely to maintain law and order.

[Dempster] It does seem as if the weapons that have been used are very easily accessible to these people. Where are they coming from, do you have any idea?

[Motlana] I have just heard a most disturbing story, unproven as yet, of white men seen at one of the local hostels dropping suitcases outside the gates. Some of the young comrades seized one suitcase to find it full of arms.

That story may or may not be true. But there are stories doing the rounds that there are white men, presumably from the extreme right wing, who are arming the hostel dwellers. While that may be, I don't know, right wing members of the police may be giving them protection.

After all, police have been seen escorting armed men to meetings. It's a very worrying situation but as Mr. Mandela said the other night: Either the state president and the South African government have lost the loyalty and support of the police or the police are doing what

they want to see and the question is, which is the truth? I am not sure. [end recording]

AZAPO Calls Meeting; Inkatha Excluded

*MB1608183890 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1820 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Text] Durban, 16 Aug (SAPA)—AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization] has initiated a multi-party meeting of extra parliamentary organisations in a bid to end the continuing fighting in black townships on the East Rand, SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] radio news reports.

Azapo's publicity secretary, Strini Moodley, told a media briefing in Durban the organisation was appalled by the internecine violence that was spreading throughout the country and the resulting loss of life.

In the circumstances AZAPO sought an urgent meeting with the ANC [African National Congress], the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] and what it termed liberation organisations, the radio said.

The consultations, which intended visible and concrete steps to be taken to end the violence, would initially exclude Inkatha, which it regarded as being in collaboration with the government.

However, AZAPO regarded it pointless for individuals and organisations to apportion blame and for organisations to act as though they themselves were blameless.

Mr. Moodley alleged the organisation that were largely responsible for the violence had lost complete control of their membership and at worst they were directly involved in organising and fanning the violence. Neither did he exonerate the security forces, accusing the police of not disarming people who carried so-called traditional weapons.

He also expressed dismay and concern that the violence had assumed proportions of a tribal conflict where alleged Xhosa-speaking people were engaged in pitch battles with their Zulu-speaking counterparts.

National Police Liaison Issue Unrest Report

*MB1608081890 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0738 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Text] Pretoria Aug 16 SAPA—Herewith the unrest report released by the SAP [South African Police] public relations division in Pretoria.

"The following unrest-related incidents were reported during the past 24 hours:

"At Cross Roads (Cape) a number of private dwellings were gutted during arson attacks.

"At Kayelitsha (Cape) police found the body of a black woman who had been necklaced.

"At Guguletu (Cape) a policeman sustained slight injuries when a police vehicle was stoned by a group of blacks.

"At Galeshewe (Kimberley) a private house was extensively damaged during a petrol-bomb attack.

"At kwaMashu (Natal) a policeman was attacked and stabbed by a group of blacks.

"At Qwehela (Natal) a large number of huts were set alight by group of blacks. One man was murdered.

"At Sebokeng (Vereeniging) a post office vehicle and two private vehicles were extensively damaged when set alight by groups.

"At Fresli Air (Cape) a policeman sustained slight injuries when police members were stoned.

"At Ashburg (Cape) three coloured men were arrested when a police vehicle was stoned.

"At Nseleni (Natal) a group of blacks attacked a woman who was returning from a funeral. The woman sustained serious injuries.

"At Boitumelong (Bloemhof) a delivery vehicle was damaged during a stone-throwing incident.

"On 1990-08-14 at 21:45 a hand-grenade of Russian origin was thrown at a private house in Wesselton, Ermelo. The house was gutted in a fire which followed. One black woman was fatally wounded and another sustained serious injuries. Police are investigating.

"On 1990-08-15 at 06:20 two black men sustained slight injuries when a hand-grenade was hurled into a shop in Wesselton, Ermelo. The building was extensively damaged. Police are investigating."

SAP To Discontinue Reports

*MB1708065690 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0637 GMT 17 Aug 90*

[Text] Pretoria, 17 Aug (SAPA)—The daily unrest report will no longer be issued by the SA [South African] Police [SAP] Public Relations Division in Pretoria.

The SAP announced in a statement to SAPA that in future regional liaison officers would be responsible for media statements about unrest-related incidents in their own regions.

The SAP decided to do away with the daily report from Pretoria for practical reasons and "as a result of requests received from media representatives."

Due to a limited number of liaison officers in some regions, media liaison officers attached to the Pretoria Division would be kept posted and, where necessary, be of assistance in fielding media inquiries.

"Should any media representatives therefore experience any difficulties, media liaison officers of this office can be contacted. When there is doubt as to who the after hours duty officer is, this can be established by phoning (012) 26-6705 or (012) 310-1911 or (012) 26-6689."

16 Aug Press Review on Current Problems, Issues

MB1608114990

[Editorial Report]

THE STAR

Mandela, Buthelezi Must Curb Unrest—Johannesburg
THE STAR in English on 16 August in a page 16

editorial points out "The battle for political supremacy between Inkatha and UDF-ANC [United Democratic Front-African National Congress] supporters was bloody enough, and intractable enough, when it was confined to Natal. But now its horrors have spread far afield." This township fighting "sees residents pitched against 'the Zulus'—and it is significant that, on the ground, people do not see it as a fight against Inkatha." "Thus the fighting assumes an even more dangerous dimension, one of trial warfare." Also, ANC Deputy President Nelson President and Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi must set the example on "the need to educate people on democracy and acceptance of each other's right to free political activity." "Somehow there are always obstacles to their actually getting together to make a joint appeal for peace. Enough of the point-scoring and pre-conditions. People are dying out there."

Fair Employment Needed at Department of Justice—A second editorial on the same page discusses a Democratic Party report on black employment at the Department of Justice. "In 1988 the department's professional establishment was 2,537, of which 2,400 were white. A year later the establishment was slightly higher, and the black component of it had risen by—a puny one percent. In 1988, there were 144 regional court magistrates, all white. A year later, nothing had changed." "Unless the Department of Justice can be prevailed on" to change its employment and promotion policies to ensure black advancement, "It will continue to promote a lack of respect for the legal process. And that, for a society in transition, is very dangerous indeed."

THE CITIZEN

New Malagasy Ties 'Welcome Addition'—In discussing the new trade agreement between South Africa and Madagascar, Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English on 15 August in a page 6 editorial states that although Madagascar is a "poor" country, "it is a welcome addition to the list of formerly critical or hostile countries that now see the wisdom of openly trading with us." Also, "When we see governments welcoming us again, we realise that we are becoming a people and country with growing acceptance. Barriers are breaking down sooner than we could have dreamed possible, and we will be accepted back in the not too distant future into the community of nations. For this breakthrough we can thank the State President, Mr F.W. de Klerk."

SOWETAN

Mandela-Buthelezi Talks 'Imperative'— "More and more people believe that a meeting between Nelson Mandela and Mangosuthu Buthelezi could stop the violence spreading. As we are all looking at measures to put out the fires, the pleas from the community must be heeded," states a page 6 editorial in Johannesburg SOWETAN in English in 16 August. "It will take political courage—something both leaders have in abundance—to effect such a historic meeting." "They should

have peace high on the agenda of such a meeting. The terrible violence is making it imperative for people to sit down and talk."

BUSINESS DAY

'Slaughter' in Townships Must End—Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 16 August in a page 12 editorial observes "The slaughter in the townships, a spillover from the simmering warfare in Natal, has reached proportions of national crisis which demand forceful intervention by the government, no matter what its political opponents may say." "A mountain of distrust remains to be overcome, and it is impossible to see how that can be achieved unless ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela and Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi can be persuaded to meet, and to bind themselves to peace. Nor will the government make much progress unless both these leaders give public backing to any measures President de Klerk may take to restore order, and to disarm the warring parties." However, as long as the ANC's military wing "maintains a readiness for a resumption of armed struggle," "neither Inkatha nor AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization] nor any other of its rivals will lightly submit to being disarmed."

Government Should Reform Press Laws—In discussing the South African Government's "decision to reconsider laws affecting Press freedom," BUSINESS DAY in a second editorial on the same page points out "as with security laws, government should reconsider Press restrictions with an eye to the future. It would be wise to purge the statute books of oppressive legislation a new administration could take over and apply as is."

CAPE TIMES

'Much Depends' on Mandela, De Klerk—Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English on 14 August in a page 6 editorial writes "It is evident that mutual confidence between Messrs. de Klerk and Mandela is advancing rapidly. So much so that Mr. Mandela can even speak of a 'kind of alliance' developing between the ANC and the NP [National Party]. Much depends on whether he can deliver his side of the bargain, commanding the loyalty of the radical youth. The future of the country depends on the success of this informal alliance in curbing the violence and setting up all-party structures for negotiation."

ILANGA

Inkatha, ANC Should Cooperate—Durban ILANGA in Zulu on 13-15 August in a page 4 editorial opines: "Most people who talk of the need for peace in Natal and kwaZulu express the wish that Inkatha and the ANC would cooperate to end the violence that has engulfed this region and many others. But what is surprising is that the ANC, despite its recent announcement that it is setting aside the armed struggle, is now pointing a

menacing finger at Inkatha, and the entire Zulu nation, by stating that kwaZulu is a bantustan and must be dismantled. Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the president of the Inkatha Freedom Party, has interpreted this statement as a challenge to the Zulu monarch and the Zulu nation." "What we and all people know for a fact is that kwaZulu is not the brainchild of apartheid but rather was in existence long before apartheid reared its ugly head and its proponents came into prominence. KwaZulu rejected independence from the onset, and it still does." "Dr. Mandela's personal guarantee that he is dedicated to ending the violence in Natal and kwaZulu does not tally with what the ANC is doing, because this continued denigration of kwaZulu merely adds fuel to the fire. Besides, an organization that puts such an immense number of Zulu votes in jeopardy might live to regret it. To put things right, Inkatha and the ANC must come together and discuss strategies for peace as black people. It is easy for blacks to rule this nation if they unite. But if they do not do this, their opportunities will rush out with the tide."

* Black Battalion Patrols Northern Border

90AF0495B Pretoria *UNIFORM in English*
Jul 90 pp 1, 14

[Article by Reuben Goldberg]

[Text] In line with reshaped Defence policy, the SA [South African] Army undertakes border protection duties. A good example of this policy was investigated by UNIFORM at 116 Battalion near Messina, Far Northern Transvaal.

The prestigious Black battalion has adapted to border protection as one of its prime tasks.

Troops at 116 Bn are involved in patrolling the South African/Zimbabwe border along the Limpopo river.

Tracking

907 Special Duty Company, known as the Reaction Force, forms part of 116 Bn and is involved in tracking. The Reaction Force is sent out to investigate any incident in the area, from landmines to illegal immigrants attempting to enter SA.

According to Cmdt Anton Kritzing, OC 116 Bn, the Reaction Force can be called out as often as five times a day.

The unit also has a platoon of dog handler which works very closely with the Reaction Force.

A mounted company manned by NSM is also based at 116 Bn.

116 Bn makes its home in the African bushveld south of the Limpopo river. The area is lush with mopani, marula and baobab trees, and teems with wildlife.

116 Bn was established in 1984, primarily to train black soldiers so they could be utilized in the defence of South

Africa. According to Cmdt Kritzing, the unit also has other specific functions. They are operations and the upliftment of black soldiers and their families.

Recruitment for the first intake of black troops was carried out mainly among the Northern Sothos of the Lebowa area. This tradition continues today.

When 907 Special Duty Company came under the command of 116 Bn it became necessary to increase the intake and as such anyone who passed the selection requirements was accepted. The battalion became multi-ethnic as Vendas, Shangaans and Zulus joined its ranks.

The unit's recruitment drives work in unusual ways. Troops who underwent training at the battalion are deployed in Lebowa at 117 Bn and Group 45 HQ. Their presence in the area aids recruitment in that they talk to the community and people hear about 116 BN and want to join.

Advertizing

The battalion also advertises in local newspapers and on SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] TV2 and 3 and local radio stations. The advertisements explain recruitment requirements and encourage people to join the SADF [South African Defense Forces].

The Dept of Manpower also helps spread the word to unemployed people who may be interested in joining the Army.

Three months before an intake, recruiting teams travel around in the area visiting schools and talking to village chiefs. They distribute pamphlets describing the benefits of joining the SADF and 116 Bn, and listing pickup points.

Requirements

When the intake date arrives, the Army sends out vehicles to the pickup points. Physical testing is carried out and those who pass are brought back to the base where they undergo further testing to ensure they meet all the requirements.

Cmdt Kritzing said in the early years of the battalion's existence there wasn't much interest amongst the black population in joining the SADF and anyone who met the basic requirements was accepted.

Today this has changed and up to four people are turned away for each one accepted.

Cmdt Kritzing instituted the following requirements in 1988. At least a standard eight certificate is required by anyone wanting to join the battalion, they should have no criminal record, they should be able to prove their identification and they should pass both the physical and psychological selection courses.

Training

For the new recruits, Army life is a strange and new experience. Training at 116 Bn starts with a three week orientation stage, which Cmdt Kritzinger called a self-enrichment course.

Cmdt Kritzinger said: "The main aim of the course is to instill in the troop a sense of responsibility".

Another important aspect of the course is to bring the new recruits into line with military culture.

Once this orientation is complete the recruit enters Basic Training, which follows the standards set by the SADF.

After basics the troops are given a chance to choose the area in which they would like to receive further training. Cmdt Kritzinger said every effort is made to accommodate the troops' choice.

Once subject training is completed individual troops are either incorporated in the unit's infrastructure or deployed. Infantry men undergo a further 8 weeks of training and are then posted out.

Future

Cmdt Kritzinger said the black people have shown that there is a lot of goodwill amongst them. "They love this country and want to do their part in protecting it and its people," he said.

"In the coming years 116 Bn will be busy training or retraining members of the SADF," said Cmdt Kritzinger.

According to him, the unit will always have the responsibility of protecting South Africa's northern border from possible external threat.

Cmdt Kritzinger said: "As the century draws to a close more and more of the Bn's officers will be black. This process has already started and will result in a unit in which most of the key personnel will be black."

* ANC Document Stresses Negotiations

90AF0495C Johannesburg THE STAR
in English 24 Jul 90 p 18

[Article by Kaizer Nyatumba]

[Text] Negotiations always involve a compromise and it is always highly unlikely that any party will have all its demands met, says the ANC [African National Congress] in a recently released document on negotiations.

Negotiations, which involve opposing parties trying to find a mutually acceptable solution to their conflict, never result in a defeat or victory for the parties involved as each is required to make compromises.

This is according to an 88-page document issued by the ANC's Department of Political Education which says no

organization can afford to stay away from the negotiating table any longer, because doing so will result in that particular organization being seen as unreasonable.

The document, entitled "The Road to Freedom: Resource material on negotiations", deals with negotiations and their importance, the historic three-day talks between the ANC and the Government in May, the Groote Schuur Minute and other organizations' criticism of the ANC for talking to the Government.

Also included in the document are resolutions of the Conference for a Democratic Future held at the University of the Witwatersrand, the Freedom Charter, the Harare Declaration on negotiations, the ANC's constitutional guidelines, an interview with Panuel Maduna of the ANC's legal department and a discussion paper on negotiations.

Support

The ANC notes that given President de Klerk's reforms, organizations which continue to refuse to talk to the Government will lose both domestic and international support.

"The regime is particularly vulnerable to sanctions at present due to its lack of funds. The democratic movement has to maintain maximum pressure on Pretoria by calling for sanctions from the West. Sanctions were imposed because Pretoria refused to negotiate.

"If Pretoria offers to talk and we simply refuse, sanctions will be lifted and instead we will be isolated internationally."

The principles of mandate and accountability to the people would guide the ANC in negotiations.

Political negotiations as understood by the ANC were "fundamentally different from the antidemocratic process envisaged by the imperialists and various reactionary elements who wish to frustrate the achievement of mass democratic rule in South Africa".

The ANC believes that President de Klerk's Government was left with no choice but to negotiate because of domestic and international pressures.

"It was because the organization viewed negotiations as yet another 'terrain and method of struggle' that the ANC had decided to participate in negotiations.

"No one," says the ANC document, "who is seriously interested in the future can be against all negotiations on (sic) principle."

The document appraises the political situation in the country and concludes that the liberation movement cannot "always choose to negotiate from a position of strength or in a situation where we expect to achieve important advances".

On the question of pre-conditions for negotiations, the document says the time is over when organizations can catalogue demands which have to be met before the process can begin.

While certain things such as the demand for the total abolition of apartheid could not be abandoned, times had changed and it was important for the ANC to "master and use a variety of weapons to a deadly effect" in the struggle against apartheid and not to treat it as rigid and unchangeable.

* SADF Supportive Role in Natal Discussed

90AF0495D Johannesburg ARMED FORCES
in English Jul 90 pp 15-17

[Text] The South African Defence Force [SADF] has deployed some 4,000 troops in the Province of Natal in support of the South Africa Police, to maintain law and order and restore normality to the lives of the 5.6 million inhabitants of this troubled Province. The reasons for the unrest, which has resulted in over 2,000 known murders, large-scale arson, stoning and intimidation, are both complex and hard for the uninitiated to understand.

Various factors have combined, or have been combined, to create a very volatile situation. There is no doubt that one of the major constituents of the present mess is the interaction between a number of political movements, each striving for control; with intimidation as one of their main weapons.

Added to this is the high incidents of Faction Fighting, with families, clans and tribes taking advantage of a volatile situation to settle scores. While this has been going on, the criminal elements have been making hay, with the under-strength police forces being too busy endeavouring to keep the peace to pay attention to their activities. There have even been reports of local strongmen imposing tolls on road users in their fiefdoms.

How the SADF Functions in a Supportive Role

The South African Army assigns troops to meet two commitments; the Conventional Forces and those allocated to operate primarily in a COIN counter-insurgency role. All recruits undergo the same basic and follow-up training, and the allocation to their specific formations takes place after their initial period of National Service training. The country is divided into eleven areas or Military Commands, and these Commands are in turn divided into sub-areas or Groups. Each Group consists of a Headquarters which controls a number of Commandos (generally area-bound units similar to a Light Infantry battalion), together with one or more Citizen Force Infantry Battalions that are based in their Group's area. During periods of 'unrest' the groups can be, and are, supported by other Citizen Force units or elements of these units that are activated to serve with a particular Group, usually for a period of two months.

In the event of a Group being required to assist the South African Police elements drawn from the SA [South African] Medical Services and South African Air Force will be activated and attached to a Group in a support role.

Points of Fact

To an observer of the current situation in Natal, a number of comparisons and observations can be made:

- The SADF fills the role of a United Nations Force.
- With large combined Police and Army operations using helicopters, AFV's and special equipment, such as the Ground Shout (the U.S. invasion of Panama comes to mind.)
- The marked friendliness of the majority of the population towards the troops.
- The gratitude of the industrialists who are now able to keep their factories running. And the workers who can now return to work without fear of being assaulted or murdered by one faction or another.
- The detailed planning of some of the operations, using sand models that have involved over 1,500 Policemen and 1,700 troops.
- Helicopter deliveries that have placed 450 men on the ground in a single operation.

During the last few years, with the removal of the influx control system, hundreds of thousands of rural people have flocked to the cities in search of a better life. They have created massive slums around the metropolitan areas, almost as bad as those of Rio. Areas of squalor with few of the accepted amenities, and in areas where the terrain would probably rule out the installation of any water, sewage or road facilities, even if the thousands of millions of Rand needed were available.

As the maintainers of law and order, the South African Police were immediately subjected to a propaganda campaign designed to cast suspicion on their impartiality. A campaign, in many instances, abetted by the media representatives and with the objective of either removing or nullifying the forces of law and order to enable mob rule to take over.

The SADF force that was moved in to Natal is a composite one, made up of National Servicemen, Citizen Force and Commando elements, as well as regular Black Portuguese soldiers drawn from 32 Battalion. This 4,000-strong force immediately began to get acceptance from the majority of the population in the strife-torn areas. They were seen to be impartial in their dealings with the problems; a more difficult status for the Police to achieve, as for years they had been seen as the enforcers of unpopular laws, such as those dealing with liquor. Despite the fact that the members of 32 Battalion are of Portuguese culture and still adhere to it and their military traditions which are based on the very strict and strong Portuguese Military Code, similar attempts were made, accusing them of criminal acts*, none of which have been found to have any foundation after Police investigations. What is factual is that the 4,000 members

of the SADF, together with the men of 32 Battalion, have succeeded in their attempts to support the South African Police and their added strength has enabled the force of law and order to greatly reduce the degree of lawlessness that existed a few months back in Natal.

*To the informed in the basics of Portuguese culture and way of life found in a Portuguese military unit, these allegations did not hold water. A subsequent investigation by the South African Police into the 15 allegations of criminal behavior have produced no evidence of any wrong-doing.

* Current Status of CSH-2Rooivalk Program

90AF0495E Johannesburg ARMED FORCES
in English Jul 90 p 35

[Text] The CSH-2Rooivalk was first unveiled to the international media on the 15th January 1990. At the unveiling ceremony, Lt Gen Jan van Loggerenberg, Chief of the South African Air Force [SAAF] announced that the SAAF would not be ordering the CSH-2Rooivalk into production due to the improved political climate which had developed with our neighboring states.

Subsequently, the local defence manufacturing industry decided to proceed with development of the CSH-2Rooivalk on their own; the reason for this being that there is an international market for such a system. The CSH-2Rooivalk is one of the most sophisticated state-of-the-art multirole helicopter weapons platforms in existence.

On Sunday the 11th February 1990, the CSH-2Rooivalk was readied for its maiden flight. It had been fitted with a special suite of sophisticated flight test equipment and given a small fuel load. At 08:00 the CSH-2Rooivalk first lifted into the air and hovered; by doing so, it became the first locally-designed helicopter of its size to have flown in South Africa.

The first flight heralded the beginning of the intensive flight-data-gathering exercise, used for the refining and fine-tuning of the CSH-2Rooivalk's many systems. Over the months since the CSH-2Rooivalk has been gradually loaded up and flown with more fuel, with all its different types of missiles and weapons, until it finally reached its maximum take-off mass.

The CSH-2Rooivalk has now completed its full range of hover tests, passing each with flying colors, and has now accumulated more than 30 flying hours. The characteristics of the helicopter in the demanding hover flight regime have now been extensively determined and the CSH-2Rooivalk is now embarking into its flight envelope expansion phase, by transitioning into forward flight.

* Police Respond to ANC Claims of Brutality

90AF0490A Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English
17 Jul 90 p 5

[Article: "SAP To Probe ANC Claims of Inhumanity"]

[Text] The Ministry of Law and Order said yesterday it would respond to an African National Congress [ANC] report alleging "inhuman" police violence against petty apartheid demonstrators at Boland towns once it had investigated the claims.

ANC Western Cape co-ordinator Mr Reg September delivered the report, based on about 50 statements, to State President, Mr F. W. de Klerk's offices at Tuynhuys yesterday.

"Some people have been killed, a number of people have been injured. Not only adults, but even young people have suffered at the hands of the police.

"This report reveals the shocking inhumanity that one still encounters," Mr September told reporters during a 30-minute wait at the gate of Mr De Klerk's Tuynhuys office.

Police outside the major cities were slow to adapt to the new, apartheid-free South Africa Mr De Klerk had promised to create, Mr September said.

New Era

He said they still used shotguns and tear gas against protesters and people throwing stones, killing and injuring men, women and children apparently without accountability.

"They have got to understand that we are entering a new era. The government must encourage their police to develop a new relationship with the people," he said.

Capt Peet Bothma at the Ministry of Law and Order confirmed yesterday the Ministry had received a copy of the report.

Buried

"The police will comment on the allegations once they have been investigated," he said.

ANC spokesman Mr Graham Block said the report was based on about 50 statements to lawyers by victims of police action in the farming towns of Ashton, Montague and Robertson, where three people killed by police were buried on Saturday. The report covers protests against the continuation of petty apartheid by local town councils after a parliamentary decision to abolish many forms of racial discrimination in October, and police action against these protests.

It says 157 people were injured in one incident in April by a stampede and police gunfire after officers threw tear gas into a hall where Robertson residents were meeting to protest against apartheid.

Assaulted

Residents, whose names were removed from copies of the report given to reporters, alleged they had been wounded by police shotgun fire in a number of incidents since April.

A 34-year-old man alleged that he was assaulted by police during a sit-down protest at a municipal office. He said he was thrown to the ground, sworn at the half-strangled.

"They took me to the passage and one of them hit my face against the wall at least five times. I tried to free myself. They then bent me over a bench and again hit my face against it," he said in a statement sworn before lawyers in June.

Many of the injured quoted in the report said they were reluctant to visit rural hospitals because they feared doctors and nurses would hand them over to police.—Sapa-Reuter.

*** Ramaphosa: Chamber of Mines Must Fight AIDS**

90AF0495F Johannesburg THE CITIZEN
in English 20 Jul 90 p 4

[Text] The Chamber of Mines, (COM) had a responsibility to fight Aids, the general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, said yesterday.

The only permanencies in mineworkers' hostels were those of human needs: for security, friendship, emotional closeness and sexual intimacy, he said.

The same sexual intimacy that may give rise to Aids, Mr Ramaphosa said.

"This is the reality in which the Aids virus spreads in South Africa. Topical writing on Aids ignores social reality, and serves to uphold the myth that Aids victims themselves are to blame for contracting the virus," Mr Ramaphosa said.

He said NUM objected to this approach, and that the vast majority of people had not chosen to live precariously. They had been condemned by social policies to put up with circumstances where health, whether mental or physical, was a matter of good luck.

Mr Ramaphosa called on mining houses and related employers to consider employing people who had tested Aids-positive, because carrying the disease would not affect his ability to work, nor would there be any danger of infecting fellow-workers.

He asked that the alleged widespread practice of dismissing workers who were sick or injured be stopped.

He said the NUM had an Aids education programme, and was considering taking the course to every mine and plant.

"The NUM accepts that the problem of Aids may assume epidemic proportions unless action is taken to prevent it. The government, business and the unions all have crucial roles to play."

Replying to Mr Ramaphosa, the COM said there was much common ground between the views held by the NUM and those of the employers on the issue of HIV infection and Aids.

A spokesman said the COM had always maintained an open-door policy towards the NUM to discuss issues related to HIV infection and Aids, in an attempt to co-ordinate efforts to combat the spread of the disease in the mining industry.

He said other countries in Africa without South Africa's socio-political problems had been unsuccessful in combating the spread of the disease, and were in a far worse situation than SA [South Africa].

A recent study of mine employees had shown that the vast majority did not have a promiscuous lifestyle, the spokesman said.

The COM had already spent a large sum of money on activities aimed at contributing to our knowledge of Aids, and at preventing the spread of the disease in Southern Africa and in the mining industry in particular.

*** Desegregated Bus Service Ignored by Blacks**

90AF0490F Johannesburg SOWETAN
in English 24 Jul 90 p 11

[Article: "Pta Blacks Shun 'Open' Bus Service"]

[Text] The Pretoria City Council bus service may be open to all races—but black commuters have so far shown little interest in using it.

Council buses were desegregated with effect from midnight on Friday.

A council spokesman said only "between 10 and 20 blacks" had used the buses at the weekend.

No incidents were reported

She said the numbers of white commuters using the service had not dropped in reaction to the opening of the buses to all races.

The council chose a Saturday and the school holiday period on purpose for the opening as buses would not be full.

It had adopted a "wait and see" attitude towards possible racial tension over the issue.

Any problem which may occur "will be handled as it comes".

No blacks were seen using the buses on Church Square early yesterday.

Most bus drivers said they had not picked up any black passengers yet.

One who did not want to be identified, said the fares were too expensive for blacks.

"A couple of blacks boarded my bus, but when they heard what the fares were, they decided not to use the bus."

The council spokesman confirmed that the council's bus fares were higher than those of Putco, taxis and trains.

A news agency correspondent, Mr Johnny Masilela, who boarded a "white" bus from Pretoria's Church Square to the eastern suburb of Sunnyside and back, said there were no other black people on board.

Lifestyle

A white passenger on the bus, Mr Charles Fourie, said he believed blacks did not board what were previously "whites only" buses because they preferred black taxis which did not run on stipulated time.

"When I nervously entered the 'white' bus on Church Square on Saturday, I was greeted by a female white driver who behaved as if the historic moment was not unusual to our lifestyle," he said.

"In the bus I met Fourie, with whom I struck up a conversation and no heads seemed to turn as white folk—young and old—just went on as if nothing new was happening."

He said, however, that at a bus stop towards the outskirts of the city centre, three white girls had boarded the bus and all gave him a "quick curious glance".

"All three squeezed on a seat next to me meant for two people, with neither of them apparently prepared to share the empty space next to me.

"On the return trip, an elderly male driver greeted me as I boarded: 'Good morning, and how are you?'"

He chatted to Johan Niemandt (27) who said he worked for the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] and who said "Welcome to the new South Africa."

"In this bus I happened to sit next to a white woman who stared out of the window as soon as I occupied the space next to her.

"I asked her if any blacks had boarded the municipality buses. Without looking at me she muttered: 'Ek weet nie (I do not know).'"

- The CP [Conservative Party] leader in the Pretoria City Council, Mr Paul Fouche, said prior to the opening of the service the "shocking" step would "without a doubt result in friction on the buses".

* Soviets Apply for Immigration in Finland

90AF0490G Johannesburg SOWETAN in English
19 Jul 90 p 3

[Article: "6,000 Soviets Want to Emigrate to SA"]

[Text] Helsinki—More than 6,000 Soviet citizens have applied in Finland to emigrate to South Africa since February, South African Ambassador Johannes Lotter said in Helsinki yesterday.

The unprecedented wave of application has taken Pretoria's embassy in Helsinki by surprise and dismayed the ANC [African National Congress].

Lotter said applications had come from all over the Soviet Union, including the Baltic republics, Moscow and Azerbaijan.

"What is amazing is that they choose to apply to this mission," he said. There had previously been no applications.

Lotter said 90 percent of letters were from unqualified people with little chance of acceptance. Most seemed to be applying for economic reasons. None had so far been approved.

ANC Helsinki representative Mohamed Hussein said: "We are opposed to emigration controlled by the apartheid regime. They make sure that only white people are allowed to immigrate.

"We object to this attempt to mop up the disenchanted people from the East," he said.—Sapa-Reuter

* ANC Ambivalence Over Transition Seen

90AF0491D Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 13-16 Jul 90 p 8

[Commentary by Steven Friedman: "A Question of Trust: ANC Must Decide"]

[Text] Does the African National Congress [ANC] believe we are on the way to a non-racial order? Some of its leaders say it does. Some of its strategies say it doesn't.

This contradiction may be inevitable. But the ANC may well have to make its mind up soon.

The government, of course, insists that we are irreversibly on the way to a new order. Trying to persuade its opponents of this has become a key element in its strategy.

It insists that the "armed struggle" and sanctions are no longer necessary because they are meant to force it to do something it has already agreed to do. And, if the ANC and its allies want the disbandment of the kwa-Zulu police, they don't have to call mass stayaways—they can negotiate this issue.

The strategy works at other levels, too. The government insists, for example, that it is willing to negotiate new local government and education systems.

That means, it adds, that rent boycotts and campaigns to force township councillors to resign are no longer necessary. Neither are school boycotts or teachers' strikes.

What isn't clear is whether the ANC and its activists believe it. In Washington, New York and other foreign cities, leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki insist that transition to a new order is only a short way away. An agreement making it possible to lift sanctions may take at most two years, says Mbeki.

But "armed struggle" and sanctions are still in place. The stay-aways, conflict on the ground, rent and school boycotts continue.

This implies the ANC doesn't yet believe the government has conceded a new order: it still has to be pushed to do this.

This contradiction clearly irks the government. The more it agrees to negotiate a new order, the harder it becomes to run the old one—indeed, to run anything at all.

There are signs that its irritation is growing and that this is strengthening the hands of its "hawks." Defence Minister Magnus Malan has been stepping up his anti-ANC rhetoric lately and no one in the cabinet seems keen to contradict him.

The contradiction may be the ANC's easiest option. Firstly, it helps keep together a constituency which might not be ready to accept the compromises which a settlement will require.

Secondly, it wants to show both that it is serious about a settlement and that it has enough mass support to partly decide the terms of that agreement. Soothing noises together with mass action might help it do that.

But the contradiction between saying that you believe the government means to negotiate a new order and acting as if it doesn't cannot continue forever. Indeed, the ANC may have to decide in the next few days.

It and the Nats are supposed to be reaching agreement on the reports of working groups set up at the Groote Schuur meeting. If there is an agreement, the two will be committed to joint action on issues such as violence: the ANC will be signalling that it believes the transition to a new order has begun and that it has an interest in making it work.

The ANC seems to be delaying, possibly because it doesn't want to choose between agreeing to cooperate with the government and continuing to pressure it.

But it can't delay forever and if it does agree to cooperate—if only on some issues—it will have to devote at

least as much attention to helping to manage the transition as it does to strengthening its bargaining position.

It may often find it difficult to do both.

On issues such as local government and education, it will also have to choose soon.

If it believes the government doesn't yet plan to concede non-racial municipalities or schools, pressure may be the only way of making it do that.

But if it believes that they have been conceded, the sort of pressure we are seeing now is counterproductive.

The more it continues, the harder will it be for a non-racial majority government to run these systems.

If non-racial municipalities and schools were introduced tomorrow, whoever ran them would face high expectations and severe backlogs which will make their task very difficult.

But they are not going to be introduced tomorrow. New systems will have to be negotiated and this will take time. The ANC seems to accept this—indeed, the government complained last week that its plan for negotiating a new education system would take too long. New systems may be at least a couple of years away.

If rent boycotts persist through the period, the debts which a non-racial municipality will inherit will make it far harder for it to meet expectations—it may well make it impossible.

If school boycotts and strikes continue to force black education towards collapse, a non-racial education ministry may inherit problems it will take decades to solve—and a majority government may find it impossible to provide jobs or schooling for a generation which lacks the skills to earn a living.

Some activists may argue that the price is worth paying to push the government into conceding systems which really meet people's needs. But if it has already conceded them, the price will be paid not by this government but by the next one.

How does the ANC or its activists know whether the government does mean what it says?

They could insist on finding out. They would then suspend mass action while new systems are negotiated—and threaten to resume it if it appeared the government didn't mean what it said.

If the government is in earnest, this might ensure that the new society is governable.

If it isn't, it might make mass pressure far more effective by showing not only that there are costs to ignoring it, but that there are advantages in dealing with it.

*** Benoni Grants Squatter Rights in White Area**

90AF0465C Johannesburg THE STAR
in English 16 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by Helen Grange]

[Text] In a move that may reap unpleasant legal repercussions, the Benoni Town Council has granted permission for squatters to stay in a white group area.

The decision was taken at a special council meeting last week after consultation with the Wattville Residents Committee (WRC), representing the squatters. The land concerned is known as Tamboville, adjacent to Wattville township.

Confident

Town clerk Denys Conradie, who motivated the watershed decision, said he was "a little uneasy" about overstepping legal technicalities, but was confident the decision was the correct one and in line with the spirit of Government reform.

When police moved in on the area last Sunday, the council undertook to have 34 charges of trespassing, brought against the squatters, withdrawn.

Benoni's council is the first to grant squatters the right to stay in a white group area. As the squatter crisis worsens, other councils have opted for shack demolition in a bid to remove squatters off "private land".

Recent opposition by squatters to demolition has resulted in at least two deaths, several injuries and scores of arrests.

Mr Conradie said the council had decided at the outset that the squatter issue would be handled in a "controlled manner".

"Although the land belongs to Benoni, it is adjacent to Wattville. There was no reason to move the squatters, apart from the fact that we wanted to avoid the confrontation that has occurred elsewhere."

Mr Conradie said the land would be serviced with water and sewerage facilities at a cost of R500,000. The squatters would be granted long leases and the WRC would eventually take charge of collecting rent.

The council, with the WRC, had also established a joint technical working committee to look into squatters' grievances. About 3,000 people would be affected by this move and the number was likely to increase.

"We want to make this a little showpiece. The township will be ordered and sites will be clearly defined," Mr Conradie said.

Although the council's move is expected to provoke the Conservative Party's wrath, Mr Conradie said the council had reached the resolution without conflict.

The only group unhappy about the development was the Wattville Town Council. It had wanted to buy the land years ago for recreational use. But the Benoni council had rescinded a resolution to sell the land as squatters had already settled there.

*** Universities Hold Labor Law Conference**

90AF0502I Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL
in English 20 Jul 90 p 36

[Text] Deregulation and privatization—and their impact on collective bargaining—were at the core of this year's labor law conference, jointly organized by the labor law departments of UCT (University of Cape Town), Wits and Natal.

The conference, now the premier event of its kind, commenced with the general issues of economic restructuring and democracy in societies in transition, before tackling the impact of political policies on collective bargaining, directions in labor law and the role of collective bargaining in what was assumed would be a social democratic state (undefined) in future.

It was regretted that there was "unwillingness by government and certain large employer representatives to participate and advance positions in public which they espouse in practice. For example, on levels of bargaining"—an indirect reference to Barlows' preference for plant-level bargaining.

Broadly, three themes emerged:

- That democratic regulation of organizations and, ultimately, society involves pluralism and the importance of maintaining free and independent trade unions;
- That some level of regulation is necessary to ensure a balance of power between unions and employers, and to check the unfettered use of power by either; and
- That collective bargaining must be institutionalized at relatively central levels if there's to be any kind of social regulation or compact between the State, capital and labor.

The assistant director of the Wits Center for Applied Legal Studies, Halton Cheadle, argues that some form of regulation is important to set reasonable standards. The Free Market Foundation is very wary about this.

The Labor and Economic Research Center's Taffy Adler illustrated how industrial councils have made a significant contribution to general social welfare, preventing wages from sinking to very low levels. He argues that the gradual demise of industrial councils has had the effect of lowering employment standards and damaged collective bargaining as an institution.

Ironically, says Adler, the result of the break-up of industrial councils is a massive additional burden to the State and society as a whole.

It is argued that deregulation and privatization are taking place without reference to unions or negotiation, and here Competition Board chairman Pierre Brooks, unable to gainsay the charge, came in for a roasting. Natal University's Chris Albertyn describes this bypassing of the unions in the changing of regulations as typical of the features of the authoritarian state, as outlined by UCT Prof Andre du Toit in an earlier address.

The charge seems to be supported by the concerns expressed by Adolph Landman (chairman of the labor relations committee of the National Manpower Commission), about the Department of Manpower holding back the law-making process for pushing through the Saccola-Cosatu-Nactu accord. "I suggest the department is overstepping the mark," Landman stuck his neck out, adding that though the NMC is government's official adviser, "it does seem to have other advisers who are not publicly accountable."

UCT's Clive Thompson says any new legislation has to serve two periods—the present transitional phase as well as the new order to come.

It is ironic that labor, once at the progressive forefront, has now started to lag behind political developments. The search for better dispute resolution procedures that measured up to ILO (International Labor Organization) standards, says Thompson, is being thwarted by the Department of Manpower.

He believes it a curious omission that the draft labor legislation makes no mention of affirmative action—essential to the future.

While we have a core of fairly well-protected industrial workers, says Thompson, there is a crucial need, linked to the land issue, to extend such rights to rural workers. Labor and management are going to have to adjust their attitudes in order to replace SA [South Africa]'s deeply adversarial labor relationship with a co-operative one. Union autonomy, he adds, is going to be crucial in the new SA if democratic pluralism is to succeed.

But should the right to strike be inalienable? Thompson believes the ILO convention should form the basis of this right in law. Cheadle says it isn't inalienable but a question of where you draw the line—either the court is given that power or it's written into the statute.

Numsa's Geoff Schreiner reckons the line should be drawn by the parties themselves, adding "we don't believe in the absolute right to strike." He suggests more emphasis should be placed on compulsory arbitration in extreme cases.

Cheadle revealed that the Saccola-union accord proposes restructuring the labor appeal court to make it more of a specialist labor court—with the status of an appeal court, beneath which would function the industrial court.

Discussing unions and political affiliation, Chris Gilmore, of the Italian union federation CGIL [United

Federation of Labor], drove home the message of the "incompatibility between trade unions and political office," which has been formally adopted by his union.

Not only does this make the formation of more cohesive unions possible, it is a question of different roles, says Gilmore, who is here advising Cosatu. This does not mean unions reject intervention on socio-political issues that affect workers as citizens.

* 'Paucity' of ANC Economic Thought Noted

90AF0502H Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 20 Jul 90 pp 36, 38

[Excerpts] The paucity of ANC [African National Congress] economic thought stood out in a debate on restructuring the economy during last weekend's labor law conference at the University of Natal.

Tito Mboweni, of the ANC's economics and planning department, stood in for heavy-weight Thabo Mbeki—but even allowing for lack of preparation it was a thin speech. Mboweni stressed that the ANC did not envisage an economy "directed from the top in commandist fashion." But "the State must actively participate as a productive agent to transform current relations of production and influence the direction of the economy." In order to reconstitute the economy, he said, it was important "first to work out how to break up conglomerates and monopolies to redistribute the productive assets of SA [South Africa]."

A middle way was put forward by Wits sociologist Duncan Innes and labor lawyer Martin Brassey. They argued for better distribution of power over monopolies and conglomerates, rather than breaking them up. This would entail greater participation in decisions, policies and ownership. Geoff Schreiner, of the metalworkers' union, suggested that negotiation on worker participation would be central to this.

Mboweni spoke mysteriously about "mechanisms to encourage foreign investment," though "we do not see foreign investment as a panacea." He talked of "huge surpluses in the JSE (Johannesburg Stock Exchange)—which I don't want to bring down by what I say—involved in a paper chase." He also repeated the ANC position that the burden of taxation would be shifted off the poor "in a equitable way."

Since the workers of southern Africa have contributed a great deal to the development of the economy, ways will have to be found to enable the regional economy to compete internationally, according to Mboweni. He added that "there is a debate going on in Lesotho about whether to federate" with a new SA. Could this mean that the ANC accepts, at least in principle, the idea of federalism?

The Free Market Foundation's Leon Louw questioned the idea of breaking up conglomerates and spoke of hysteria over the alleged concentration of capital.

Breaking up big companies would reduce SA's competitiveness even further, he said, "and in any case our conglomerates are tiny compared to world players: each of Japan's five major banks is bigger than the SA economy."

Louw said a better way to "redistribute productive assets" was by deregulation to open up opportunities for people. He cited the black taxi industry and explosion in the informal, unrecorded sector.

Cosatu's Alec Erwin said that in restructuring the economy, the challenge—particularly to business and Lean Louw—was to beware of dogma. He argued for a more flexible approach to overcome the inequalities of apartheid and to build an economy that was more "democratically regulated."

The economy has strengths and weaknesses, said Erwin. Among its strengths are the fact that in many ways we don't have to start from scratch and we are well-endowed with exportable commodities. Weaknesses include high unemployment, a housing shortage and widespread poverty; black education and health are in tatters. Economic reconstitution for a new growth path will require a "package of policies" which must include skills training.

Markets, said Erwin, tend to under-invest in certain activities, like health and infrastructure; the market doesn't respond to people who can't pay, and over-invests in other areas.

Louw disagreed, offering to take anyone to places like Winterveld where they could see the success of "little" people in endeavors like road-making and electricity provision using generators bought at hypermarkets. "The market will provide these needs better than any State," said Louw.

* Former Army, Police Officers Join Right Wing

* Military Influence Noted

90AF0505A Johannesburg SUNDAY STAR
in English 22 Jul 90 p 15

[Article by Kitt Katzin and Steve McQuillan: "Out of Uniform and Into the Right"]

[Text] New Research shows that a strong, disturbing military influence is emerging within the swelling ranks of the right-wing movements.

A detailed study of extremist political activity highlights the growing and close links between the ultra-rightist groups and former military officers and policemen.

This chilling assessment of the status of the right wing comes in the form of a 21-page report by the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression (IBIIR).

The report emerges against the backdrop of a wave of terrorism in which 67 people have died in just one month.

'Seize Power'

Many of the acts of violence have involved bomb blasts—perpetrated, police believe, by right-wing activists whose leaders have publicly declared they will not hesitate to seize power "through the barrel of the gun".

Allegations of the para-military connection have been strengthened by the apparent ease with which SA [South African] Defence Force weapons have been stolen from military arsenals.

Against the background of growing public fears that most members of the security establishment support the Right, the IBIIR, a watchdog group made up of academics and lawyers which monitors the right-wing threat, has released a report evaluating these claims.

The document names at least 27 ultra-rightist movements, many of which have become prominent after President de Klerk's watershed speech in Parliament on February 2 in which he announced the unbanning of political organisations and the release of political prisoners.

The groups range from relatively harmless "think-tanks" to shadowy "armies" intent on urban terrorism and, ultimately, a "third freedom struggle" for the Afrikaner.

Among former members of the security establishment who play key roles in the white revolutionary movement are:

- Colonel Servaas de Wet, a former member of the SAP [South African Police] and one-time bodyguard of former State President John Vorster. He is commandant-general of the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement] commandos and deputy leader of Magsaksie Afrikaner-Nasionalisme, formed to patrol the streets of Pretoria.
- Brigadier Theuns "Rooi Rus" Swanepoel, a former policeman and commander of Aquila, the former military wing of the AWB which now fulfills a security function and guards AWB leaders and property.
- Keith Conroy, an Irishman believed to have been trained by the British SAS and military training commander of Aquila members in the Cape.

Anti-Semitic

Mr Conroy has been named as a distributor of the anti-Semitic publication Cape Rebel.

- Colonel Poon Jacobs, retired SADF [South African Defense Forces] officer and commander of the AWB/Boerestaat Party joint commando.
- Hendrik Steyn, one-time regimental sergeant-major in the SADF, is a former organiser of Blanke Veiligheid (White Security), a Welkom vigilante group.

Mr Steyn, a mine captain was arrested in June in connection with the bombing of the Welkom offices of the NUM [National Union of Mineworkers].

Eugene TerreBlanche, a former SAP sergeant who heads the AWB.

Three national servicemen appeared in court in April in connection with the arms theft from Air Force headquarters in Pretoria for which fugitive Piet "Skiet" Rudolph, deputy leader of the Boerestaart Party, has claimed responsibility.

According to report, right-wing leaders are confident they have the support of the rank and file in the SADF and SAP.

Leaders such as Mr Rudolph and Robert van Tonder, the Boerestaart Party leader, have claimed publicly that the right could count on support of the majority of officers and men in the security forces.

Koos van der Merwe, CP [Conservative Party] MP [Member of Parliament] for Overvaal, recently said the majority in the security forces supported the CP.

Among the militarist movements named are the Witkommando (White Commando), responsible for a series of bomb blasts; the Wit Bevydingsleer (White Freedom Army), which claimed responsibility for the Johannesburg taxi-rank bomb blast on July 6; and the underground Nazi organisation called the Afrikaner National Socialist Movement. Its head, Koos Vermeulen, celebrates Hitler's birthday every year.

Others are: Orde van die Dood (Order of Death), which planned to kill President de Klerk and three Cabinet Ministers; Orde Boerevolk (Order of the Boer People), which claimed responsibility for the Melrose House bomb blast in May and appears to be headed by Piet Rudolph.

Declared War

The Boere Weerstandsbeweging (the Boer Resistance Movement), the "military wing" of the BSP (Boerestaart Party?); the BSP itself, which has declared war on the Government; and the Blanke Front (the White Front).

Not named in the report, but known to exist, is the Afrikaner Fascist Coalition, a new right-wing group based in Pretoria.

Known militarist groups include the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and the Boere Vryheidsbeweging (Boer Freedom Movement). A former member of the latter, Leon van Rensburg, was arrested last month in connection with various bomb blasts. He is a technical control officer at Pelindaba, an Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] subsidiary.

Lesser known groups on the Right, but which are not necessarily military in character, are listed by the independent board.

They are:

- The Gemeente vandie Verbondsvolk (Congregation of Covenant People). Based in the western Transvaal,

the group adheres to the belief that the "lost tribes of Israel" are not Jews, but Afrikaners. The movement's main protagonist is Ds F. W. Naser of Vereeniging.

- The Flaminke (Flamingoes), a vigilante group in Odendaalsrus and Virginia. A spokesman, CP supporter Davis Naude, claims a membership of 2,500.
- The Odal Clan, which was the youth wing of the Anglo-Afrikaner Bond, formed by former Hitler Youth member Rudolph Schmidt. He recruited white children to work for racial domination and white purity.

Hitler His Hero

One of the last known leaders of the Odal Clan was Jan Posthumus, whose heroes he once named as Hitler, Mussolini and Hendrik Verwoerd.

- Wereld Apartheidsbeweging (World Apartheid Movement) which claims affiliations to dozens of right-wing organisations worldwide. It claims to produce right-wing propaganda in seven languages.
- Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners (Association of Real Afrikaners), whose representatives met President de Klerk last month.
- Brandwag (Sentinel), a vigilante group in Brits formed by former AWB executive member Manie Maritz. It patrols and guards the properties of whites.
- Blanke Veiligheid (White Security) formed in Welkom in February ostensibly to fight crime by patrolling the streets.

The IBIRR report shows that most right-wing groupings were also openly anti-Semitic, and reflected a sharp increase in the number of anti-Jewish incidents.

* English-Speaking Members

90AF0505B Johannesburg SUNDAY STAR
in English 22 Jul 90 p 15

[Article by Patrick Bulger: "English-Speakers Flock to the 'Boer' Side"]

[Text] Street, Howell, Stopforth...one could be forgiven for thinking that English-speaking South Africans are in the vanguard of attempts to establish a Boerestaat.

As the above names suggest, almost all the rightwingers detained or arrested recently are either English-speaking or have English origins.

Political observers and spokesmen for the various right-wing organisations confirmed this week that English speakers were joining the right-wing movements in droves.

"I was astonished by the high percentage of English-speaking South Africans I came across in the right-wing movements," said Wim Booyse, a political consultant who has just completed a major study of the Right in South Africa.

"If you look at the names of the people who have been arrested so far, they are almost all English-speakers," Mr Booyse said.

Right-wing Boksburg firebrand Beyers de Klerk is, in spite of his name, of Scottish origin.

"I think in English and I pray in English. I am an English-speaking Boer," Mr de Klerk told the SUNDAY STAR.

He said there was "a vast number of English-speaking rightwingers in the country—especially in Natal".

The English people, he noted, had always kept themselves "apart" as a separate nation. "Our forefathers did not integrate. They believed in keeping our bloodline clean."

Andrew Ford, leader of the Boere Weerstandsbeweging—armed wing of the Boerestaat Party—said his organisation had "plenty of English-speaking people."

Mr Ford, whose mother was Afrikaans and whose father was English, said: "We are prepared to accept anyone who wants to live the way we do. We don't only have Afrikaans in our society. The English will have a vote."

"We also speak English at our meetings. The English realise what is happening in our country and that it is falling under communist domination."

A spokesman for the World Apartheid Movement said the organisation had "a big crowd of English-speaking members."

Conservative Party leaders—the party most rightwingers chose as their formal political home—often break into English at their meetings.

They also break into song quite often. Pamphlets with the words of songs left on the seats at their gatherings also boast some English tunes.

But while rightist fervour rises to a pitch with renditions of "die Lied van Jong Suid Afrika" it takes the dedication only a convert can muster to drum up any militancy at all with the lines of "My Bonnie Lies over the Ocean."

* Commentator Views Disunity in ANC Ranks

90AF0495A Cape Town CAPE TIMES
in English 16 Jul 90 p 6

[Article by Ken Owen]

[Text] The fissures are starting to show in the ranks of the ANC [African National Congress] and its supporting network of trade unions and front organizations, although it requires the techniques of Kremlinology to make sense of the disputes.

A good starting point is Comrade Pallo Jordan's attack, in an obscure journal called "Transformation", on Comrade Joe Slovo. The burden of Jordan's argument is that Slovo remains, if not a Stalinist, then an apologist for

Stalinism who will not subject socialism to the rigorous examination demanded by its degeneration into corrupt tyranny.

Jordan is an unusually interesting man who, unlike many ANC leaders, has a fine, well-trained mind. In Paris last year, called on at short notice to address the national Assembly in the place of Thabo Mbeki (who failed to turn up), he delivered a deliciously provocative commentary on the French revolution which held his audience spell-bound.

His French hosts, still basking in the distant glory of 1779, were nonplussed when he shifted the focus of decade forward, to a time when revolutionary terror had persuaded the French to accept the military dictatorship of Napoleon as a lesser evil.

I wondered at the time whether he was addressing himself to the French, to Idasa's amiable but harmless liberals, or to the ANC itself. A few days later, the question arose again when he interrupted my standard liberal harangue on the freedom of the press to say (to my great alarm), "I agree with Ken".

Now he has done it again, dismissing as untrue Slovo's protestations that the South African Communist Party [SACP], in contrast to the European parties, managed to avoid the excesses of Stalinism.

"Firstly," says Jordan, "there is too much evidence to the contrary. Any regular reader of the SACP's publications can point to a consistent pattern of praise and support for every violation of freedom perpetrated by the Soviet leadership, both before and after the death of Stalin..."

"Secondly, the political culture nurtured by the SACP's leadership over the years has produced a spirit of intolerance, petty intellectual thuggery and political dissembling among its membership..."

Of course, it pleases me that Pallo Jordan says these things, though I wouldn't wish him to agree with me too often. However, the really interesting thing about this direct attack on Slovo and the party leadership is that it echoes what Fatima Meer, Nelson Mandela's biographer, said about the loss of the democratic content in what is laughingly called the Mass Democratic Movement.

Her theme was taken up by the UDF [United Democratic Front]'s Faried Esack who discerned within the MDM "fascist tendencies" that led to the rubbishing of parliamentary democracy and civil liberties as "bourgeois luxuries". (Esack has accused me of "quoting selectively" from his 19-page lecture, but he is a singularly honest young man and has not withdrawn or repudiated any of its criticism.)

All this internal criticism is the tip of an iceberg, and sometimes difficult to interpret. For example, Jordan makes the argument that the Soviet Communist Party had moments of choice when it might have escaped the

path to Stalinism, but chose wrongly. He seems thus to be trying to exonerate socialism from the charge that it is necessarily and inherently totalitarian.

However, he may have another purpose in mind: to blame the individual leaders of the SACP for the "fascist tendencies", the "intellectual thuggery", for the dissembling, and ultimately for the murders and the tortures committed by the ANC-SACP alliance.

If no choice exists, socialism is inherently flawed; if there is a choice, the leaders are flawed. Which is it? Where is the source of this intellectual thuggery? Obviously, South African society at large has a compelling interest in the answer.

The debate is complicated by the divisions within the movement on racial questions, with some leaders leaning heavily towards the Africanist, or black nationalist, stance of the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] ("One settler, one bullet"), and others cleaving to non-racialism. It is an old line of cleavage.

The SACP, indeed, takes credit from time to time for upholding the non-racialism of ANC policy even though—despite the prominence of Slovo, MacMaharaj, Aziz Pahad, Albie Sachs and others—the leadership of the party is now said to be predominantly African. Certainly the rank and file is overwhelmingly African, and linked now to the union movement.

This raises further difficulties of analysis. The Stalinist faction in the SACP is blamed (by Esack, among others) for directing its intellectual thuggery against "worker-ists" who tend to put union interests above the party's interests, and who therefore stray from the party line.

There has been considerable talk in union circles, of varying levels of credibility, about the exclusion of Cyril Ramaphosa from the ANC's negotiating team (supposedly on the grounds that Ramaphosa over-played his hand when Nelson Mandela was released from prison).

In the background, one may discern developing personal rivalries that would pit Ramaphosa, with his power base in the National Union of Mineworkers, against men like the intelligent and polished Thabo Mbeki (whose father has been a life-long communist, but whose own views are said to be more moderate).

Disorganization

Finally, I think, there is a paranoid fear, understandable in underground movements, of spies, infiltrators, and police agents. Both Umkhonto we Sizwe and the ANC have intelligence units which compete with each other in the pursuit of spies, and which have both been responsible for atrocities.

All of this exists in an atmosphere of disorganization, policy dispute, nepotism and personal ambition, an unpromising mix for a liberation movement which is trying to become a political party. The events in Eastern Europe have, I am told, been a dreadful shock to the

SACP members, who are now trying to scramble towards democratic high ground—just as Nelson Mandela has scrambled from the sinking wreck of Eastern Europe to an America economic lifeboat.

Meanwhile, of course, the methods of totalitarianism learned during the long tutelage of the SACP and the Comintern carry forward; the killing goes on. Dissidents voice their dissent, but scurry fearfully away when that dissent is published. On the picket lines, the label of "scab" is a death sentence.

This sort of mess can be sorted out only by exposing the Mass Democratic Movement, including the ANC and its rider, to public inspection. Not even the members of the Communist Party can still say with any confidence that they all belong in the same organization; the ANC is a conglomerate, and the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] is little more than a collective noun.

Meanwhile, for such a crowd to talk of its "policies", whether on economics or on such bourgeois rubbish as parliamentary democracy, is a farce; for its leaders to pretend to be a government-in-waiting is more so.

To agree to transfer power is one thing; to find somebody capable of wielding it is quite another. The MDM and all its parts simply don't qualify.

* PAC's Impact on Political Developments Viewed

* Consultative Conference

90AF0493A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 13-19 Jul 90 p 6

[Article: "The PAC Factor"—first paragraph is THE NEW NATION's introduction]

[Text] The PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] held its first consultative conference in Johannesburg last week. Among the issues discussed at the conference was the organisation's position on negotiations. NEW NATION examines this and what impact the PAC is likely to have on future political developments in the country.

A week after its first internal consultative conference, the Pan Africanist Congress' stance on negotiations remains unclear.

Its conference resolutions are still under wraps, ostensibly to give the PAC National Executive Committee (NEC) a chance to examine them.

What is unanimous within the alliance of organisations present at the conference is the flat rejection of the ANC/SACP [African National Congress] (South African Communist Party) contact with the government.

But even the explanation advanced in support of this rejection runs into serious problems when viewed against the PAC's overall position on contact with the government.

According to the PAC's discussion document, "On a negotiated political settlement", a negotiated settlement is only possible under certain conditions, which it articulates in the form of three demands:

- straightforward majority rule;
- the redistribution of resources, particularly land; and
- a constituent assembly (CA) based on one person, one vote, on a common voters' role of "Azanians" 18 years and older.

The paper does not make it clear whether the PAC wants these demands to be met in concrete terms or whether the organisation would be satisfied with a simple in-principle commitment on these issues from the government.

From discussion with one PAC leader, it appears that the former option spells out the PAC position more clearly.

It says that, when the conditions defined by the three demands exist, the government would have effectively been defeated and would no longer be in a position to rule.

It could therefore be inferred that, when the PAC's conditions are met, there would effectively be a vacuum, with no government and governing institutions in place. Yet, none of its documents spell out how the country would be governed in the transition period.

However, the PAC says it is only when these conditions exist that it will enter into negotiations to eradicate apartheid and end the conflict.

It does not say who it plans to negotiate with in the absence of a government or what substantive issues it hopes to negotiate.

This also raises the question of the election of the CA and the administration of such an election.

While going into detail on the mechanics of how a CA will function, it provides scant detail on the actual administration of the election of the assembly. Its documents go no further on this question than to say that "it is only the masses who can implement a CA in the context of struggle".

One of the most precise details yet to emerge from the PAC position on the CA is that the assembly should be made up of 265 seats. But nowhere does it explain the arithmetic used in arriving at this figure.

There is also no clarity on the precise mechanics of how land would be redistributed and whether this would be an immediate or long-term objective. Linked to the land question is whether white farmers, currently producing the country's food, should be driven off the farms and replaced with Africans, who have not farmed on any meaningful scale since they were dispossessed by white settlers.

It must also be asked: who will administer the redistribution of land?

In the absence of answers and clarity on these issues, the PAC's rejection of contact between the government and the ANC as opportunistic, carries little weight.

So too does its claim that current talks about talks are aimed at sharing the "government only".

The ANC has, on numerous occasions, stated that contact of the Groote Schuur-type was only aimed at removing the obstacles to negotiations and that substantive negotiations will be aimed at nothing less than the transfer of power to the people, not just the parliamentary institution of the state.

Just how widely the PAC position will impact on the direction of political events, including negotiations, also depends on the support it can generate for its policies.

While it claims to have had more than 1,000 delegates at its consultative conference, the PAC has yet to quantify this in terms of the size of the constituency represented at the weekend meeting.

There has as yet been no scientific evidence of the extent of its mass support. Its most organised constituency, Nactu, claims a paid-up membership of under 200,000. However, these are not necessarily PAC supporters.

PAC rallies have not attracted significantly large numbers. There is also no evidence of a substantially-organised civic, youth or student sector.

The PAC's active opposition to the recent national stayaway to protest against violence in Natal pointed to limited support for the organisation. The stayaway, called by the ANC and its allies, was highly successful, indicating that the majority of people had ignored the PAC call.

In the absence of solid organisation on the ground and a clear political programme of action, the question must be asked: how much has the PAC changed from the early 1960's?

* Options as ANC Rival

90AF0493B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 13-19 Jul 90 p 7

[Article by Gary van Staden, a senior research officer at the SA Institute of International Affairs: "The Outbidding Position"]

[Text] In February this year, movements such as the African National Congress [ANC], Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC] and the South African Communist Party [SACP] were unbanned and leaders such as Nelson Mandela were released.

In so doing, the South African government unleashed forces which were to fundamentally alter the political environment. The key process was a "negotiated settlement", and the decision by the ANC to participate in this process did not meet with universal approval.

The major concern was—and continues to be—that the government was not seriously considering handing over power, but was looking to buy itself some breathing space, particularly where its foreign debt was concerned.

While a number of organisations articulated that concern, it was the PAC which was billed as the organisation most likely to gain from any disenchantment among ANC supporters.

Before attempting to understand where the PAC may be going, it is necessary to briefly examine the conditions present in the South African political environment and changes within the movement itself during the 1980s. These conditions and changes played an important part in the organisation's revival.

Some of the more important were:

- high quality leadership;
- the growth of African nationalism;
- the revival of PAC-inspired insurgency;
- the expansion of its international contacts and increasing financial support; and
- high levels of state repression.

Recently a new factor has been added to the list—the willingness of the ANC to seek a negotiated settlement.

But for the PAC to grow at the ANC's expense, the situation demands that the PAC gain maximum benefit from the "outbidding position" (giving people the message they most want to hear) it has assumed on the issue of negotiations.

The crunch for the PAC is that it can maintain this position while negotiations remain in the preliminary of pre-bargaining stage.

The instant the negotiations become substantive (they concern the actual distribution of power) the PAC has two options.

It can opt to stay out because it is strong enough to prevent the implementation of any agreement which may merge, or it can join the process and negotiate for a share of power, but that would mean conceding its "outbidding" advantage.

Two issues are apparent. First, the PAC is not strong enough to prevent the implementation of any agreement which may emerge from a bargaining process.

While no conclusive empirical test of the PAC's actual ground strength exists, it seems fairly safe to assume that it does not command majority support.

This implies that the PAC can only maintain its "outbidding" position while the negotiation process remains in its early stages.

Once substantive bargaining begins, the PAC must insist on joining the process or become marginalised. That was perhaps the real message of the disputed PAC document on negotiations, which raised such a storm recently.

The second issue is that the PAC seems unable to maximise the potential profits of its "outbidding" position. This is partly due to a lack of exposure (except in the negative context of a threat to the ANC) and partly because the major mechanism for maximising its advantage—remains unavailable.

Because the PAC regards itself as the true revolutionary element of the South African liberation movement, its exiled leadership is unable to return without losing face.

In addition, there is the possibility that, should the exiled leadership return it could fail to match the response generated by the returning ANC leaders.

It is for the PAC's leadership to weigh up the options, the advantages and disadvantages, and decide on a course of action. The "outbidding" advantage will not last much beyond the first quarter of next year, so there is not a lot of time available.

The advantages of an early return of its exiled leaders are considerable. The PAC will gain much needed "positive" exposure.

Its leadership, particularly men such as Johnson Mlambo, Gora Ebrahim, Joe Mkwazi and Lesoana Makhandia, are extremely talented and powerful personalities, who could mobilise and galvanise support for the PAC on a significant scale.

The extent of its revival depends almost entirely on what the PAC does next. The revival, whatever its extent to date, has clearly begun to run out of steam and needs a decisive injection to keep it going.

As regards the potential threat of this revival to the dominant position currently occupied by the ANC, there is some space for tentative conclusions.

Once again, much will depend on how the PAC works to maximise its advantages. However, even if these are used to maximum effect, it seems unlikely that the PAC could emerge as a real threat. But no one will know for sure how much support the PAC commands until the people of South Africa are given the opportunity to decide.

In broad terms, the PAC's position on the issue of negotiations has shown signs of shifting, even before the release of the contentious document on the issue recently.

While remaining adamant that the time is not ripe to enter into a negotiation process, the PAC has not ruled out the possibility of negotiations at some future date. It simply cannot afford to do so.

Current thinking among the PAC leadership is that the regime is out to buy itself some time and space to manoeuvre rather than seriously considering handing

over power to a black majority. Under such circumstances, the organisations continues to insist that certain conditions are met before it will agree to enter any negotiation process.

The PAC is thus clearly prepared to involve itself in a negotiation process but not in one which would mean comprising its principles.

A mechanism which could substantially improve the PAC's chances of mounting a real challenge to the ANC would be the formation of a broad alliance between all organisations and parties which oppose negotiations.

Such an alliance is unlikely due to the considerable differences in ideology, strategy and tactics which exist between the PAC and, for example, the Black Consciousness movements. Nor is there any real prospect of the PAC significantly improving its base among the unionised workforce.

Cosatu remains far larger than its counterpart, Nactu, and Cosatu's loyalty to the mass democratic movement is unquestionable.

The PAC has its work cut out if it wants to replace the ANC as the major political force in South Africa today and one which ultimately may not succeed.

* International Representation

90AF0493C Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 13-19 Jul 90 p 7

[Article: "An Official in Britain"]

[Text] Unlike the ANC [African National Congress], the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] office in Britain is not listed in the phone book. The telephone number, once obtained, does not work.

Repeated requests for an interview this week with the organisation's chief representative in Britain, Nyembezi R. Mzotane, brought no replies.

NEW NATION finally tracked him down to the offices of a controversial Trotskyist-dominated faction in the anti-apartheid movement, known as the "City Group".

With the PAC's phone out of operation, he was using theirs.

Controlled by the self-styled Revolutionary Communist Group, the City Group is notorious for disrupting—sometimes violently—meetings organised by the official Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM).

Although the faction organised the 24-hour "Free Mandela" picket outside South Africa House in Trafalgar Square, its fight with the pro-ANC AAM has seen it move close to the PAC.

"Victory to the ANC, victory to SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] . Victory to the PAC,

victory to Azapo [Azanian People's Organization]," has been the City Group slogan in making this shift.

Mzotane gave high praise for the City faction, describing it as non-sectarian, but he had harsh words for the official AAM.

"With all the money that the AAM collects, it supports one organisation [the ANC] at the expense of the other.

"Most British trade unions and [anti-apartheid] organisations are under the influence of the AAM and this is a big problem," he added.

Discrimination against the PAC was also alleged by Mzotane in explaining why his organisation had not achieved the same high international profile as the ANC.

"The problem is not with us," he said. "Those who want to be accommodated in the structures of the imperialist regimes will be treated as a political darling by the Western world.

"We are not fighting for reform and concessions like the ANC, and it is a sure case that the oppressors will not love Azanian people fighting for the return of the land and the seizure of power.

"ANC is regarded as a reasonable organisation [internationally] and the PAC is regarded as radical. We regard ourselves as realists."

Mzotane said that, in Africa, both the PAC and ANC were recognised and given equal treatment.

But he complained bitterly about the ANC's refusal to share platforms with the PAC internationally, unless it had no choice, as at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations.

Describing an OAU meeting last May which heard calls for the two movements "to stop bickering and quarrelling", Mzotane said that PAC chairman Johnson Mlambo had given a positive reply.

"But ANC president comrade Oliver Tambo said in response that—all I quote—although co-operation was necessary, it was not essential," he alleged.

The PAC representative said that his organisation would "very soon" be opening an office in Lusaka. This followed improved relations with Zambia, such as Mlambo being invited to address the ruling UNIP [United National Independence Party] party last year.

Mzotane said that the work of the PAC's external wing, which includes its entire central committee based in Dar es Salaam, was to prosecute armed struggle and diplomatic issues.

The PAC has some 13 offices around the world, compared to the more than 30 run by the ANC.

The organisation's missions are based in Britain, West Germany, Australia, New York, Dar es Salaam, Nigeria, Guinea Conakry, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Egypt and Iraq.

Asked if the PAC's relations with China had changed after last year's massacre in Tianamen Square, Mzotane said that nothing had altered: "China has been a friend and continues to be a friend."

Recent United States-Soviet co-operation in settling regional conflicts did not affect the PAC, because neither country had supported the organisation.

"There are no approaches from them trying to get us to put off armed struggle."

NEW NATION asked the PAC representative how his organisation responded to the new situation in South Africa.

"Changes inside occupied Azania have to be clarified," he said. "When the racist settler president [FW] de Klerk unbanned the PAC and other organisations, he took a step back to before 1960."

"So, in terms of forward movement, he has not moved an inch."

Mzotane conceded, however, that the PAC could now organise aboveground in the country.

Pressed as to the conditions required before the organisation would send some of its external forces to assist the internal work, he said that the PAC leadership would decide when the time was ripe.

"It is not a priority for us to get exiles returned, although a committee has been set up to investigate the issue."

Mzotane said he was not party to the work of the committee and did not know what it was doing. This was part of a long-term programme, but there was no specific timetable.

Asked how many exiles fell under the PAC, he replied: "One cannot estimate strength in terms of numbers."

He indicated that the PAC would reject having to get clearance from Pretoria for people to return home, considering that the movement had been unbanned.

On negotiations, Mzotane said that his president, Zephaniah Mothopeng, had stated that the PAC could not be a party to negotiations at the moment.

"Five pillars supporting apartheid must go if negotiations are to take place. These are non-negotiables," said the representative to Britain.

The five were the Land and Group Areas Acts, the tri-cameral parliament, the bantustan system, and bantu education.

Unlike the internal PAC leadership, he did not mention majority rule and the election of a constituent assembly as preconditions.

The PAC's political programme remained "forward movement, fighting for the national liberation and self-determination of the oppressed and exploited masses of Azania."

Asked about PAC campaigns and activities in Britain this year, Mzotane said that an event was planned for Womens Day on August 9.

* Presence of Clandestine Far Right Groups Noted

90AF0506A Johannesburg SUNDAY STAR
MAGAZINE in English 22 Jul 90 pp 6, 8-13

[Article: "When the Flag Comes Down; Cold Steel, Silent Bullets"]

[Text] For most South Africans, the right-wing threat means the AWB [Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging] and other vigilante groups associated with it in style and method. But who has heard of the shadowy groups operating even further to the right? In an exclusive series of interviews for SUNDAY, Chris Barron met men who claimed to be leaders of paramilitary organisations no-one had previously interviewed. At no stage was he able to identify these men. He discovered a chilling tale of ex-recces and former policemen who said they were ready to take action to restore the old Boer republics by means of assassinations and urban terrorism. Their aim: to make the country ungovernable. Who trains these groups? Barron was told that instructors from the IRA [Irish Republican Army] and the British SAS are in the country training groups of men. The IRA, in a recent telex to newspapers, confirmed that they have established their 'newest operation headquarters' here. How seriously do we need to take these publicity-shy right-wing groups? Asked to comment, the SAP [South African Police] said: 'The SAP is fully aware of various far-right groups and individuals who propagate violence. The activities of the above groups and individuals are monitored on a continuous basis. Various criminal cases, of which some are sub judice, have been brought to court in the Witwatersrand, Pretoria and the OFS [Orange Free State] involving extreme far-right supporters. The SAP view all incidents of political violence in a very serious light and full attention is given to them.' In spite of a lack of evidence as to the effectiveness of these groups, Chris Barron was convinced that in intent they were deadly serious and had the means to carry out their plans. Readers can decide for themselves.

Priesta is two metres tall and physically imposing. For three years he fought in the operational area and beyond as a member of an SADF [South African Defense Force] recce unit—the creme de la creme of South Africa's combat forces and equal in military expertise and training to the most elite fighting units anywhere in the world. Now in his thirties, he is a farmer in the northern

Transvaal and cell leader of a non-AWB right-wing military organisation dedicated to resisting black majority rule in South Africa and to re-establishing the old Boer republics of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Vryheid in northern Natal.

In spite of his size, a pair of black woolen gloves and a sinister-looking brown balaclava pulled down over his head and neck, Priesta's attitude as he sits opposite me in a house in Benoni is neither intimidating nor threatening. In fact it is precisely his almost self-effacing manner his unexcited, evenly-modulated voice and the complete absence of any AWB-type swagger and bravado that makes what he says so disturbing.

"We're a resistance movement and we have cells throughout the country from Cape Town to Messina. We have established cells in the Cape, many more in the Transvaal, many in Natal and many in the Free State. Each cell has about 100 people, and we have about 12,000 people altogether. We have nothing to do with the AWB or any other party or organisation. We know there is sympathy for our cause in South America, especially Paraguay, and in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Scandinavia and Spain, and we have also established links with blacks outside our borders as well as inside. We have instructors helping us here from the IRA, from Belgium and from Israel, as well as from SAS (Britain's crack Special Air Services force). We have about 240 ex-recce in our group, and also some police officers. About 15 percent of our members are CF [Citizens Force] commando people. We have access to all the weapons we need.

"I myself was trained in SWA [South West Africa] by an IRA instructor in urban terrorism. This is what we're concentrating on. This and "silent death". We do have short lists, so yes, what we could see are assassinations aimed at specific targets. In the first stage our targets in this country will be the Afrikaner Broederbond, the liberal press, and Freemasons (Priesta's movement is not alone among right-wing movements in believing the government is under the influence of Freemasons, some of the country's most senior of which, they claim, are members of the Cabinet). There are another three targets which I cannot mention. We are not going for the Jewish community.'

Along with other right-wing movements, Priesta's organisation believes in what has come to be known as the government's 'four-finger plan'. According to this the government has committed itself to a four-stage transfer of power to a black majority by December 1991.

'The moment the South African flag comes down our movement will start operating,' says Priesta. 'I know for a fact that the majority of the army and the police are not loyal to the government. If it came to a choice between and ANC and us, they would be on our side. That is for sure.'

Klaas was a member of the SADF from 1969 to 1983. For most of this time he was a recce and when PW

Botha's reform initiatives provoked him to quit he was a captain. Now he is a qualified engineer and the leader of a right-wing cell on the East Rand numbering more than 150 men. His cell is not part of the AWB. It has informal links with other non-AWB right-wing resistance groups among which he moves as an instructor.

At this stage, says Klaas of the broad resistance movement throughout the country, numbers are of secondary importance. 'What is important is that we have the methods, the infrastructure, the logistics...the lines are in place. We know exactly what we're going to do with our wives and children. If we want food we will know where to get it, weapons, we know where to get them, medical supplies, we can get them. We have some of the best doctors among our people. For example in one cell in the northern Cape we have a doctor, a dentist and a vet. We spend a lot of time discussing these things and our drills have all been worked on for a long time now. If there is no link where we feel there should be one then we create it. It doesn't have to operate right now, but the point is we know it is there when needed. People always say, "die boer maak 'n plan", but that is wrong. Die boere maak nie planne nie, die boere het planne.

'What matters now is not the numbers but the fact that we have an infrastructure ready and waiting. When they start integrating Umkhonto we Sizwe with the SADF you'll have many very high-ranking people leaving. They won't have jobs anymore, but we'll have posts waiting for them.

'We're not going to be taken by surprise. We've covered all facets. Many people were impressed by the AWB people who drilled for the press, but these are just ordinary guys off the street. Many of the people in my cell are guys who served with me and under me in the SADF, and they have had specialist military training.'

Oompie is an ex-AWB man. Now in his fifties he is the leader of a vigilante-type group in Delmas, a 300-strong group which he prefers to call 'a freelance, safety-conscious group of people.' Blacks in the area call them 'the khaki commando'. They say they're not scared of the police—they're scared of the khaki commando.

The members of Oompie's group all have regular jobs—they include farmers and businessmen as well as clerks and artisans. Not a few are also members of local CF commando units. They have regular training sessions, assisted for the last two years by ex-recce captain, Klaas. The group has no formal links with the local police, 'although we do work with them sometimes', says Oompie. As an example he tells of the time a crowd of squatters began establishing themselves in the area. He received a call and within half-an-hour had assembled his 'hard core' men. They sent a legal advisor to the SAP inquiring what the police intended doing about the situation. The answer was not entirely satisfactory, so the legal advisor was sent back to the police with the message: if the squatters had not been moved out by 4pm (this was just before midday) then Oompie's men would

clear the place themselves. Within an hour the police had arrived with their riot gear and by 2pm the area was 'clean'. While the police were busy their commander chatted to Oompie. He told Oompie: 'If I am ever told to arrest you or point my gun at you, I will lay it down'. 'When the clearing operation was complete 'We gave his men a braai and a couple of beers, and the atmosphere became quite friendly. Our experience of the SAP is that, under the top brass, these people are largely with us. The experience in 1922 when Smuts used government forces against the (white) strikers—this will not happen this time. Even if they don't go with us, they will never be actively involved against us.'

Oompie tells of a 'bosparty' which is held twice a year and attended by 'a number of high-ranking people'. 'We have discussions. Last year we had three such meetings. Usually they're from Saturday morning to Sunday evening. From these discussions I can tell you that while these people would not be prepared to get involved in a coup, they are with us 100 percent.'

Trying to predict the course far right-wing resistance may take is in itself a highly hazardous activity but certainly less hazardous than ignoring the issue altogether, and the use of historical parallels is probably the best way of proceeding. The most popular seem to be the Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914 and the Ossewa Brandwag of 1939-43, but one huge difference between these events and those of today largely invalidates them as a means of predicting our future. Neither of these attempts to overthrow the government met with any support or encouragement whatever from the political powers of the right-wing movements involved. In 1914 both JBM Hertzog the former President Steyn of the OFS were strongly opposed to the rebellion of the generals. This opposition significantly deprived their efforts of legitimacy and in the event only a small minority took up arms against the government and were easily dealt with by Prime Minister Louis Botha. In the case of the OB, Van Rensburg was fiercely opposed by DF Malan, who believed the Afrikaners would look to constitutional means for the realisation of their hopes. No such opposition to right-wing militants has been forthcoming from Dr Andries Treurnicht and the reason for this is crucial for a consideration of present probabilities. In the words of controversial erstwhile Unisa political scientist Professor Willem Kleynhans: 'For the first time we now have a situation where Afrikaners perceive a real threat to their very existence.' And, in the more succinct words of one right-wing source: 'When your survival is at stake you don't play by the rules.'

[photographs not reproduced] (Clockwise from left): A pre-De Klerk AWB poster photographed in mid-Johannesburg bears a grim threat; AWB signage on a Namibian vehicle; a right-wing poster campaign, June 1987, calls for 'all non-whites' to be 'repatriated'. The Blanke Bevrydings Beweging (BBB) until then unknown, placed the posters; retired General Constand Viljoen and (bottom, left) General Charles de Gaulle, who ignored

warnings that loyalty for his government within the armed forces was evaporating, until a coup attempt came close to toppling him.

It is in considering some of the major factors involved in the Algerian Civil War (at the height between 1958-62) perhaps, that we come closest to trends which are becoming discernible in our own situation. The whites of Algeria (called the 'pieds noirs') constituted one tenth of the local population but owned nine tenths of the land and wealth. At one end of the political spectrum were the liberals who supported reform. These were predominantly from the professional, wealthy classes for whom transfer to the motherland, should the going get tough, would be massively inconvenient, no doubt, and would mean a less luxurious life-style, but would not be the end of the world. At the other end were the die-hard conservatives, (the 'ultras'), who came mostly from the lower end of the professional and social scale. A lack of material and cultural wherewithal made the idea of starting life anew, even in the motherland, unthinkable, and for them any change in the status quo was anathema.

They believed Algeria had been created out of nothing by their own sweat, blood and toil and that of their forefathers. They had 'won' the title deeds to this land in the hardest way possible and swore that only over their dead bodies would they surrender it by acceding to Algerian independence.

The historical argument—that the land of the Boer republics was uninhabited and bare when their Voortrekker forefathers moved in—is one of the main arguments deployed by the far right to justify their stand against black government. Their other main argument is religious and, along with the historical, is recited with absolute conviction by virtually every far right-wing Afrikaner you talk to. Supported by quotations from the Old Testament, this argument has it that the arrival of whites in South Africa was no mere coincidence. God intended them to play a divine role here as torchbearers of Christianity and provide a bastion against heathenism. Communism is one aspect of this heathenism and they see the fight against Communism in quasi-religious terms. Their fight against black government is as much a fight against Communism as a fight to retain their God-given identity as Boers.

The pieds noirs too believed they were a bastion of Western civilisation against the Communist threat, an attitude held most strongly by the armed forces in Algeria: 'We want to halt the decadence of the West and the march of Communism,' said a parabat colonel at the time. 'This is our duty, the real duty of the army.'

Right up to the time they began talks with the Algerian liberation movement, the FLN, the French government in Paris seemed to back the arguments and desires of the pieds noirs to the hilt. Its oft-stated policy was: 'No independence for Algeria, there is no question of Algeria being anything other than French.' It promised the pieds noirs it would never 'negotiate with terrorists.' No

attempt was made to prepare the *pieds noirs* for what the government had already, secretly, begun to realise was inevitable. When talks began 'traitors' and 'sell-outs' became effective rallying cries for ultra resistance movements. The ultras were imperiously ignored by de Gaulle who made little effort to talk them out of their fears. President de Klerk's gravest mistake, says Professor Kleyhans, is to 'assume in a blind way that his people are still with him.' He is scrapping one measure after another with no consultation of the Nat rank and file. The government has made no attempt to educate its followers.

De Gaulle ignored warnings that loyalty for his government within the armed forces was evaporating, until a coup attempt by senior generals came close to toppling him. A major difference between the *pieds noirs* and our own ultra-rights is that they commanded the kind of massive financial, media and top-rung military support that the latter have no hope of getting. This made a coup a very practical possibility for the *pieds noirs* whereas, in spite of coup-like noises from the likes of Boerestaat leader Robert van Tonder, commentators, as well as most right-wing leaders themselves accept that this is not an option here. General Bob Rogers, chief of the South African Air Force until 1979 and now Democratic Party spokesman for Defence, admits that 'there is widespread emotional support for the CP [Conservative Party] in the SADF,' but 'whether this would lead to them taking up arms against the government is another matter.' He says a coup would be 'virtually impossible' because support of it would be too 'scattered' and large-scale involvement of the general staff, 'without which a coup could not happen', would not be forthcoming.

Right-wing leaders, among them HNP [Reformed National Party] leader Jaap Marais, stress the significance to right-wing forces of support from Citizen Force commandos and especially of CF commando structures 'that have been created over the last 20 to 30 years and can be activated at a moment's notice.' It is true that CF commando units constitute 80 percent of the army (only seven percent is Permanent Force) and that theoretically the threat they pose is important. Strategically they are well placed.

Their *raison d'être* is internal security in their own areas, which means they are intimately acquainted with the lay-out and systems of those areas. They would know the vital points to go for. They are fully trained. But, says an expert source with close links in the CF, inquiries in the Transvaal and OFS suggest there would 'not be vast support' from this source for a right-wing coup attempt, and 'unless there is at least 50 percent support from the armed forces they can forget it.'

'A small number does not present a danger. They can easily be crushed. Any attempt to form up for a coup would make them a large target and they don't have access to the heavy weaponry and enormous supplies of ammunition which would be necessary.'

When the coup option had been exhausted in Algeria it was the turn of terror. The *pieds noirs* had as their leader a restaurateur called Joe Ortiz. He was a rabble-rouser par excellence and his supporters took to wearing khaki shorts with armbands bearing the Celtic Cross, as obvious a fascist symbol as the AWB's triple seven. They were well-equipped with weapons which they kept at home, they were shaped into a fairly well-disciplined para-military militia and held regular training sessions. For many months before their first open actions there were mysterious disappearances of arms and ammunition from territorial arms depots. Here, of course, one thinks of the weapons heist Peit Rudolph pulled at the Air Force HQ in Pretoria and the disappearance of weaponry and ammunition from a commando armoury in the Transvaal not long ago.

After watching a demonstration by Ortiz's 'shock troops' in Algeria an observer wrote contemptuously: 'They resemble senile beggars who masturbate in a corner to make people believe that they are virile. No one wants to take them seriously.'

What both he and many others did not take into account was that Ortiz's men would not be the be-all and end-all of *pieds noirs* resistance. In fact Ortiz himself disappeared from the scene almost before the real fighting began. When this hour struck his supporters were considerably beefed up by a far more seasoned and battle-hardened lot from the armed forces. (Here one considers the existence of former CCB [Civil Cooperation Bureau] members who may feel doubtful about their future in a new South Africa, as well as the existence of well-trained units led by people like Priesta and Klaas). Together they formed what became one of the most ruthless terror groups of all time, the OAS [Organisation de l'Armée Secrete (Secret Army Organization)?].

Do not underestimate the ability of the far right to wage 'guerilla-type conflict', warns a well-placed, expert and reliable source who is certainly not one of their number. 'Terrorist actions would constitute a big problem. Whites would do this far more effectively than Umkhonto. They have had the best training in Africa, the best in most of the world. They're expert soldiers.'

Lending an invaluable stamp of authority to the OAS was one of France's most decorated and highly regarded generals, Raoul Salan, who, by this time officially retired, agreed to come out of retirement and lead the organisation.

While most of those in the upper echelons of right-wing militant movements have little time for Defence Minister Magnus Malan, referring to him scathingly as 'Sister Magnus', all of them think highly of former chief of the SADF General Constand Viljoen whose presence in the public gallery of Parliament during the Defence vote aroused interest from the DP [Democratic Party] and favourable remarks from the CP—from the floor. On the other hand General Viljoen is liked and respected by many across the political spectrum, such as General

Rogers. He knew Viljoen personally and sees him as someone who was 'a highly responsible military leader. No matter what his political feelings may be he would never get involved in anything like a coup,' says Rogers. 'In fact he once said to me he hoped it would never come to a situation of brother shooting brother.' Someone else who knows the general 'personally' is Priesta. He, too, thinks the general is 'a very good man'.

The stated aim of the OAS was to achieve its goal of, in the words of General Salan, 'a kind of apartheid for Algeria', by creating in the country a situation of 'total ungovernability' which would eventually force the government 'to hear us'.

There are many friendly, well-spoken, articulate, law-abiding citizens in the country who are frightened of what the future holds for them. Their fears may seem irrational to many, but they are fears which the Nationalist government has carefully, insidiously and effectively planted and encouraged in millions of white people over the last 42 years. These fears have ruled South Africa since 1948, and these fears, together with religious and historical creeds which the Nats and their minions in church and classroom have sponsored, are now the driving force of right-wing resistance movements.

'It's not me that has changed,' says ex-recce captain Klaas. 'It is the circumstances that have changed around me. There are thousands of us who have decided we aren't going to give one inch in the direction of integration. So what is going to be done with people like us? The present system no longer caters for us.'

'It is political suicide to think that people who have been brainwashed for generations to see blacks as the "swart gevaar" can simply shed these prejudices overnight and accept integration,' says Professor Kleynhans. 'Whites will never accept unconditional integration. They have said over their dead bodies, and they mean that.' He warns of 'chaos' if President de Klerk fails to secure minority veto rights in negotiations.

Former head of History at Pretoria University, Professor Floors van Jaarsveld, points out that South Africa is certainly in a 'crisis period', with Afrikaners being called on to sacrifice the power they have held since 1652. This, he says, is 'a tremendous sacrifice' which will lead to 'a dangerous problem' and quite possibly a situation 'where Afrikaner shoots Afrikaner.'

On the other hand the head of political studies at Wits University, Professor Alf Stadler, while conceding that the right-wing armed threat is 'a serious problem', believes that it 'gets exaggerated'—'A tendency to indulge in kaffirbashing does not necessarily translate into a serious inclination to support the AWB rather than De Klerk.'

Time alone will prove which one of these academics is out of touch with present reality, of course, but are we

ourselves, in our allusions to the Algerian Civil War for instance, missing the target badly?

Certainly we are not the first to establish a connection between right-wing politics in South Africa today and right-wing extremism in Algeria three decades ago—the men who went on to forge the OAS did that when they were planning their coup against De Gaulle. It is believed they sought, and were promised, material aid from South Africa to be forthcoming once the coup had reached the eight-day mark. In the event this promise was never put to the test, but the episode does at least suggest a bond of mutual sympathy between rightwingers on both sides. One should remember that the beliefs and emotions that constituted South Africa's government then are precisely the beliefs and emotions motivating right-wing resisters here today. And the leadership element among these resisters, people like Priesta and Klaas, have studied the Algerian Civil War, presumably because its lessons are not entirely inappropriate to the scenario they see unfolding here.

It is not altogether fanciful then when the role of a General Salan prompts one to consider the possible role of General Constand Viljoen. He himself says he cannot see what circumstances are likely to be over the next couple of years and so cannot say whether or not he would play a role or what this role would be. He stresses however, that when he retired as SADF chief he 'made it perfectly clear' that he had 'no intention of playing any role in politics. I was perfectly happy as a soldier and now I am perfectly happy as a farmer.'

It is a fact that his name triggers a reaction among leading rightwingers involved in militant organisations quite unlike that triggered by the mention of any other name. There are knowing smiles and acknowledgements that he is 'a very good man'—then the subject is changed. While comments about TerreBlanche for instance are readily forthcoming—and by no means all favourable—the name 'Viljoen' seems wrapped in a cocoon of protective secrecy.

Certainly one cannot deny that he would be a major, perhaps THE major, trumpcard for rightwingers once jaw turned to war. Military men who joined the OAS had nothing but contempt for the pieds noir ultras although they shared their goals. The air of authority and legitimacy that surrounded the name of General Salan acted as a powerful magnet for them. He was the crucial figurehead behind which disparate elements felt they could unite.

It is generally accepted that Terre-Blanche has an important role to play at the moment, but few look to him as the 'real leader' once the time for stage tricks is over.

If TerreBlanche and his AWB were the alpha and omega of right-wing resistance then one might be tempted to agree with Professor Stadler's reading of the situation. After all, no matter how impressive pictures of khaki-clad phalanxes twirling truncheons may look in the Sunday newspapers, this kind of thing wouldn't get the

most dexterous band of brothers in the world down to the corner cafe in anything remotely approaching a war situation.

Somewhere in the situation are faceless, nameless groups—tightly-knit, well disciplined and expertly trained by some of the world's deadliest and most efficient killers. They are led by people like ex-recces Priesta and Klaas, people who have nothing in common with the kind of gratuitous thuggery witnessed in places like Welkom, people who have no time for AWB-type publicity stunts, people who are self-controlled, modest and deadly serious.

The AWB has been public knowledge for some years now—but who had heard of the CCB until the other day?

*** ANC Urged To Choose Between Ideologies**

90AF0518B Cape Town CAPE TIMES
in English 23 Jul 90 p 6

[Commentary by Ken Owen: "Time Now for ANC To Choose—and To Act"]

[Text] A squad of cold-eyed, knife-scarred township youngsters sought me out not long ago to demand with great ferocity: "Why do you call the ANC [African National Congress] a horse? You must be an enemy."

Nothing could be further from the truth. It is from a heart brimming with goodwill that I do my best to pound into the ANC an awareness of the dangers it runs by carrying a rider like the SA [South African] Communist Party.

For the ANC, this is the moment of opportunity. When Joe Slovo launches The World's Last Communist Party on the path of the dinosaur next week, the ANC will have a unique chance to shed the ideological baggage of the Fifties, including the Five Year Plan to Remake the World, and offer to South Africa a new, modern, democratic definition of itself.

Collective Relief

And if that new definition comes credibly close to, say, West German social democracy (I wouldn't recommend the Swedish model right now; it's failing), white South Africa will heave a collective sigh of relief and, I suspect, fling itself happily into the task of national reconstruction.

Let me try to explain the need for re-definition.

The ANC faces three mortal dangers: That the present mounting anarchy will take us into civil war, or into degenerative decay; that a foolish and discredited ideology of class struggle will wreck any chance of economic growth or prosperity; and that in the Gaderene rush to create a socialist Utopia, all chance of liberty will be lost.

Obviously these dangers are mutually reinforcing, and to a degree they are inherent in the situation, the product of a brutal and unjust past. The question is whether the

ANC's actions make matters worse, or whether its leaders are wise enough to begin now to husband the patrimony they hope to inherit. There is much the ANC can do.

For example, the rising level of violence owes something to the rhetoric of liberation which has in the past encouraged young black men to "liberate" private cars to go to meetings, or beer trucks for a party, or taxis for convenience. That violence is spilling into the suburbs, where the mood of white people is approaching hysteria.

The violence owes something, let us confess, to the exhortations from Lusaka and Addis Ababa to "eliminate sell-outs" and to "make the townships ungovernable" by murdering police constables and town councillors. Just as the foolish slogan, "liberation before education," has created a lost generation of ineducable young people, so the campaign for ungovernability has created a culture of anarchy. The township youth has been corrupted by it.

Parts of the country are in fact ungovernable, and will remain so unless the ANC helps to restore respect for law, property and human life. The Nationalist government cannot restore that order—it has tried, with all its might, and failed. That is why it is ready to negotiate.

One result of this is that the white population lives in acute fear, not simply of losing privilege, but of losing life and loved ones. So sharp is this fear that if we are to prevent them from resorting to their own brand of armed struggle (white civilians have two-and-a-half million firearms in their possession), the ANC must help to drain away the sea of fear and personal insecurity in which the AWB swims.

Rightwing violence, according to one reasonable estimate, accounts for only 15 percent of all violence, and is rising fast. But even if physical fear—of murder, robbery, rape, hijacking or random shootings—does not drive the white population into the arms of the right, it will cause rising emigration of skills, continuing leakage of capital, a diversion of scarce resources to security expenditure, unwillingness to invest, and an economically corrosive short-term view of the future.

Nor is it simply President De Klerk's problem; it is Nelson Mandela's. To unleash violence is easy, to bring it back under control is the work of years, and Mandela, if he is ever to play a part in the government of this country, may find himself struggling to restore peace, wishing he had started sooner.

Much the same arguments apply to continuing sanctions (though, speaking personally, I have grown weary of arguing with people determined to shoot themselves in the foot). The task of restoring the economy will fall not on President de Klerk, who has done just enough to keep things ticking over while we all get slowly poorer; it will fall on the ANC.

Put it this way: Nearly all black children who have emerged from the school system since 1976 are so poorly educated as to be virtually useless in an industrial society. They may get some elementary training, but in effect their lives are a waste, and destined to remain so. Unless the economy is revived, another generation will follow them. Is that what the ANC wants?

Or will it begin now to help generate the resources that, in three or four years time, will be needed to deal with the collapse of education? Communists are notoriously ready to sacrifice children to history, and The World's Last Communist Party may be no exception. But the ANC? Does it also have the merciless light of history in its eye?

On this front, there is another problem. Some of the rhetoric that emerges from the trade unions (not from the rank and file, but from the professionals who lead them) seems to me to imply a determination to wage class warfare against "capital," and to wage it to the death. A privileged class of union workers is emerging which does not give a fig for the suffering of a huge unemployed underclass, or for the general welfare of the country. It sees the workplace as an arena of class struggle, and it is sowing mayhem there.

Will the ANC try to tell the unions that, after all, we are all in this together, and that capital and workers have common interests; or will it watch content as control of offshore diamond mines shifts from Kimberley to Switzerland, as gold mining shafts close one by one, and as capital and skills vanish abroad? If so, neither prosperity nor democracy will emerge.

Difficult Transition

Nothing that has happened since February 2 seems to me to have been beyond the limits of reasonable expectations. For everybody, transition has been difficult and sometimes frightening. The turbulence in the townships, the burgeoning crime, the internecine feuding in Natal and elsewhere, the low-level warfare, the rising rightwing anger, were all to be expected in the aftermath of a sudden switch from confrontation to negotiation.

But it has to come to an end. President de Klerk has shown exceptional courage in sitting out the period of turbulence, but his political base is eroding and he can't sit much longer.

If the ANC wants to preserve this "window of opportunity," as the space explorers call it, it must come soon to a decision whether to work with The World's Last Communist Party for a socialist revolution, or with the rest of us for a simple democracy in the Western—say the West German—pattern.

The time has come for the ANC to choose, and to act accordingly.

* MRA Survey: Most Blacks Support ANC

90AF0502B Johannesburg SOWETAN
in English 24 Jul 90 p 6

[Text] The African National Congress [ANC] and its political allies have the support of 84 percent of the country's blacks, according to the results of a survey by Market Research Africa [MRA].

This conclusion is based on a sample of 2,281 black adults interviewed throughout South Africa.

However, 22 percent of the population was excluded because attempts to ask political questions in Natal, KwaZulu and parts of Transkei were abandoned when interviewers were threatened physically.

Of those interviewed—there were 1,181 males and 1,100 females—38 percent expressed support for the ANC, 19 percent for the United Democratic Front [UDF], 15 percent for the Mass Democratic Movement [MDM] and 12 percent for the South African Communist Party [SACP].

Support

The remaining support went to the Pan Africanist Congress (10 percent), National Party [NP] (7 percent) Democratic Party [DP] (5 percent), Inkatha (2 percent) and, with one percent each, the Conservative party and the AWB [Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging].

The survey was conducted between April 1 and June 11 and involved face-to-face interviews with all the subjects.

The ANC's high popularity rating stretches across divisions of ethnicity, age and gender, straddles the urban-rural divide and reaches from South Africa's cities into the remote settlements of the rural hinterland.

The exclusion of Natal-KwaZulu, traditionally a strong area of support for Inkatha, has to be borne in mind in assessing the results of the MRA survey.

The skewing effect, however, may not be as great as it might have been until the mid-1980s, when, according to various early surveys, Inkatha support was unquestionably still high in Natal-KwaZulu.

A separate contemporary survey, conducted by Markinor in April this year in the main metropolitan areas, including Durban, provides indirect confirmation of the MRA's central finding: the rise of the ANC's appeal and a corresponding decline in Inkathas.

Low Appeal

A salient feature of the MRA survey is the low appeal of Inkatha outside Natal-KwaZulu, even in areas like the Witwatersrand where there is a sizeable Zulu population and where Inkatha once enjoyed substantial support.

There is high-level of awareness of Inkatha—it is as well known as the UDF. But, judging from the survey's findings, it is awareness of an organization which is disliked and/or feared.

One of the attitudes explored by MRA was how close black people feel to, or how distant from the various organizations.

Three central points emerge:

- Blacks feel distant from Inkatha;
- They feel closer to President FW de Klerk's National Party and the Democratic Party than they do to Inkatha;
- The degree of distance from, and presumably antipathy towards, Inkatha is only marginally smaller than that shown to the CP and the AWB on the far right of the political spectrum.

The same patterns prevail among Zulus outside Natal-KwaZulu.

Contrasts

Distance from Inkatha among these Zulus contrasts with a much higher degree of closeness towards the ANC.

The PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], SACP and UDF fall between the ANC and Inkatha, with the UDF slightly ahead of the PAC and SACP.

Blacks feel closer to these organizations, although not much closer, than they do to either the NP and the DP.

A striking point is the degree of distance—and, with it, possible skepticism and suspicion—which on average blacks feel toward all political organizations, even the ANC.

The degree of closeness or distance is reflected on a scale ranging from plus-four (very close) to minus-four (very far), with zero signifying a state of neutrality (neither close nor far).

The ANC's overall rating was 1.2, indicating what can perhaps be characterized as tepid or qualified support.

The UDF attains a zero rating, while the PAC and SACP level-peg with ratings of 0.9 each. All three ratings point to a measure of doubt.

Seen in that context Inkatha's minus 2.8 rating is perhaps not quite so bad. But it is clearly bad enough to be cause of grave concern to its leaders, especially in light of its once undoubted popular appeal.

The absence of strong, positive identification with the main political forces may be due to any of several factors.

Insecurity

It may mirror inner insecurity about the future, a reluctance by blacks to commit themselves fully in a rapidly shifting political terrain.

It may simply be a reflex reaction after years of repression, in which it was dangerous to express approval of outlawed organizations.

From the perspective of organizations which have been overshadowed by the ANC there is, perhaps, some slight consolation.

The still relatively high degree of distance from the ANC and its allies may mean that attitudes are as yet unfixed, that there may still be a relatively high degree of mobility in black political preferences.

However, from the PAC's perspective the survey highlights a pattern which is likely to be of concern to its leaders.

Nearly 80 of those blacks who feel very close to the PAC also feel very close to the ANC.

There is no reciprocal tendency among people who feel very close to the PAC: only 11 of blacks who feel very close to the ANC feel very close to the PAC as well.

These findings infer that many PAC supporters would be just as comfortable in ANC ranks, thus raising, theoretically at any rate, the prospect of defections to the ANC.

Supporters

By contrast ANC supporters do not have the same potential loyalty to the PAC. Where dual loyalty exists among ANC supporters it is directed at the UDF, a strong ANC ally and even a surrogate ANC.

The high correlation between support for the ANC and the UDF is not surprising. They are two sides of the same political coin. Sympathy for the ANC implies sympathy for the UDF and vice versa. These attitudes are mutually supporting.

From the ANC's viewpoint, there is one very gratifying result: most of its strongest supporters are drawn from the 16 to 24-year-old category, the youngest and fastest growing group.

Nearly half (47) of blacks in the 16-24 age group feel very close to the ANC, against one tenth (9,9) for the PAC and a minuscule proportion (1,8) for Inkatha.

The same pattern is found in the next age group of 25-34.

In general the proportion of people who feel very close to an organization decreases with age, indicating, perhaps, that skepticism strengthens with age.

There is one exception: in the 25-34 group, the proportion of people who feel very close to the PAC increases, rising from just under 10 to a little over 12.

In the ANC the comparative figures are 47 and 40.

The Makinor survey, conducted in April among 900 black women and 600 black men in the main metropolitan areas, provides confirmation of the ANC's clear dominance at present.

Majority

Thus a clear majority, 64, of blacks nominate the ANC as their favorite organization.

The NP does relatively well attaining 8 of the vote. De Klerk does even better, winning 22 of the vote against 58 for Mandela.

These results, coupled with strong support for the NP in the white community (46 against 22 for the CP), may mean that the NP has a future even under a system of universal adult suffrage, provided its leaders show the necessary skill and nerve in the transitional phase ahead.

Footnote: The MRA survey did not poll attitudes towards Azapo, the main black consciousness organization.

* DP Youth Congress Discusses Future

90AF0502E Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 13-19 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by Patrick Goodenough]

[Text] Differences over economic issues and conflicting perceptions of the Democratic Party [DP]'s future role emerged at the party's first national youth congress recently.

Rumblings in the youth wing of a political movement usually spell change, disruption or trouble ahead for the broader organization. Young people are more impetuous, outspoken and perhaps even more honest than their older, more staid counterparts.

At the Democratic Party's first national youth congress held last weekend, representatives of the Eastern Cape region walked out in protest against the election of a hard-line free-marketeer, Mark Heaton, as national youth chairman.

Earlier, Heaton's Southern Transvaal region had proposed a resolution calling on the party "to declare itself unequivocally in favor of the free market system, and require its members to abide by this declaration".

Lengthy haggling over the wording and debate about the implications of the proposal finally saw the motion defeated. But the deep divisions were obvious.

The Eastern Cape's youth chairman, Kevin Wakeford, said pushing a dogmatic free market stance would jeopardize the links the region had forged with community organizations.

Differences among the youth over the importance of those links were evident even before the election flare-up—at a meeting between the delegates and South African Youth Congress activists in kwaZakhele township earlier on the weekend.

While Wakeford spoke then in glowing terms about contacts already made between the Eastern Cape young democrats and Sayco, other delegates appeared less than enthusiastic about the whole exercise.

African National Congress [ANC] veteran Raymond Mhlaba contributed a short speech to the meeting.

The predictable questions raised by the DP youth on the "armed struggle" and sanctions, and the dissatisfaction of some with the answers he gave, did not stop Mhlaba from expressing his joy afterwards at the "inspiring" encounter.

According to Wakeford, two camps have formed among the youth around differences over economic issues and over conflicting perceptions of the DP's future role with regard to "other democrats".

Support for an unfettered free market came primarily from the Southern Transvaal, Northern Transvaal and Natal Inland, while the Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Natal Coast preferred what Wakeford called a "social market economy".

"Certainly a free market is necessary for economic growth, but also with massive state responsibility in social fields, such as health, education, housing ...," he said.

As far as he was aware, the party's given economic policy coincided with this model.

The second point of contention dealt with the party's future role, with Eastern Cape-led camp pushing for a "convergence" of democrats, as opposed to a "confrontational" stance—broadening the DP's base at the expense of other democratic organizations.

Wakeford said this policy of "destructive competition" would leave the DP out in the cold when the major players sat down to talk.

After the walk-out, the Eastern Cape region suspended all ties with the national youth leadership until clarity was achieved on the party's views on the issues, "and we feel secure that we aren't compromising on principles we have stood for a long time", he said.

The Western Cape and Natal Coast sympathized and had adopted a "wait and see" approach.

Wakeford said the region's main gripe with Heaton's election was that it did not think the Southern Transvaal chair's views reflected the views of the party. It was not a case of sour grapes—the Eastern Cape had not put forward a nominee, he said.

The congress was also significant in that it provided an opportunity for two of the party's co-leaders, Dr Zach de Beer and Dr Denis Worrall, and a third contender for a future single leadership position, Tian van der Merwe, to feel out and woo the young.

All three candidates stressed the need for the DP's continued existence—at least, De Beer maintained, until board consensus was achieved on a constitution which embodied the DP's policies and principles.

New approaches and new ideas were called for, and future roles for the DP optimistically examined.

The three speakers had the DP emerging as the one party which could, and should, ensure that the negotiation process succeeded—and included the widest possible spectrum of players.

Resolutions taken by the youth before the election drama dispelled some of the earlier optimism apparent at the congress, reflecting the more common debates raging currently and a refreshing determination to put forward issues perhaps overlooked by the party's older members.

For instance, the delegates resolved that mass consumer action should be taken against companies which violated accepted environment-friendly practices. They called on the party to reassess its land reform policy and suggested that kibbutz-type agricultural and industrial collectives be considered in a future South Africa. They voted to outlaw sexist terminology, and came out strongly against sexual violence.

They called for impartial policing in Natal, for the removal of police powers from kwaZulu authorities, and for an end to the use of violence as a political tool. They stressed the importance of individual, rather than group rights. And they resolved to push for an end to damaging, anonymous "leaks" to the media, then in-house "democratic forums" existed for conflict resolution.

Despite the divisions among the youth, many still see the DP as the party which holds the moral high-ground, which is unburdened by the historical baggage of apartheid, which can change people—while the National Party can only change laws—and which can be an agent for national reconciliation.—Eena

*** Urban Management Hampered by Group Areas Act**
90AF0528A Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English
25 Jul 90 p 6

[First paragraph CAPE TIMES comment]

[Text] In Johannesburg yesterday the Private Sector Council, a coalition of commerce, industry and community leaders, released a major report, "The Urban Challenge," drawing on research carried out in association with the Urban Foundation. In this extract the PSC concludes that the Group Areas Act can no longer be

effectively enforced and should be scrapped and the implementation of the Free Settlement Act should be halted.

Central commercial and office zones of all South African cities are increasingly characterised by a majority of black employees. It is inevitable that this workforce will seek, both in its own interest and (as a consequence) that of city efficiency as a whole, to minimise distances between home and work.

The Group Areas Act can no longer be enforced or implemented effectively. There can be little doubt that legally enforced residential segregation will increasingly come under tremendous pressure. Its removal can only be a matter of "how" and "when."

The current Free Settlement Areas legislation is in many respects an impractical response to the de facto breakdown of group areas.

Difficult to Implement

In essence, it is an adjustment to the Group Areas framework which is unlikely to accommodate the scale of economic, demographic and property market forces in any single city.

Thus legislation, as designed, could well result in unira-
cial city centre "ghettos." It is extremely complicated for local government, will be difficult to implement and may further politicise the process of residential desegregation.

The record of desegregation of towns and cities elsewhere in southern Africa is positive in terms of the housing market and inter-racial relationships. The impact on the residential pattern of these cities has not been disruptive.

Moreover, the international experience shows that the Group Areas Act is not an indispensable mechanism for the maintenance of broadly homogeneous neighbourhoods. All over the world the residential concentration of particular groups results from voluntary choice, economic factors and, at worst, informal processes of discrimination.

Vibrant

The maintenance of the Group Areas Act is the core policy and legal obstacle to effective urban management for the 1990s. Separate residential areas form the base for dividing functionally integrated cities on a racial, political, administrative and financial basis.

This is the key inhibition to planning for effective metropolitan-wide and city-wide futures for South Africa.

However, the abolition of racial laws is essential but cannot alone guarantee a healthy, vibrant, urban environment with improved neighbourhood quality and amenities. This will require positive, effective and

appropriate management. In particular inner cities (widely defined) will require special attention by city managers.

A period of transition places the quality of life and the enormous investment in South Africa's city centres at risk.

Compact Cities

To prevent decline through official neglect, high-density neighbourhoods will need creative positive intervention to protect this investment, provide security for existing and new tenants and attract people back to the city and full use of its facilities.

Such positive intervention is inhibited by the retention of the Group Areas Act and the resultant insecurity in city centres. Moreover, the demarcation of Free Settlement Areas in the inner city alone will do little to enhance conditions and could exacerbate them.

The abolition of the Group Areas Act is the critical first step (and only the first) in an incremental process of tackling the structural changes necessary to create more efficient, equitable and compact cities better able to provide jobs, services and shelter for an expanding population.

It is necessary therefore to judge all policy and legislative changes to the Group Areas Act in the context of the core development challenge facing South Africa's divided cities, whose populations will double in the next 20 years.

Fears and uncertainties in a period of transition must be recognised and acknowledged. Leadership is required to place these fears in the context of national priorities, rights of citizenship, the needs of the cities and the failure of the Group Areas Act in practice.

Fundamental

The 1990 repeal of the Separate Amenities Act and the recent announcements by the State President on the likely repeal of the Group Areas Act indicate that this kind of leadership is possible.

The Group Areas Act is a fundamental structure in our society which can no longer be effectively enforced. The key policy challenge then is to immediately repeal the Act and then institute pro-active measures to manage the transition away from legally enforced segregated residential areas.

The success or otherwise of this transition is critically important as it will affect future residential harmony, urban growth and in particular inner-city development, race relations more generally, and the speed and timing of constitutional developments.

Property Market

Government should commit itself to the following principles concerning the cities:

- Residential freedom and choice for all.
- The establishment of a free property market in urban areas.
- The preservation of neighbourhood quality and environmental upgrading.
- The enforcement of democratically formulated legislation and municipal by-laws to enhance neighbourhood quality and prevent the decline in urban conditions.
- A pro-active urban policy at national and local level to protect, preserve and extend the public and private investment in South Africa's cities.

These principles are in direct contradiction with the Group Areas Act and other existing laws, and government should therefore:

- Stop the implementation of the Free Settlement legislation.
 - Repeal the Group Areas Act as a matter of urgency.
- To prevent any insecurity in the interim, government should take the necessary legal steps to ensure that:
- No further prosecutions are made under the Group Areas Act.
 - All permit applications under the Act be granted.

* NUM Campaigns for Racial Equality

90AF0516B Lusaka SECHABA in English
Jul 90 pp 11-14

[Article by Jean Middleton: "National Union of Mineworkers Campaign for Racial Equality"]

[Text] Since mining first began in South Africa, the mining companies have used race discrimination to divide the workers and to create a cheap labour force of the black workers. Now that it is campaigning against practices of race discrimination, the National Union of Mineworkers [NUM] is confronting the mining companies and the basis of the apartheid state.

Last year, all over South Africa, people were challenging the injustices of apartheid. The protest had a profound effect on events in the country. Black mineworkers added their organised force to this massive expression of militancy, and their actions were among the most famous of the Defiance Campaign.

These actions included washing in changing rooms reserved for whites, organising demonstrations in segregated canteens, boycotting kitchens because of the quality of the food and protesting over access to shaft

lifts. Unarmed, defying mine security forces, the police, and racist whites they knew were probably carrying guns, the mineworkers showed a courage that places them among the heroes of our struggle.

Before the campaign began, the employers tried to neutralise it. The Chamber of Mines suggested a "working party" to investigate discriminatory practices. The director of industrial relations at Anglo-American stated that the segregation remaining on Anglo mines was based on rank and not race—Anglo has not abolished discriminatory practices, but nevertheless is anxious to present itself as a progressive and enlightened employer. Management at Vaal Reefs, an Anglo mine, urged employees not to take any actions that would "lead to the polarisation of racial attitudes," by which it meant any action in protest against racial discrimination.

The mineworkers were not deceived by this soft talk. They went ahead, and though the protest actions were not, for the most part, organised through union structures, they had unqualified union support. Cyril Ramaphosa, General Secretary of the NUM, called the suggestion for a "working party" a "delaying, evasive tactic," and said that violence and polarisation on the mines were caused by the system of labour control, which separates black miners from both white miners and white management. He said:

"NUM has to oppose those structures which insult and degrade its members: which depress and destroy their economic position, create reservoirs of cheap labour and hamper the process of unity."

During the campaign, management often intervened in support of the status quo. President Steyn No 4 Mine in Welkom banned all meetings to discuss the Defiance Campaign or any other political issue, and Impala Platinum, a Gencor company, locked whites-only toilets, and gave keys to the white workers. When NUM members down No 2 shaft at Vaal Reefs refused to accept white priority in the use of the shaft lifts, and insisted on one queue, Anglo called in the police. Eleven workers were charged with intimidation, and were later dismissed at an internal disciplinary hearing so hastily arranged that shaft stewards complained there had been not enough time to prepare a defence. The NUM accused Anglo of racism.

White workers intervened too. They felt their position seriously threatened. Their racist unions, continually watchful over the racial privileges they enjoy, have openly opposed any forms of racial equality, such as the granting of blasting certificates to black mineworkers, the sharing of amenities with blacks, and even a Chamber of Mines proposal, made in 1989, to integrate mine hospitals said to be "under-utilised."

The murder of Jeffrey Njuza, shaft steward at Rustenburg Platinum Refinery, was one example of white worker response to the black workers' campaign. After his death, Njuza was described by the NUM as having

been "a courageous participant in the Defiance Campaign." Since defiance activities at the plant had first begun, he had been engaged in them, and he had earlier been charged with using a chair reserved for whites in the refinery canteen.

At ten o'clock at night on Saturday, September 2, a white supervisor, Ockert Vermeulen, pulled a revolver and shot Jeffrey Njuza dead at point blank range. A few minutes later, he turned the gun on himself. The NUM said Vermeulen had murdered Njuza "because he could no longer tolerate workers' defiance ... of facilities reserved for whites." Johannesburg Consolidated Investment, which owns the refinery, told the press that no reason had been established for the suicide.

Four days later, the whites of South Africa went to the polls. At the end of the day, it appeared that Rustenburg had returned a Conservative Party member to Parliament. On that day, knowing the danger to themselves, a group of black mineworkers entered the grounds of a white high school in a white suburb and began playing football. Police arrived with dogs and sjamboks; the workers were assaulted, forced into vans and taken to the police station. Some took refuge in the local NUM offices, and the police then arrested everyone they found there, including some who had not been on the football field at all.

The murder of Njuza brought to public attention the fact that, while black workers on the mine are searched before they go on shift, white workers are not, and some, at least, go down bearing firearms. In March this year, the Welkom branch of the white Mine Workers' Union called on its members not to arm themselves before going underground, but at the same time Eugene Terre-Blanche of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging was calling on the white miners of Welkom to arm themselves, so this dangerous question is not yet resolved.

When the Central Committee of the NUM met in April 1990, it reviewed the situation and decided that defiance on the mines should continue. It called on the mine employers to abolish discrimination. It identified no less than 59 areas of discrimination, and commissioned the National Executive Committee of the union to do further research into the matter.

The search when they go on shift is only one of the many indignities black mineworkers are subjected to and white mineworkers are exempt from. There are also the toilets underground—white workers have cubicles, but black workers complain that their toilets are primitive, that they provide no privacy and that there are not enough of them. They are the exhausting and apparently pointless "heat tests" which black recruits and black mineworkers returning from leave are forced to undergo, stripped naked, for up to four hours at a time, for five days.

The discrimination in hoisting procedures is a serious grievance. When NUM members at Vaal Reefs demanded one queue for the lifts, they were opposing a system in which certain lifts, or sometimes certain decks

on the lifts, are reserved for whites. This means a delay of three or four hours for black miners before they reach the surface, and it means that black miners must start queueing at least two hours earlier than whites before the morning shift. This is why the NUM has sought wage compensation for time spent travelling to the workplace.

Worse, the rules over reserved space in the lifts remain in force at the time of an accident, so there is a delay before black workers can get away from danger. At the time of the Kinross disaster in 1987, when flames and poisonous fumes filled the tunnels, the white mineworkers who rushed the lifts, leaving black workers to die, were following procedures laid down by the employers.

Medical services are another area of inequality. The NUM has called mine medical stations "accident-orientated," asserting that they do not provide adequate treatment for illness and disease. Shortcomings in mine medical services mean serious deprivation for black mineworkers, who have no alternative sources of medical attention. White miners belong to private medical schemes outside the mines, and so are not dependent on the mines for the care of their health.

Black miners' dissatisfaction over the food served up to them is bound up with their dissatisfaction over their living conditions and the hostel system. Black workers may not visit friends in other hostels, nor may they receive visitors—and the facilities provided for 'conjugal visits' is so limited as to make very little difference to the workers' lives. White workers can eat at home, but black workers have little alternative to mine food, for they are generally not permitted to bring in food they have bought outside, and in any case the mine food is regarded by management as part of their wages. Black miners complain that they are not allowed to eat down the mine, but white workers bring lunch boxes from home.

Wages paid to white and black mineworkers are the most stark example of discrimination. In May 1989, according to the NUM, the basic monthly wage for black workers was R360, and R1,000 for the lowest-paid white.

In the coal industry, the low wages paid to the vast majority of South African mineworkers have effects that go far beyond the borders of the country. These wages make it possible for the mine owners to sell their coal at a lower price and still make a profit, and South African coal is the cheapest in the world. In Britain, the local council of North-East Derbyshire, concerned at retrenchments in its area, placed the following advertisement in the June 1990 issue of ANTI-APARTHEID NEWS, the paper of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement.

"Black miners in South Africa are paid only one-sixth of the wage of white miners and British miners, leading to cheap South African coal.

The South African coal price is the marker price on the international coal market. Coal from other countries has to meet this low level to be competitive.

The need to keep the price of British coal down has driven pit incomes down. This is the motor behind the British pit closure programme.

Six out of ten pits in North-East Derbyshire District Council's surrounding area have been closed in the last ten years.

Congratulations to Anti-Apartheid on its 31st birthday. Continue the struggle!"

Wage negotiations between the NUM and the Chamber of Mines have been protracted and beset with problems.

For one thing, South African mineworkers face retrenchment, too, as the employers close less profitable mines. Some 17,000 jobs were lost in 1988 and the first half of 1989, and more losses were threatened as the Chamber of Mines announced the possibility of more closures. The NUM said the announcement was an attempt "to pressure workers to accept starvation wages in the face of annual wage negotiations."

The price of gold is falling, and that of coal is rising. It was on these grounds that the Chamber was pushing in 1989 for separate wage negotiations for gold and coal mines—an attempt to divide the workers and also to make black workers subsidise flagging profits. The Chamber offered 11 percent increase, which the NUM said was not enough. In any case, the NUM wanted an increase in money and not percentage terms, for, as trade unionists know, percentage increases strengthen inequalities that already exist, widening a gulf that will widen still further with the next percentage increase. The difference between white and black wages will be even greater since the white miners' 13.5 percent increase that took effect in May.

The discrepancy between white and black wages is based on the nature of the jobs white and black workers do. The battle the NUM is fighting is for unskilled workers, for white mineworkers still have a virtual monopoly of skills. In August 1989, after a Supreme Court judgment had nullified potentially discriminatory legislation in mining, the NUM commented that, after years of educational discrimination, black miners would still find it difficult to get the more skilled jobs. The NUM is trying to address this problem now by instituting training schemes in conjunction with mineworkers' unions in Australia, Canada, the German Federal Republic, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

When the NUM enters into battle with the Chamber of Mines, it knows well that it confronts no ordinary employer. The South African mining industry is a many-headed monster, which, defeated in one place, can rise somewhere else. Anglo and De Beers have both been preparing to pull out of South Africa entirely should the going get rough, and in March 1990 De Beers felt strong

enough to cancel its agreement with the NUM. The threatened closures have been accompanied by the possibility of new mines in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape, near or within the bantustans. Some mining houses—notably Anglo—have diversified into other industries. All have grown in size and strength through their drive for profits. The demand for equality threatens these profits.

The NUM is a giant, and its great campaigns have had a significant impact on the policies both of the mine bosses and of the regime, but there are social and economic factors that, alone, the NUM cannot control. Apartheid, and specifically apartheid education, holds black workers back from acquiring skills. The economy of the apartheid state creates undeveloped rural areas in South Africa and neighbouring states, and pools of unemployed and desperate people, flowing into the system of migrant labour and single-sex hostels.

Interviewed in the June 1989 issue of *LABOUR BULLETIN*, the President of the NUM, James Motlatsi, spoke about this in relation to the strike of 1987:

"The strike ... became political ... in the sense that it involved sovereign neighbouring states which oppose apartheid. We should have made political consultations with these states. Within the country it should have involved the entire mass democratic movement, so that it could mobilise people in the rural areas where scabs could come from.

What we underestimated, to be quite honest, was the presence of the Chamber in the neighbouring states ... in the rural areas. That kind of action required us to man each and every institution of the enemy.

It suits the bosses to have many experienced mine-workers without work in the rural areas and neighbouring states. Then, whenever there is a strike they can dismiss workers and find scabs who have experience of the mining industry."

Retrenchments in the mining industry are even now adding more experienced mineworkers to the pool of unemployed.

There can be no justice, no decent life, for South African mineworkers except under a people's government that keeps control over the mining industry. The trade union struggle cannot be seen in isolation from the political struggle.

The strategy of the NUM is based on its understanding of all these factors. It sees itself as part of the struggle for liberation. Its support for sanctions is uncompromising. In April 1990, it stated its support for the ANC policy of talking with the Pretoria regime. At its Central Committee meeting in April, it made Nelson Mandela its honorary president for life, greeting him with a banner that bore the words: "NUM welcomes our beloved honorary president and commander, Nelson Mandela."

In April, 1990, in an article in *THE SOWETAN*, Cyril Ramaphosa wrote:

"If ever there is any cardinal clause in the Freedom Charter that appeals to us most, it is: The people shall share in the country's wealth.

With the adoption of the Freedom Charter by our congress in 1987, we consciously took a political step towards our freedom from national oppression and exploitation.

The ANC, in alliance with the SACP [South African Communist Party], as the leader of the liberation struggle enjoys our unqualified support."

* Paper on Whites in Nonracial Democracy

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[Article by Albie Sachs; first paragraph SECHABA comment]

[Text] This is the second instalment of Albie Sachs' draft paper intended to provoke thoughts about aspects of a future constitution and what should be done now to prepare the way for change in South Africa. The first instalment appeared in the May issue of SECHABA. Certain sections have been condensed owing to lack of space. It is titled "White South Africans in a Nonracial Democracy," and under this topic deals with the question of identity, the question of property and the conclusion—Freedom for all. The last part is titled, "The Last Word—Freedom."

The virtues of non-racial democracy would seem to be self-evident in South Africa, and yet experience shows that they have to be spelt out. The basic scheme is a simple one. It represents the application in South Africa of universally held views and corresponds to the vision long projected in the Freedom Charter.

In essence, it presupposes a constitutional structure based on the following inter-related principles:

1. Equal rights for all South African citizens, irrespective of race, colour, gender or creed;
2. A government accountable at all levels to the people through periodic and free elections based on the principles of universal suffrage on a common voters' roll;
3. Political pluralism, a multi-party state and freedom of speech and assembly;
4. A mixed economy;
5. Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms through a justiciable Bill of Rights;
6. A separation of powers including an independent and non-racial judiciary entrusted with the task of upholding the rule of law and the principles of the constitution.

In the light of the pro-democracy upsurge in many parts of the world, such positions should be regarded as axiomatic and unassailable. Yet, against the background of what can only be described as racist assumptions, all manner of excuses are offered for departure from these principles in the case of South Africa.

For the purposes of analysis, it will be accepted that the prospect of majority rule, even if subject to a justiciable Bill of Rights, is alarming to the great majority of those who choose to classify themselves as whites in South Africa today. The argument will be that the best way to allay these fears is to ensure that democracy and its institutions are firmly planted in South Africa; the worst way is to undermine democracy from the start and subvert it with a complicated and unworkable set of institutions based on notions designed to keep racially-defined groups locked in endless battle.

From a purely moral point of view, it is not easy to accept that the fears of the white minority in South Africa should merit special attention. It is they who made the bed in which they are now so unwilling to lie. If they are cut off from their fellow South Africans, it is because this was their choice. If they feel exposed because of their conspicuously high standard of living in the midst of much poverty, homelessness and hunger, this was the gap they passed laws to maintain. If they are concerned at the tendency to solve political question by force, they should recall that it was they who seized the country by forceful invasion, ruled it by force and then outlawed peaceful protest and opposition.

Nevertheless, if we are to build a new nation on the ruins of apartheid, we have to address ourselves seriously to all the preoccupations of all the people, whatever their past roles might have been. The abstract defence of democracy is easy: its concrete application is difficult, especially in a country where it has been much talked about and little practised.

When racists and democrats meet it is difficult for the racists not to be authoritarian and for the democrats not to be patronising. Bearing that in mind, three areas will be selected out for discussion on the basis that they are the most sensitive, controversial and difficult. They are:

- loss of identity,
- collapse of the economy,
- loss of freedom.

Political Rights and Cultural Rights

We are struggling in South Africa for the right to be the same. We are also fighting for the right to be different. No question has caused so much confusion as this one, perhaps because in the past the issues have been deliberately obscured. The struggle for the right to be the same expresses itself as a battle for equal citizenship rights, as a struggle against being treated differently because one is black or brown or white or Christian or Moslem or Jewish or Hindu or female or male or Tswana-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking. We are all South Africans, human

beings living in and owing loyalty to the same land. The country belongs equally to all of us, and we belong equally to the country. There should be no differentiation whatsoever of citizenship or nationality between us. Nobody is worth more or less than anybody else because of his or her appearance, or origin, or language, or gender, or beliefs.

This is the principle of equal rights for each and every individual. In affirmative terms, it gives each South African the right to vote, to be educated, to travel and to take part in the life of the nation. Expressed negatively, it is the right not to be discriminated against. No individual may be treated advantageously or disadvantageously because she or he belongs to a certain racial, linguistic or religious group, or is of a certain gender. The protection applies not only to individuals but to groups; they shall neither be discriminated against nor shall they receive the benefits of discrimination against others.

The constitution must expressly and unequivocally guarantee the fundamental equality of all citizens, and establish appropriate mechanisms to make this guarantee a reality. The law must ensure that in all spheres of public life—education, health, work, entertainment and access to facilities no-one is discriminated against because of colour, language, gender or belief.

Equality, or the sameness of political rights, does not mean homogeneity or cultural blandness. As feminists and others have pointed out, to be equal in a hegemonic culture means to take on the culture of your oppressors. Non-racial democracy presupposes just the opposite. Political equality becomes the foundation for cultural diversity. Once the problem of basic political rights is solved, cultural questions can be treated on their merits. Liberated from the blockages and perversions imposed by their association with domination and subordination, the different cultural streams in South Africa can flow cleanly and energetically together, watering the land for the benefit of all.

Language is a good example of an area where the principles of equality and diversity need to go together. No citizen should be entitled to more or subjected to less favourable treatment because of the language that he or she speaks; no language should be regarded as inferior or superior to any other language; there should be a policy of encouraging the development of South Africa's many languages.

It will not be necessary for the constitution to attend directly to all the myriad problems associated with a democratic language policy. There will be questions relating to language use in Parliament, the courts and the public service, in the police force and army and at the level of local government. There will be the matter of medium of instruction at schools and universities, of the language of broadcasting, books, films and newspapers, of place names and street signs.

The new South African constitution will accordingly favour diversity and an open society. It will recognise

that the emerging South African nation will be made up of many different groupings with a multiplicity of languages and historical experiences. Cultural diversity and political pluralism are both desirable constitutional objectives. Each is important in itself, and each complements the other. What should be avoided at all costs, however, is the merging or conflation of the two. Basing political rights on cultural formation is to guarantee that the voting public will fragment themselves into warring racial and ethnic blocs. It is also to ensure that true cultural expression is subordinated to shallow and opportunistic posturing of a chauvinistic kind.

The Public Domain and Private Rights

There is another dimension to the question of the right to be the same versus the right to be different, and that is in relation to where the public domain ends and the private sphere begins. In constitutional language, this means determining the point of intersection between the fundamental right to equal protection and the fundamental right to personal privacy.

We cannot imagine a constitution which sought to prescribe whom people should marry or not marry, or whom they should have as their friends or dinner guests or companions. Nor should it permit any state official to dictate such matters. These are questions that belong exclusively to the individuals concerned, and the constitution will guarantee to him or her such rights of privacy. At the same time, a democratic constitution could not acknowledge a right to bar people from hotels or restaurants or taxis or sports facilities because of the personal prejudices of the managers. In the former case the right to privacy would take precedence; in the latter the right to equal protection would prevail. What would be disastrous in South Africa would be to convert the right to privacy into an instrument for permitting organised discrimination.

La Difference—the Gender Question

The question of the constitutional rights of women and men is a complicated one that requires extensive and special treatment. Suffice it to say at this point that the issue of the right to be the same and the right to be different would appear to be fundamental in any analysis. In terms of general political and civil rights men and women have the right to be treated in the same gender-free way. The equal rights clause in a new South African constitution should be unambiguous in outlawing any discrimination or exclusion based on gender.

The New Ideologues

What is at issue in South Africa today is not whether to have a market economy or a centrally planned one, capitalism or socialism. The basic problem is what to do about the fact that as a result of apartheid the whites today own 87 percent of the land and 95 percent of the country's productive capital; that as a consequence of generations of legally segregated schools and hospitals,

health and education services for whites are vastly superior to those of blacks; that in a country where tens of thousands of whites have private swimming pools, millions of blacks do not even have piped water.

Once the principle of a mixed economy is accepted, as it has been by all the major components of the broad democratic movement, the constitutional issue falls away. What remains is the question of what to do about apartheid-induced inequality. Economic clauses, apparently designed merely to guarantee the continuation of a system of free enterprise, in fact have the effect of preserving a system of grossly unjust division of access to economic goods, that is, much enterprise and little freedom.

At a constitutional level, then, the real issue is the competence of Parliament to deal with the totally skewed property relationships produced in South Africa by centuries of colonial dispossession and apartheid law.

It is suggested, then, that the constitution should neither require nor foreclose specific economic policies. It is not necessary or even desirable for the constitution to be committed to any particular economic programme or philosophy. What the constitution should do, and this is the task of constitutions, is guarantee as much general fairness as possible, whatever economic policies are followed.

Guarantees could then comfortably be given that personal property, which has so much meaning in the day-to-day lives of the people, would be immune to any form of expropriation other than that normally authorised by law.

What About the Workers?

It is not necessary to speculate about what workers' rights should be in a democratic South Africa—the workers themselves are speaking, and a clear set of principles is beginning to emerge. South Africa has a long and complicated history of workers' struggles, the last decade having been particularly rich in experience. The demand has now gone up for the elaboration of a Charter of Workers' Rights which would consolidate the advances made by the workers especially in this recent period, and set out their perspectives for the future.

The possibility therefore exists of a hierarchy of legal provisions relating to workers' rights in a democratic South Africa. The foundation would be the constitution, which would guarantee the right to form trade unions, the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike.

As citizens, the workers would be able to campaign for socialism and support existing organisations dedicated to socialism, or form new ones, if that were their wish. The Charter could re-state this right, or it could be left to the general clauses of the Bill of Rights, which, would, of course, permit workers or anyone else to campaign against socialism.

Finally, there could be specific statutes and regulations dealing with the concrete aspects of implementing the Charter. These could all be collected together in the form of a Code of Labour Law.

Affirmative Action

In a sense we already have affirmative action in South Africa, but it is affirmative action in favour of the whites. The state today spends about five times as much on the education of each white child as it does on each black child, and the disproportion in the sphere of health services is the same. The Land Bank advances billions of rands to white farmers in terms of loans that are not called in, while the amount available to black farmers is paltry. Figures have been produced to show that the inhabitants of Soweto are in fact subsidising municipal services for the luxurious white suburbs of Johannesburg.

Thus before we even arrive at affirmative action for the dispossessed, there is a lot of equalising out that can be done (in a sensible and orderly way, of course) simply by removing such subsidies in favour of the privileged.

In essence, affirmative action in the normal understanding of the term is a strategy which sets out a series of special efforts or interventions to overcome or reduce inequalities which have accumulated as a result of past discrimination. It acknowledges that the ordinary processes of law or of the market or of philanthropy or benevolence are insufficient to break the cycle of discrimination, which replicates itself from generation to generation. Sometimes it is called positive discrimination, sometimes corrective or remedial action. The most widely employed phrase, however, is affirmative action.

Considerable attention will have to be paid to the question of harmonising affirmative action with non-racial democracy. Non-racism presupposes a colour-blind constitution; affirmative action requires a conscious look at the realities of the gaps between the life chances of blacks and whites. The right to be the same takes on an additional meaning—it is the right to have the same opportunities, and if these are blocked because of the heritage of past discrimination, then it includes the right to special intervention to remove the disadvantages.

In fact it is difficult to see how a truly non-racial society can be built in South Africa without at least one generation of accelerated progress being achieved under the principles of affirmative action. The promulgation of a non-racial constitution will clearly be vital, both at the symbolical level and in terms of guaranteeing equal political rights, yet a non-racial society cannot be declared. It has to be built up, over the years, so that all vestiges of inequality on the basis of race, etc., are removed.

Freedom for All

The one theme that unites all the above discussion is that the guarantees referred to are really not guarantees to the whites at all, but guarantees to the whole population. This really is the guarantee of guarantees. What is being suggested is not a set of privileges, for one section of the community to be defended by special constitutional mechanisms, and ultimately by force of arms or by outside intervention. Rather it is a constitutional arrangement created by South Africans for South Africans in a common determination to move away from the hatreds, divisions and injustices of the past. A justiciable bill of rights becomes central to the defence of liberty for all.

It is in the interest of everybody to feel free and at home throughout the length and breadth of the country. It benefits everybody to have the vote and the right of free speech and assembly and the possibility of throwing out a government that no longer commands respect. It is to the advantage of all to be able to worship freely, speak one's language and express oneself in the way one feels most comfortable. Everyone gains if the process of bringing about true equality is an orderly and peaceful one. The rule of law helps everybody.

This is really the guarantee of guarantees for the whites, as for everyone else, namely that their deepest interests coincide with the deepest interests of their fellow citizens. What all South Africans should be trying to do is to strengthen the institutions of non-racial democracy, so that they become deeply implanted in the country and part of its general culture. Only in this way can the conviction grow in the whole population that the constitution is their shield, since it enshrines the principle at the heart of all democratic constitutions namely that an injury to one is an injury to all.

The Last Word—Freedom

We give the last word to freedom, yet we do not know what it is.

This is the central irony of the deep and passionate struggle in South Africa—that it is for something that exists only in relations to what it seeks to eliminate.

We know what oppression is. We experience it, define it, we know its elements, take steps against it. All we can say about freedom is that it is the absence of oppression. We define freedom in terms of the measures we need to take to keep its enemy, tyranny, at bay.

Tyranny in South Africa means apartheid. That is the form that oppression takes. It is also the negative indicator of freedom; freedom is what apartheid is not.

When the call went up in the 1950s: "Freedom in our lifetime" it signified the end of something very specific, colonial domination in Africa and apartheid tyranny in South Africa. The Freedom Charter adopted in 1955 was conceived of as the reverse of apartheid. A product of struggle rather than of contemplation, it sought in each

and every one of its articles to controvert the reality of the oppression the people were undergoing. Its ten sections were based on the demands that a suffering people sent in, not on any ideal scheme created by legal philosophers of what a free South Africa should look like.

Any new constitution in South Africa must be first and foremost an anti-apartheid constitution. The great majority of the people will measure their newly-won freedom in terms of the extent to which they feel the arbitrary and cruel laws and practices of apartheid have been removed. Freedom is not some state of exaltation, a condition of instinctive anarchy and joy, it is not sudden and permanent happiness (in fact, some of the freest countries have the most melancholic and stressed people).

Freedom means being able to do what formerly was unjustly forbidden. If the majority of the people can vote where they could not vote before, this will be freedom. If they can move as they wish, live where they want, feel at home everywhere in the country, this will be freedom. If they can speak openly and say what they believe, support the organisations they agree with, criticise those in authority, this will be freedom. If they can feel comfortable within themselves, have a declared pride in who they are and a sense that they are recognised by the world they live in, then they will be free.

Freedom is indivisible and universal, but it also has its specific moments and particular modes. In South Africa the mode of freedom is anti-racist, and antiall the mechanisms and institutions that kept the system of racism and national oppression in place.

Yet if anti-apartheid is the foundation of and essential pre-condition for freedom in South Africa, it is not of itself and on its own a guarantee of freedom.

The very thing that brings joy to the oppressed majority, namely, the end of the system they have always known, is exactly what induces apprehension in the oppressors. Those who traditionally have supported apartheid, and who today might concede, happily or reluctantly, that apartheid is wrong and doomed, are alarmed at what might happen to them when the structures they have lived by are destroyed.

The constitution has to be for all South Africans, former oppressors and oppressed alike. It expresses the sovereignty of the whole nation, not just a part, not even just of the vast majority. If it is to be binding on all, it should speak on behalf of all and give its protection to all. In the past, rights for the one has meant tyranny for the other. Does that imply that the freedom of the oppressed can only be achieved by means of a new form of domination, this time of the majority over the minority, of black over white? Will freedom be guaranteed for all, or only for most South Africans? Or will the principle be followed that the constitution does not see majorities and minorities, as apartheid has always done, but only citizens, each as important as the next?

To be effective, the constitution must be rooted in South African history and tradition. It must draw on the traditions of freedom in all communities, not just those who at this historical juncture are in the forefront of the freedom struggle.

There is in fact not a section of the population, whatever its position today, that has not at some time in its history fought for freedom. Many of the foreparents of the whites who live in the country today were refugees from persecution—the Huguenots who fled from massacre because of their faith in France, the Jews who escaped from pogroms and then from Nazi terror. Thousands of English-speaking whites presently occupying important positions in the professions and public life, volunteered for military service against Nazism and fascism in Europe and later marched in the Torch Commandos against the extension of racist rule in South Africa.

South Africa has had an unusually large number of bishops who have been willing to go against the tide, usually stronger in their own churches than outside, as well as of writers and journalists and lawyers and academics and medical people, (even at least one freedom-fighting dentist and two road engineers).

There is not an Afrikaans-speaking white family that was not touched by the struggles over the right to speak Afrikaans and have an Afrikaner identity; Boer heroism against the might of the British Empire became legendary throughout the world, and is part of South African patrimony, just as the concentration camps in which thousands of civilians died are part of our shame.

Workers from all over the world, driven by hunger and unemployment, came to work on the mines in South Africa, where they died in huge numbers of lung disease, hundreds fell at the barricades, gun in hand, as they fought against reduction in wages, and the tradition of singing freedom songs as patriots faced execution was started by four trade unionists who sang the Red Flag as they mounted the gallows.

Many South African women joined the suffragette movement and challenged the physical, legal, and psychological power of male rule.

Apartheid has distorted this history, subordinating each and every action to its racist context, suppressing all that was noble and highlighting all that was ugly. The ideals of democracy and freedom are presented as white ideals, the assumption being that blacks are only interested in a full stomach, not in questions of freedom. Daily life refutes this notion.

It is the anti-apartheid struggle, not the white presence, that has kept democracy alive in South Africa. Anti-apartheid in South Africa has come to mean pro-democracy. The principles of non-racial democracy have for decades now become part and parcel of the anti-apartheid movement, and through it, have emerged as strong themes in South African life. It is not just the number of organisations that have indicated support for

a document such as the Freedom Charter that proves this, but the growth of a powerful, alternative democratic culture in the country. The culture of democracy is strong precisely because people have had to struggle for it.

In the last resort, the strongest guarantee of freedom in South Africa lies in the hearts of the oppressed. It is they more than anyone who know what it is like to have their homes bull-dozed into the ground, to be moved from pillar to post, to be stopped in the streets or raided at night, to be humiliated because of who their parents are or on account of the language they speak. Inviolability of the home, freedom of movement, the rights of the personality, free speech—they fight for these each and every day. If the constitution is suffused with the longing of the ordinary people for simple justice and peace, then freedom in South Africa is ensured.

For many years, supporters of majority rule looked with suspicion on the idea of a Bill of Rights and the rule of law. On the other hand, proponents of entrenching fundamental rights and freedoms balked at the notion of one person one vote. Two currents that for a long time tended to flow in different directions are now joined together. In turn, solving the questions of political rights and of fundamental liberties makes it possible to give guarantees in relation to the aspect of cultural diversity. All taken together make it possible to contemplate manifestly fair procedures for regulating the process of eliminating the inequalities created by apartheid.

Spelt out in terms of constitutional principles, one can envisage the following cluster of entrenched guarantees:

The constitution will be designed in such a way as to ensure full and equal participation in political and civil life for all South Africans, irrespective of race, colour, gender or creed.

Discrimination on the basis of race, etc., will be outlawed, and machinery created to prevent insult, abuse, or ill-treatment on such grounds.

There will be a multi-party system with freedom of speech and assembly and periodical elections to choose Parliament and the government.

There will be a Bill of Rights guaranteeing fundamental human rights and liberties to all citizens. This Bill of Rights will be entrenched in the constitution and will be justiciable, that is, persons alleging infringements of their rights will be able to seek a remedy by recourse to the courts. Provision should be made to ensure equal access to the courts independently of financial means.

The application of the doctrine of the separation of powers will establish a system of checks and balances between Parliament and the executive, and guarantee that the judiciary is independent in fulfilling its functions of upholding the rule of law and defending the principles of the constitution.

Steps will be taken to ensure that there is vigorous government at the local and regional levels subject to the principles of permanent accountability and active community participation.

Within the context of a single citizenship and a common patriotism and loyalty, the diversity of the South African population will receive constitutional recognition through provisions guaranteeing the free expression of religious, cultural and linguistic rights.

The opening up of equal opportunities for all and the process of redistribution of wealth in the country will be conducted according to constitutionally-defined principles covering public interest, affirmative action and fair procedures, with the courts having the power of judicial review in relation to the defence of these principles.

These are not provisions for black South Africans or for white South Africans, but for all South Africans; the last word goes to freedom.

*** Role of Indian Community in Struggle Viewed**

90AF0516A London *THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST* (No 122) in English 1990 Third Quarter pp 29-41

[Article by Abdul Karrim: "The Indian People and the National Democratic Movement"]

[Text] Contradictory cultures of resistance and collaboration shape the response of the Indian community to the national democratic revolution. This article agrees with the call made by some NIC [Natal Indian Congress] and TIC [Transvaal Indian Congress] activists at the meeting between a cross-section of the Indian community and the ANC [African National Congress] in October 1988 for an assessment of the appropriateness of previously held analyses and strategic and tactical positions.

It aims to analyse the Indian reality in the light of two strands of resistance and collaboration which permeate the community. This contribution will take the following as its basic theses:

- the place of the Indian community in the developing South African nation cannot be seen in isolation from that of the national question generally. The solution of the national question, in turn, takes into account the specifics of the ethnic and cultural groups in the country.
- that the national oppression faced by Indians, Coloureds and Africans lays the basis for these people to address themselves to a common enemy;
- the recognition of class differentiation assists in the exposure of both a democratic and a reactionary culture in every group.
- despite the existence of a minority, reactionary, collaborationist group, there is an objective basis for the unity of the major section of the Indian people with the rest of the exploited sections of South Africa;

- the phenomenon of inter-racial/inter-ethnic conflict must be placed in its socio-economic context, and seen as the tool of state policy and of reactionary forces within both the black and white communities;
- ultimately the national question can only be solved in the process of struggle—now and in a post-apartheid South Africa. The struggle against apartheid should lay the basis for the resolution of this question, while the achievement of state power by the democratic forces will allow us to intervene more decisively.

The Indian Community Today

The Indian community has enjoyed an upward mobility in relation to the rest of the oppressed. The 70's and 80's have witnessed a process whereby its overwhelmingly proletarian character with middle class elements and a limited commercial bourgeoisie has changed due to the specific place the Indian community occupies in the South African political economy.

Today the community is broadly divided into those facing severe hardships not unlike those of their compatriots in the African and Coloured communities, the large middle strata and the significant commercial, industrial, agricultural and financial bourgeoisie.

Where in 1911, 142,670 Indians were involved in the agricultural sector¹, in 1980 the figure stood at 3,122! Furthermore, in the Transvaal the Indian proletariat has disappeared completely, having absorbed into supervisory and clerical positions. In fact, the supervisory and clerical sector constitutes almost 25 percent of the total economically active Indians (TEA) which numerically is 256,000². The figure for clerical workers is 49,209 and that for supervisors and other such categories 13,493.

The manufacturing sector, which at this point displays the highest level of militancy among Indian workers, represents about 37 percent of total economically active Indians. In 1985 the figure stood at 88,600 after having peaked to 95,300 in 1981.³ This decline is due mainly to increasing unemployment, which for the Indian community stood at 23,000 in 1985.⁴

The main branches of manufacturing in which Indian workers are involved include: clothing, textiles, food and footwear (all employing more than 5,000 Indians). Of the number of Indians employed in the manufacturing sector the majority are unionised under the recently launched South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (SACTWU).

Those sections employed as supervisors, clerks, and industrial workers (representing about 62 percent of the TEA) are part of the struggling masses of South Africa. They suffer economic hardships in common with other exploited South Africans. A survey carried out by MONITOR, a journal of the Human Rights Trust, of the different communities in Port Elizabeth revealed that Africans, Coloureds and Indians all cite apartheid policy, unemployment, racial discrimination and the shortage of housing as among the biggest problems faced.⁵

Whereas Africans may have been educated to be nothing more than 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' Indians were channelled into clerical positions. Due account has to be given to those in the upper supervisory and clerical layer who may be above the station of 'boss boys' and whose income allows them to escape the category of the struggling masses. This more privileged group, in conjunction with the professionals, traders and artisans, could be seen as the middle classes of the Indian communities. Of the middle strata the professionals are the most significant, representing 10 percent of the TEA, with teachers making up about half the number. During the 60's, 70's and the first half of the 80's the Indian community had the greatest concentration of university graduates.

Most Indians use English as their sole language.⁶ Of those still using the languages of their forefathers the Hindi and Tamil-speaking are by far the largest while there are many Telegu, Gujarati, and Urdu speakers. The two main religions are Hinduism (the overwhelming majority) and Islam, while a few are Christians. The remainder consists of Buddhists and atheists.

The implementation of the Group Areas Act has had a major impact on sections of the Indian community. It is usually the middle-aged and older group, that is people in their forties and older, who have felt the impact most. They were adolescents or older when they were forcibly removed from their residential areas.

Reactionary Tendency and Reality

Progressives, long fed on the splendid history of resistance of the Indian people, particularly of the 40's and 50's, must be as bold as the activists who met the ANC in Lusaka and admit that 'physical/geographical (residential) separation of the Indian sector from the African sector for 25 years has led to the development of a narrow, insular approach to national political questions and a kind of cultural introversion'.⁷

The state, aided by reactionaries, encourages a xenophobic 'minority syndrome' which is based on some aspects of the Indian reality. The reactionaries would, for example, point out that the Indian reality is such that ordinary Indians could arise from their Chatsworth home, send their children to an Indian school, travel on a bus owned and driven by Indians, buy a lunch time meal of Indian curry from an Indian owned take-away, consult Indian doctors at the RK Khan Hospital, be represented by an Indian attorney; pray, play, shop amongst Indians, be protected by Indian policemen and sleep to the tune of an Indian radio station. In fact, the reactionaries would argue, the Indians in South Africa are better off than they would ever have been in India so why should they change their situation?

The constant reminder that Indians have an ancient civilisation is used by the reactionaries to encourage a sense of cultural superiority over the African and Coloured people. The high percentage of professionals or

the number of successful matriculants are used to argue that Indians enjoy a mental superiority over other black people.

The comparatively low crime rate in the Indian community is produced as evidence that other communities are inherently violent. The experiences of Indians in Cato Manor, Evaton and Inanda and in some independent African countries are used to encourage fear for the future under majority rule. Hinduism and Islam are used to justify fatalism.

The group which has most consistently pursued such reactionary policies and which benefits most from it is the Indian upper class. A survey of the history of the Indian community in South Africa reveals that while there has been a militant tradition, a moderate or reformist leadership has also been in existence. The latter originated from the Indian merchant class which accompanied those who arrived under conditions very similar to that of slavery. The reformist grouping sought to distance itself from indentured and ex-indentured workers. Indeed, they went to the extent of saying that it was unfortunate that 'all Indians, freed and free are attempted to be put on same scale.'⁸

In the first few decades of this century this reformist grouping occupied centre stage in Indian politics, waging campaigns which sought to alleviate the 'lot of the community'. In reality these campaigns were directed at the improvement of business opportunities of the emerging commercial bourgeoisie whilst trying to rally the other Indian classes behind their demands.

Ethno-centrism

The policies advanced by the early moderates and present day reactionaries can only be labelled as 'Indian ethnocentrism'. Lacking a common territory, language or religion, their separatism can only take the form of extra-territorial autonomy. Untenable scientifically and practically, the idea that Indians—because of their cultural peculiarities—constitute a separate nation is politically reactionary. The exercise of extra-territorial autonomy (which is also fostered by the regime) is described, in part, by Yunus Carrim:

'Hindi and Arabic are offered at schools, rather than Zulu. Pupils are also given a half-day off in mourning for Indira Gandhi's death. 'Indian culture' is given concerted encouragement.'⁹

For the Indian people, whose daily life allows for the minimal contact with the African people, the racially divided education system can only mean the perpetuation of their isolation.

The building of non-racial unity in struggle has been the constant objective of progressive activists. There are various historical and contemporary blockages which need to be overcome. Organisers in the Indian community have to struggle against the effects of events such as those in Cato Manor, Inanda and Evaton. Many sections

of the Indian people, especially the present older generation, have tended to develop a persecution complex, seeing the African masses as 'anti-Indian'.¹⁰

What persists of this self perceived 'anti-Indianism' is used by the reactionaries to tie the Indian masses to their own collaborators, wooing them away from African/Indian unity. Historically the phenomenon arose from the practices of the Afrikaner petit-bourgeoisie who saw the Indian merchants as a threat to their livelihood. Hence the use of various devices to curb Indian commercial expansion—segregated trading areas, disallowing Indians into the Orange Free State and the fanning of racial animosity between Africans and Indians as witnessed by the 1949 'riots' in Cato Manor.¹¹

Writing about the tragic events in 1985 Heribert Adam says:

'Inanda is the only area in South Africa where Africans and Indians live side by side, albeit in different classes... though many Indians, too, dwell in shacks. The riots confirmed the success of the state in alienating the divided segments from each other through separate institutions and different incorporations.'¹²

The present day experience of 'inter-ethnic/racial' conflict also arises from a set of conditions to which different sectors of the African people react. It occurs in the context of the harsher privations African people suffer. The endemic poverty of the African people, especially in Natal where the vast majority of Indians live, makes the contrast starker given the relative economic advance of the Indian people over the past two decades. The relationship between Indians and Africans is confined to largely master/domestic servant, boss/worker, supervisor/underling, shopkeeper/consumer. The way many Indians relate to Africans at a personal/social level helps to fan the hostility which arises from the above mentioned relations.¹³

Furthermore, the likes of Gatsha Buthelezi, threatened by the progressive Indian elements in Natal, brandish the spectre of the 1949 riots, exploiting the base feelings of the communities. Their aim is to instil fear and hostility towards the progressive leadership.

The spontaneous reaction of the Indian community, save for those who have been actively involved in non-racial struggle, is to withdraw into their purdah and sleep with the devil they know. This reaction, like most spontaneous reactions only serves and gladdens the enemy. Indian ethno-centrism and anti-Indianism are two sides of the same coin; they feed on each other.

House of Delegates

The reactionary interpretation of Indian reality is also used by the regime to pursue its goal of suppressing the Indian masses. The colonial masters, having failed to blot out the Indian people through repatriation schemes and restrictions on Indian nationals migrating to South Africa, now superimpose the apartheid ideology over

the reactionary interpretation of the Indian reality—hoping to co-opt the entire community. It can be concluded that ethno-centrism and the apartheid ideology fuel each other. This is not without its contradictions. The tri-cameral system is the latest measure to be used in the pursuance of such a strategy.

The 1984 and 1989 elections of the Indian component of the Tricameral system, the House of Delegates, has returned a consistent poll of only 20 percent of the registered voters. This comes down to about 10 percent of the potential voters. Campaigns around the elections by progressive organisations stressed solidarity with the African majority, the incapacity of the House of Delegates to bring about change and the tradition of resistance to apartheid in the Indian community. However, the consistency of the poll figures shows that the collaborators have been able to consolidate a percentage of the electorate into a bloc. The distribution of the votes indicates that this bloc is spread through various sectors of the community.¹⁴

The House of Delegates has been given a certain leverage which it uses to effect. Thus a system of patronage has been developing where those belonging to the correct language group and found to be politically acceptable are given promotion, speedy allocations of homes and trading licences, among other things. The cases of nepotism abounded to such an extent that the state had to appoint the James Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of Amichand Rajbansi. It has emerged that those belonging to the Hindi speaking group have been most favoured by Rajbansi's regime. It is practices of this nature which, in part, explain the spread of the voters through various class backgrounds. The factors which promote ethno-centrism complete the explanation.

While this bloc has become consolidated there has also been a consolidation of the majority opposed to the Tricameral scheme. The cases of corruption—be it nepotism, greasing of palms or personal kick-backs—have discredited the collaborators even further. They have come to be seen by many as 'an embarrassment to the community'.¹⁵

A common thread of a moral and principled opposition to apartheid runs through the section opposed to the Tricameral system. This opposition has made possible the mobilisation of major sections of the community in the pursuit of a just and equitable system. But, as argued above, such opposition comes unstuck on the thorny issues of social relations. It is clear that the majority of Indians are steadfast in the pursuit of power for the people and can play an even greater role. However, if the issues identified above on the question of resolving the national question in relation to the Indian community are not addressed it could become a community alienated from the post-apartheid progressive developments.

The exploitation of the Indian community—though veiled by relatively better housing, higher state and

private funding of education and training and cheaper transport—cannot be wished away under the present system. As the masses increasingly assert themselves, the inability of the House of Delegates, and the rest of the structures of apartheid, to bring about major changes will become clearer.

A Culture of Resistance

Reaction has spun the threads of Indian experience into a web of false self-perception and deceptions about other South Africans and about their positions in South Africa.

Democrats must take as their starting position that 'this process of spreading a national (as opposed to ethnic or tribal) consciousness and the national consolidation of existing state entities is, in the modern Africa era, generally a weapon of liberation and social advance'.¹⁶ The strategic task facing democrats is to untangle the web of deception and weave a new tapestry representative of the racial oppression and exploitation Indians suffer in common with the majority of South Africans. This weaving process must highlight the need for unity.

"The struggle for national cohesion in multi-ethnic communities does not imply the imposition of cultural uniformity. Cultural diversity does not stand in contradiction to national unity. Such a unity can be made up of a totality of both distinct and inter-mingling cultures which in their totality constitute the culture of the ... people as a whole'.¹⁷

It is a fact that the Indians of South Africa display distinct differences in their socio-cultural make-up from that of their relatives in other parts of Africa. Apart from the Indians who landed in Mauritius none of the other communities have a history of indentured labour. This basic class difference, with the Indians in the rest of the continent being mainly of merchant origin, lays an objective basis for the incorporation of much of what is regarded as being Indian into the national democratic culture.

When referring to the culture of the Indian people in South Africa it is incorrect to refer to it as 'Indian' culture; it is very much an Indian South African culture—Indians in South Africa, despite the ambiguities they may express about other South Africans, do not owe an allegiance to the Indian state. Relations with the sub-continent are based largely on religious, cultural and familial grounds. Such relations can only be afforded by those with means. Returning to India is not entertained as an option if 'things get bad for the Indians'. Despite 'a strong sense of being Indian' (Carrim) there is an equally strong sense of being South African.

At the same time we must guard against the tendency of rejecting all that is Indian—which some of the less mature activists have tended to do. We must seek out, encourage and bring to the fore each and every spark of democracy in every religion or cultural form.

The strands can be drawn from history. Despite the posturing of some of the moderates in the first few decades of this century, the history of the Indian people remains the history of struggle against colonialism and apartheid. The 1911 strike on the coal mines by Indian workers, the principles of Satyagraha and the campaigns led by Gandhi, are examples which still find resonance in the Indian community—particularly among the older generations. The passive resistance campaigns, the forced removals due to the Group Areas Act, the Dadoo-Xuma-Naicker pact, Ahmed Kathrada ... these are factors with which the community identifies and which continue to shape much of the community's political perceptions.

Most importantly, the culture of struggle comes from the deprivation common to all blacks due to unemployment and high rentals, expensive medicine in overcrowded hospitals and clinics, a costly education which prepares their children inadequately and the pittance which is dished out as old age pensions.

It comes from the tradition of joint struggle which is being revived under the leadership of the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the united democratic front and which will be stimulated now that the ANC [African National Congress] and SACP [South African Communist Party] are legal once again.

Common Future

Ultimately, it comes from the vision of a common future which the President of the African National Congress, OR Tambo, elaborated most clearly: 'We conceive of our country as a single united democratic and non-racial state, belonging to all who live in it, in which all shall enjoy equal rights, and in which sovereignty comes from the people as a whole, and not from a collection of bantustans and racial and tribal groupings organised to perpetuate minority power.'¹⁸

From the 1940's onwards, the main Indian-based political organisations have been led by far-sighted patriots. Radical leadership has emerged from the middle strata, as well as the working class. Of the former it is the professionals who, owing no loyalty to the authorities and armed with an enlightened world view, have stepped forward into leadership roles. It should be emphasised though that this leadership derives its progressive nature mainly from its identification with—not in spite of—the working class.

Today the numerically significant middle strata responds in sympathy to or actively supports the NIC/TIC [Natal Indian Congress/Transvaal Indian Congress]. Some elements from this strata however, have problems with the 'Indian' tag and prefer to work with organisations which have a strictly non-racial form. The radicals of today, as well as those of the fifties, represent the democratic culture of the toiling masses, but the life blood of this culture remains in the womb of the working class.

Indian big-businessmen, almost to a man, collaborate in some government structure or other. They must be made to realise that while the whites regulate and deregulate trading areas today, the extent to which they can significantly improve their lot is deliberately hemmed in. As Joe Slovo explains:

"Under a people's government the black middle and upper classes will be better off economically and in every other aspect of their lives than they are now. In this sense the national democratic revolution represents their immediate interests as a class; it provides a legitimate and principled basis for the kind of inter-class alliance which is projected by our liberation front."¹⁹

Mobilising the Indian Community

The key organisations addressing themselves to the political mobilisation of the Indian people have had to resort to a combination of arousing people around the question of basic issues such as wages, rents and the cost of living, as well as on the basis of a moral commitment to justice and fair play.

Since the repressive days of the early 60's to the beginning of the 80's the Indian working class has been playing a relatively passive role. This occurred despite the massive waves of strikes during 1973 which rocked the Durban area where the greatest concentration of Indian workers is located. Shamim Marie in her contribution on the history of the Indian workers described this period as one in which 'African workers had started to rise up. Indian workers stood by and watched'.²⁰

It is generally agreed that the relative passivity of the Indian workers during these two decades was due to a number of factors including the further division of Indians from their fellow African workers through the movement into more skilled, supervisory and clerical jobs, the effects of the Group Areas Act and other apartheid institutions, the state's increased per capita expenditure on Indian education and housing, and, perhaps most importantly, the repression which the Indian working class movement had to face from as early as the beginning of the 50's.

However, the 1980's have seen spectacular developments within the Indian community which have underlined the commitment of major sections to the destruction of apartheid. The following serve as highlights in these developments: the 1980/81 education and rent boycotts, the 1981 Anti-SAIC campaign, the rejection of the tri-cameral system in 1984 and again in 1989. The funeral in Chatsworth in 1988 of fallen MK cadre Lenny Naidoo and in Lenasia in December 89 of Prakash Napier and Yusuf Aklahwaya are further indications of the often over-looked potential grassroots militancy which has seen many Indians join the ranks of the People's Army/Umkhonto we Sizwe and the underground structures of the ANC and the SACP.

The most striking advance has been in the clothing and textile sectors where the majority of the Indian working

people in Natal are employed. These sectors have been transformed from passive sectors to militant ones, returning uniformly high figures for the stayaways called for June 6, 7 and 8 in 1988 as well [as] those called for September 6, 1989.

It was not surprising, then, that within this climate a broad delegation of about 70 Indian men and women with occupations ranging from workers, trade unionists, doctors, teachers, priests of different religions, to owners of factories met with the ANC in October 1988. This meeting represented the formal recognition by a significant section of the Indian community of the ANC as the vanguard of the national democratic struggle.

Nevertheless, there have also been contradictory tendencies. Organisers in the Indian areas reported in 1985 the growth of a conservatism which was not only in response to events at Inanda and Evaton, where Indian businesses were looted, but also to the overtly violent form the struggle was assuming in the African townships during the uprisings of 1984-1986. Organisers in Indian areas, some of whom had been active in their communities since the 70's, were expressing exasperation at the fact that, despite almost five years of consistent work promoting the ideals of non-racialism, the community was reacting in such a negative manner.

Reactionaries encouraged this by exploiting fears which were a product of the state's divide and rule policy. During the conflicts in Inanda, false alarms spread in Indian areas of impending attacks by Africans would send people either scuttling into their homes or, armed with pangas and other weapons including firearms, into the so-called 'defence committees'. These were largely run by people with reactionary connections and could be found in areas which were a great distance from any African township as well as those immediately adjacent.

It was a period of introspection as activists battled to find the correct approach to organising the Indian community in that climate. It was also a period when the state and its collaborators were refining their methods for their overall objective—that of co-opting the entire Indian community into the apartheid system.

Progressive Ethnicity

Lenin, in his explanation of the process of cultural differentiation provides further insight into the question as to why a community having such a rich history of resistance, with a relatively well-developed tradition of working class struggle, can still have moments of reactionary fervour or even long periods of passivity. He says:

"The elements of democratic and socialist culture are present, if only in rudimentary form, in every national culture, since in every nation there are toiling masses, whose conditions inevitably give rise to the ideology of

democracy and socialism. But every nation also possesses a bourgeois culture (and most nations a reactionary and clerical culture as well) in the form, not merely of 'elements', but of the dominant culture."²¹

It is clear that the Indian community is not a homogeneous grouping with predictable responses and attitudes. That there exists an objective basis for the Indian community to develop a South African consciousness over and above an ethnic one is also clear. Given the peculiarities of this section of the South African oppressed, it must be recognised that there are certain obstacles to the development of a national, democratic consciousness.

The objective of the vanguard movement must be to reach the point where this community can be led by the ANC without the mediation of progressive Indian organisations. Leadership arising from the African masses is recognised as leadership of all the people. This requires that progressive Indian organisations surrender, step-by-step, terrain which is being organised by national formations like the South African Youth Congress, non-racial women, professional and sports organisations, as well as formations which span the religious spectrum. The strides made by the clothing and textile workers under the leadership of the Congress of South African Trade Unions stands in the van of the developments possible by the pursuit of such an approach.

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Angola

MPLA, UNITA Delegations To Meet 27-28 Aug

LD1708100590 Lisbon International Service
in Portuguese 0900 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Text] The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA] and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] delegations are due to meet in Lisbon on 27 and 28 August for another round of peace talks. The terms of a cease-fire will be the focus of this meeting. At the moment, the two sides have different concerns: The MPLA insists on the need to obtain a cease-fire; UNITA wants to be recognized as a legal movement. Jonas Savimbi's movement wants a multi-party system recognized in Angola and wants an electoral timetable from the outset.

In the meantime, in Lisbon, a nongovernmental organization—Mission of Studies for Development and cooperation—has made an international appeal for humanitarian aid for the victims of the drought in Angola.

UNITA Leader on Cease-Fire, Talks Propsects

PM1608103590 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 8 Aug 90 p 4

[Eduardo Mascarenhas report: "Jonas Savimbi to DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: 'I Do Not Like Living in Jamba'"]

[Text] UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] Chairman Jonas Savimbi, who received the DIARIO DE NOTICIAS special correspondent for about an hour Saturday [4 Aug] evening, shortly before the latter began his journey back to Lisbon, said that he believes that a cease-fire, too, "will have to be promoted by the Portuguese."

"If a cease-fire agreement is signed with Portugal's assistance and following recognition of the principles which we will not renounce, Lisbon will have gained the trust of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] (or of the People's Republic of Angola), the United States, and the Soviet Union, and will then be able to go further," UNITA's top leader told the journalist.

In Jonas Savimbi's opinion, Portugal could thus shoulder new responsibilities in the Angolan reconciliation process by playing "a very important role in monitoring the cease-fire," integrated into other contingents, "such as those of the United Nations, which appears to be interested."

However, the UNITA chairman displayed awareness of possible adverse effects on public opinion in Portugal, stemming from the possible return of Portuguese troops to Angola, but he strove to play down its psychological effects.

"They will be not combatant contingents but logistics, topographical, and aerial photography contingents, and the Portuguese forces, who know the land best, will be able to help the United Nations decide on the places

from which it will be most effective to monitor the cease-fire," Savimbi maintained. He added that he believes that if the Portuguese public realize that their country's Armed Forces are returning to Angola not in order to wage war but in order to "consolidate peace," they will receive the initiative favorably.

UNITA's stance on the matter is already known to the Portuguese authorities. Savimbi revealed that he disclosed this desire to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Durao Barroso during the meeting the two men held recently in Morocco. "We have not yet received a reply," he stated.

Portuguese Mediation

The Portuguese authorities do not publicly regard themselves as formal mediators in the process of resolving the Angolan conflict. However, in Savimbi's opinion the Portuguese Government is right now actually "the mediator."

"The Portuguese Government does not accept being called a mediator in order not to clash with President Mobutu's official position, but we fervently want Portugal to succeed, and if, as we hope, this happens, its mediatory role will be indisputable," the UNITA chairman told the DIARIO DE NOTICIAS special correspondent in his study at Jamba.

Portugal's more direct involvement in this stage of the Angolan process, he maintained, began only after his visit to Lisbon at the beginning of this year. Savimbi revealed that when he spoke in Lisbon with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and with the secretary of state for foreign affairs and cooperation he received a negative response to an initial feeler about a Portuguese mediatory role in the conflict.

"They immediately said to me 'No,' that Portugal was not interested in accepting such a position, because it would not be able to do much owing to its limited influence, but after I had persisted for an hour they changed their stance, maintaining that if the MPLA also requested Portuguese mediation, they would consider the possibility," Savimbi stated. He now has no doubt that Luanda has also requested it.

Negotiations in August

The third stage of the negotiations between the Luanda government and UNITA is supposed to begin this week. This will not happen because, according to UNITA's version, the MPLA has requested a postponement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Durao Barroso, although on vacation, is conducting demarches with the two sides in order to ensure that the new round of negotiations takes place before the end of the first half of August, as is reported, moreover, elsewhere in this issue of DIARIO DE NOTICIAS.

The UNITA chairman believes that the MPLA's request is significant but not grave, and so "should not be dramatized." It is significant, he explained, because the

stage has been reached of the unavoidable recognition of UNITA by Luanda, which shows that it is trying to avoid it by seeking, as previously, to escape "the pressure from the Americans and the Portuguese" in search "of the South Africans" and of another course, which "would be that of South Africa and Cape Verde."

"In vain," he said, "because Cape Verde, following Portugal's example, is also telling it that it will have to recognize UNITA, and South Africa is reminding it that it recognized the African National Congress as the opposition."

"Right now, the MPLA can find no champion to support its views, and so either it recognizes UNITA or it prolongs the war until the revision of the Constitution, which is in December, but if it does so it will be condemned, and that is why I do not believe that it has any choice but to continue the negotiations and sign a cease-fire agreement this year," Jonas Savimbi told the journalist, who had asked him about the reasons for his confidence about the date when the MPLA and UNITA will silence their weapons.

Savimbi in Luanda

UNITA will not fire a single shot after the signing of the cease-fire agreement, added Savimbi, who showed no reluctance to live in Luanda with his family after that event, not only because he has always been "very well received" by the city's population but also for another reason.

This is that, he said, "I am no villager; I have always led my life in towns and cities, and I do not like living in Jamba, where I find myself, like many other UNITA members, owing to adverse circumstances."

* MPLA Dissident Discusses Hopes for Democracy

90AF0453B Lisbon JORNAL DE O DIA
in Portuguese 10 Jul 90 p 12

[Interview with Professor Manuel Santos Lima, by Adulcino Silva: "Agostinho Neto Was Forced on the MPLA by the Communists"]

[Text] Like some other African young people of the 60's, he felt, or thought that he felt, that "he could doubt everything and everybody, except the revolution." A few years later came the crumbling of the wall of their illusions and the growing tide of disappointment, of disillusionment. To the ears of these young people, inebriated by the independence of their lands, came the screaming and the groaning from the victims of their own people, who are now wasting away and starving. To talk about all of this, we interviewed Professor Manuel Santos Lima.

"There is a conspiracy against the Third World, and the people running the governments of those very countries are accomplices in that conspiracy. And within 10 years, Africa will have 600 million poor people."

This statement comes from Dr. Manuel Santos Lima, a writer, poet, retired professor, and founder and first chief commander of the People's Liberation Army of Angola.

Santos Lima was one of the main driving forces behind the First Congress for Democracy in the Portuguese-Speaking Countries of Africa, which was held in Lisbon. In an exclusive interview that he granted to O DIA, he made some controversial statements, such as the following: "After assuming the power of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], Agostinho Neto proved to be a dictator, a stubborn man, and for that reason, it was not possible to work democratically with him."

[Silva] Was that the reason that you abandoned the MPLA?

[Santos Lima] I left the MPLA in 1963, because that struggle, the way that it was being pursued, had lost all meaning for me, because it was condemning Angola to the status of a protectorate, but also because Agostinho Neto was not allowing any voice that differed from his own to be heard, in political and military terms. He is one of the founders of the MPLA in the underground, and had been the companion of Amilcar Cabral, even if he was younger.

He also reveals that, in 1950, while he was still a student at the Casa dos Estudantes do Imperio [House of Students from the Empire], he participated in a meeting of a political nature at the Politeama Cinema, where it was decided that Marcelino dos Santos would be the representative of the movement in Paris among the African contingent.

[Santos Lima] His escape was carried out in the strictest secrecy, because the political police were closing in on our group. Three days after Marcelino dos Santos's 'leap,' Mario Pinto de Andrade went into exile in the French capital, and I was supposed to follow him to Paris in 1958. However, the PIDE [International Police for Defense of the State] apprehended me as I was leaving the country.

Justifying his knowledge of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, Manuel dos Santos Lima said that he acquired them at the Practical Infantry School, adding: "I must have been the first black official of the Portuguese army in the territory of what was then metropolitan Portugal." After a brief pause, this professor of literature in Montreal (Canada) and at the University of Rennes (France), and member of the Societe Africaine de Culture (Paris), the African Literature Association (Edmonton), and the Union of Angolan Writers (Luanda), stated: "I deserted from Portugal in 1961 to join the MPLA in Rabat. Later, I headed for Conacry, Brazzaville, and Leopoldville, having founded the People's Liberation Army of Angola during that year [1961], and having worked out all the military organization work in duplicate, because Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] needed that work too."

Continuing to recall his political and military career, Manuel Santos Lima added that the PAIGC [African

Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde] also based itself on that work that he did. He went on to say: "I met with Nelson Mandela in Rabat." He had the support of the Algerians "because it was in Algeria that the MPLA guerrillas were being trained, according to a preestablished program, keeping in mind the tactics of Portuguese counter guerrilla warfare."

Questioned about the countless deaths and the physical injuries that the war in Angola has caused, and still continues to cause, Santos Lima seemed to express some regret, saying: "If it were possible to go back and do it over again, I would certainly not proceed in the same manner." He added, however: "My participation in the MPLA was beneficial, because it always operated under military rules and discipline, and in the most humane way possible in a war situation. Anyone who, under my command, violated the rules of military discipline was severely punished, because I did not want us to be a band of criminals."

In 1962, however, the conflicts within the MPLA became sharper with "the entry of Agostinho Neto, who was forced upon it by the Portuguese Communist Party. It was an investment by the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] in the struggle against the presence of the Portuguese in Africa." Time went by and the disillusionment that was caused by the Portuguese and the international Left began piling up. "We began to see that the real struggle had been betrayed, and with it, a whole generation. It was then that Viriato da Cruz became a dissident, since he was shaping up to be a member of the pro-China faction, and Agostinho Neto was proving to be a member of the pro-Soviet faction. Agostinho Neto's faction won, but it has since shown that it is not up to the task. The MPLA split apart, and the degeneration of the movement has led to dissidence."

Mysterious Disappearance of MPLA Soldiers

Professor Santos Lima relates a case of which few people are aware. "At the time of the first national MPLA conference in Leopoldville, during the presidency of Agostinho Neto, there were cases of mysterious disappearance of soldiers in the movement who were opposed to the ideas of the man who would eventually be the first president of the People's Republic of Angola. As of today, no one has tried to find out what happened, but many people, such as I, harbor strong suspicions that those soldiers were shot, and that those shootings were covered up."

Still referring to Agostinho Neto, Santos Lima recognizes the fact that "He did not have the merit that the communists attributed to him."

With regard to the presence of Portugal and England in Africa, there were a number of differences. Speaking about these, Santos Lima stresses: "The Portuguese are more spontaneous, for good or for bad. Portugal lacked the technical means to exploit the soil and the subsoil,

and the socioeconomic difference between the two colonial powers expressed itself in the land and in relations with the people."

In 1961, Santos Lima married a Portuguese woman in Morocco, and two years later, he emigrated to Switzerland, pursuing his university studies, which were interrupted, however, because he had chosen to get his doctoral degree in Romance languages. In 1967, he took up residence in Canada, where he still resides today. He teaches at a Canadian university, at another French university, and has yet another teaching position at the Superior School of Education in Santarem. He is a writer, and has already had several books published, among which the following titles stand out: "The Seeds of Freedom," "Tears and Wind," "Disillusioned Independence," and "The Dwarves and the Beggars." But his books "did not circulate in Angola."

Second Struggle

He left the MPLA. He felt betrayed, as he has previously stated.

Why, then, did he return to the struggle?

[Santos Lima] It is a different struggle now, a second struggle against the dictatorship that has been forced on Angolans. In this struggle, I am committed to the task of assembling and organizing the democratic forces of civilian society and obtaining from them the political commitment to achieve two fundamental objectives: the proclamation of a State of Law for Angola, and the installation of a multiparty system, given the fact that there are more than seven million Angolans who have no active means of political expression, the National Unity Movement having been born for that reason."

Stating that he is "not worried about the form but rather about the content of the democracy that is to be established in Angola," Professor Santos Lima, bolstering the thesis that restoring democracy in Angola is feasible, cites "the example of Namibia," followed by a condemnation of "the acts of harsh violence in Eastern Europe."

With regard to the steps that have been taken toward peace in Angola, Santos Lima is unequivocal: "These are fragile steps. Encourage them, but they are very fragile."

[Silva] What would happen to UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the MPLA/PT if democracy were suddenly restored to Angola?

[Santos Lima] They would both run the risk of dissolution if the process of democratization were to begin immediately. For this and other reasons, it becomes necessary to create two or three more political forces in Angola to interpose themselves between the two existing organizations so that we can move beyond the conflict.

And in conclusion: "Democratic unity is necessary in Angola so that there can be a victory over war and starvation."

*** Political Exile Announces 'Candidacy'**

90AF0453A Lisbon JORNAL DE O DIA
in Portuguese 11 Jul 90 pp 12-13

[Interview with the president of the Angolan Democratic Reformist Party, Rui Caldeira de Victoria Pereira, by Adulcino Silva]

[Text] Rui Caldeira de Victoria Pereira, an Angolan who is a political exile in Portugal, is launching a challenge to Jose Eduardo dos Santos and to the MPLA/PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola/Labor Party], daring to make public his candidacy for the presidency of the People's Republic of Angola, hoping that the current Angolan president "will keep his word and recognize that Angola cannot continue under Soviet-Cuban guardianship."

In a conversation with the reporter from O DIA, Rui Victoria Pereira explained that his candidacy arises out of the words of Eduardo dos Santos which were recently spoken, and at a moment when Angola can no longer continue to be colonized by Cuba.

Exiled to Portugal 14 years ago, Rui Victoria Pereira comes from one of the most highly respected families in Angola. He is married, has children, is Catholic, and was born in Luena (Moxico), Angola, in 1933. He is a technical engineer of topography and geometry, and is the brother of the deceased Milo, of the "Ouro Negro Duo."

"I will declare my candidacy for president of the Republic of Angola as soon as the necessary conditions for that purpose are met," he said, adding: "Meanwhile, I am taking steps in that direction [and have made contact] with international figures. I am doing this because of civic and patriotic conditions."

It is Rui Victoria Pereira's goal to "create a multiparty system and a Western-type democratic regime, and provide for the return to Angola of those Angolans abroad who have fled from political persecution, and the return of Portuguese citizens who have been stripped of all their possessions and have likewise fled for the same reasons." And he recalled: "There are nearly two million Angolans scattered throughout various countries in the world who, at the present time, find it impossible to return to their nation of origin because of political rivalries."

[Silva] What steps have you taken already in order to declare your candidacy?

[Pereira] I have already communicated my intention to the High Commissioner for the Displaced, and I have likewise informed other authorities from several countries. I have also written to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos. If I am elected, I will renegotiate the foreign debt, and I will not let them pull the wool over my eyes with regard to the debt that Angola owes to the USSR. This will be a very serious case, because I am not going to pay for war materiel that Russia provided to my country for the purpose of killing Angolans... I will uphold the

Catholic Church in Angola, without friction or disagreements, because I am an Angolan Catholic. I was baptized and married in the Catholic Church. It is obvious that I will not antagonize other religious institutions, nor will I allow the State to interfere, as the MPLA/PT has done, in the Church's affairs.

As for the current situation of the war in Angola, Rui Victoria Pereira expresses his point of view:

[Pereira] The war is being waged by the MPLA/PT. UNITA is defending itself. Even when it attacks, it is defending itself. The MPLA's original ideal was betrayed when it made a commitment to communism, and ended up by coming to power with the help of Marxists from abroad, including some Socialist-Fascist Portuguese.

Pereira accuses the movement led by Eduardo dos Santos of having "created elitism and having imposed it on the Angolan people at the same time that it was installing people in the state bureaucracy who were incompetent, and some of whom were corrupt."

Portugal in First Place

[Pereira] As far as foreign policy is concerned, in case I am elected, Portugal will enjoy a privileged relationship in fact, and not just in official documents and political speeches. It is important not to forget the unparalleled work that was done by the Portuguese colonizers over a period of almost five centuries, and the family relationships that still exist between (current) Angolans and Portuguese citizens. Moreover, it is in Portuguese that Angolans talk to each other and understand each other. It is also important not to forget, even for a moment, the missionary work that helped the Angolans make progress and understand the reason for their existence as "children of God." Angola without Portugal will be nothing, just as Portugal without Angola will not be very much. Portugal is a Euro-African country, which will have to be Angola's closest ally, and this country will have to be one of Portugal's closest allies. The greatest testimony to my words are the ancient blood ties and the sincere friendship, which are five centuries old. (One of Rui Victoria Pereira's key ideas is "to transform Angola into a federated state in order to unite all Angolans, including Cabinda.")

Invoking Article 435 of the United Nations charter, I intend to force Eduardo dos Santos to hold a popular referendum to change the current political Constitution of Angola (referring to the current impasse created by the MPLA/PT).

Peace and national reconciliation, as well as the development of Angola, are some of the main preoccupations of this candidate who is at the top of his country's hierarchy. And with regard to peace, Rui Victoria Pereira defends, without hesitation, "the path of political dialogue, not war. This has been the greatest and the most profound mistake that has been committed against the Angolan people."

We wanted to find out the reaction in Luanda to the announcement of his intention to become a candidate for the position of Angola's head of state. Rui Victoria Pereira

told us: "The news, which has already reached Angola, has been received very warmly among the popular classes, but it has left some of the authorities confounded." He added: "I have 200,000 Angolans with me."

To conclude this interview, it remains to be added that Rui Caldeira de Victoria Pereira is the president of the Angolan Democratic Reformist Party, which he formed while in exile on 14 November 1976.

Mauritius

* Acquittal in Soobiah Case Discussed

90AF0371A Port Louis L'EXPRESS in French
5 Jul 90 p 5

[Passages within slantlines published in English]

[Text] The former Mauritian high commissioner in London, Soo Soobiah, and his wife, Muriel Soobiah, were absolved yesterday afternoon of any guilt in the narcodollar laundering attempt by their son, Nigel Sevan, after a trial on the charges. The jury, composed of 12 persons, rendered a unanimous verdict of not guilty in the case against Soo and Muriel Soobiah, after deliberating for about an hour and 45 minutes at Court No. 13 of Southwark Crown Court in London.

It was 2:15 PM (London time) when the jury foreman announced the verdict of not guilty for Soo and Muriel Soobiah. The couple was immediately released. They were congratulated by their friends, who were in the courtroom, shortly after Judge Rucker left. Soo Soobiah was represented by Mr. Arlidge, Queen's Counsel, and Mr. Green, Queen's Counsel, defended Muriel Soobiah.

Moreover, Judge Rucker declared that the cost of this trial in Southwark Crown Court with three Queen's Counsel would be defrayed by the government ministry. The jury delivered a unanimous verdict of not guilty, because it reached the conclusion that Soo and Muriel Soobiah were not aware of the illegal activities of their son and that the assets involved were derived from drug trafficking.

Yesterday morning was reserved for the summation up and the instructions of Judge Rucker to the members of the jury. This final statement, which had begun the afternoon before, lasted about 2 hours and 15 minutes.

Judge Rucker first took up Nigel Sevan Soobiah's activities as a drug trafficker.

For the judge, there was no doubt that Nigel Sevan Soobiah was a true Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. On the one hand, Nigel Sevan Soobiah was trying to rehabilitate his friend, Martin Wynan, a heroin addict, while on the other he was shown to be an important drug trafficker. The judge also commented on the relationship between Nigel and Soo Soobiah, and concluded that "Nigel Sevan Soobiah became progressively isolated from his parents."

Judge Rucker admitted that even if Nigel's parents were not wise to his illegal activities, his friends were. The judge cited the case of Christopher Joyce, arrested in Buffalo, in the United States, at the same time as Nigel Sevan Soobiah. "It is perhaps obvious that Nigel would not want his parents to know about his drug dealings. There is no reason why he should have revealed it to them," Judge Rucker commented in his summation.

In taking up the matter of Soo and Muriel Soobiah's knowledge of Nigel Sevan Soobiah's drug trafficking activities, Judge Rucker examined the testimony presented by the various witnesses in Court No. 13 at Southwark Crown Court. "What did they know? What knowledge did drive to believe or to suspect about that?" [as published] the judge asked. He was referring to the testimony of the American attorney Robert Murphy.

The main concern of the American attorneys was to collect their fees, and Murphy was unable to broach the subject of the charges against Nigel because of the emotional state of Muriel Soobiah during her visit to Buffalo in December 1988. He also referred to Nigel Sevan Soobiah's arrest with seven kilos of marijuana (gandia) at Heathrow Airport in 1973.

"He was caught in possession of drugs in Algeria in 1975. There is some evidence that he was sentenced to a long-term imprisonment. The prosecution says that the defendants (Soo and Muriel Soobiah) have not told you the truth. It's a fair comment. You have to consider this," Judge Rucker pointed out yesterday morning.

Based on this background information, the judge said that: "There is no doubt that during the mid-eighties Nigel Sevan Soobiah was an active trafficker." But he went on to say that this information was unearthed by investigators in the Customs and Excise Department, because this department has the necessary resources and powers to conduct an inquiry of this sort. "But in view of their son's reluctance to discuss his activities, did the Soobiah's have easy access to this information?" Judge Rucker wondered.

To support his position that Nigel Sevan Soobiah was a major drug trafficker, the judge listed Nigel's assets, namely real estate in England, the United States, Amsterdam, Spain, and South Africa, and bank accounts in Australia. "Legitimate sources do not explain the funds to the tune of 1.11 million pounds," he said.

Commenting on Muriel Soobiah's decision to take charge of her son's assets after his arrest in the United States on drug charges, the judge maintained that Muriel Soobiah had taken the advice of an attorney in England. "One is perfectly right to rely upon the advice of a professional," he underlined.

Judge Rucker then analyzed Soo Soobiah's character. He explained that there was nothing sinister in the fact that Soo Soobiah "has built a good capital portfolio over the years." He also commented on his professional career.

As regards the \$45,000 in January 1986, the judge asked the jury not to consider it in their analysis of the facts, for this information came out during the opening statement of the case by the defense attorneys. "No doubt if the prosecution had known about it, there would have been allegations. Maybe they were the proceeds of drug dealings. But it is important to note that there is no allegation about it." Judge Rucker also pointed out that there were no charges to the effect that Soo Soobiah had abused his diplomatic immunity, even after his dismissal, to help his son after his arrest. "Are they significant lies?" the judge asked when he discussed the countertruths revealed during the initial investigation of Soo Soobiah by the Customs and Excise investigators in February of last year.

The judge then analyzed the events that occurred following Nigel Sevan Soobiah's arrest in Buffalo and the arrest of Soo and Muriel Soobiah. He spoke of the renovation of the Mauritian high commission, converting the high commissioner's dining room into an office, the removal of Soo Soobiah from office, the move to Greenside, the move of Muriel Soobiah to New York, the presentation of Soo's credentials at various capitals, and Muriel Soobiah's three-week vacation in Spain.

As regards Nigel Sevan Soobiah's letter to his mother in which he said: "Hanging over me is the twin of a huge sentence and all my things gone when I'm out," the judge explained that the letter had been written on 13 January 1989, and postmarked 31 January in the United States, and that she would have received it around 3 February at the earliest. "After that time, Soo and Muriel Soobiah only tried to sell the apartment on Mowberry Road," he added.

In conclusion, Judge Rucker asked the jury to weigh its decision carefully, because the main argument of the defense was that Soo and Muriel Soobiah knew nothing of their son Nigel's drug trafficking. "They must satisfy you on the balance of probabilities," he concluded in requesting the jury to return to the courtroom with a unanimous verdict. "Forget about majority verdict," he advised the jury.

Mozambique

Chissano Closes Central Committee Session

MB1508185890 Maputo Domestic Service
in Portuguese 1610 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] The Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] Party Central Committee ended its third session a few moments ago after unanimously approving the Frelimo Party Political Bureau report, four specific resolutions, and a final communique.

During the nine-day historical session characterized by intense debate, the Central Committee decided to approve the establishment of a multiparty system in Mozambique. Accordingly, it approved a resolution on principal issues to be taken into account in the drafting

of a new electoral law as well as the drafting of another law on principal issues to be taken into account in the drafting of the law on the existence of parties.

In its resolution on principal issues raised during the process of the debate over the proposed draft constitution, the Central Committee established a commission to prepare the final draft of the Constitution. The Central Committee favored an economic organization based on a market economy.

The Central Committee approved the removal of the word people's from the People's Republic of Mozambique, the People's Assembly, and the Supreme People's Court. Thus the People's Assembly will be called the Republic's Assembly while the Supreme People's Court will be called the Supreme Court. The Central Committee also decided to maintain existing land laws.

The Central Committee decided that the draft constitution should stipulate the absence of death sentence in the country and that the head of state should equally be the head of the government.

On national symbols, the Central Committee decided to maintain them; however, the wording of the national anthem will have to be changed, while the metical should be stipulated in the Constitution as the national currency.

The Central Committee also decided that the draft Constitution must stipulate the existence of the freedom of speech and the freedom of press and the right to information. It should also stipulate the existence of trade unions to be governed by ordinary law.

The Central Committee third session also decided that the draft law on parties must be submitted to the People's Assembly December session and issued a series of recommendations.

Other issues of fundamental importance for our country's life and future were also examined and turned into resolutions, including draft laws on the behavior, rights, and duties of senior state officials, as well on citizens who have performed duties outside the state apparatus.

The Central Committee also deeply examined the report on the military situation in the country and the first three years of the Economic Rehabilitation Program.

In an exhaustive final communique, the Central Committee examined issues mentioned above and drew up guidelines on the activity and operation of the party which, more than ever before, has the historical task of continuing to lead the process of broadening democracy and establishing peace and progress in the country.

The Central Committee recommended in particular the need to streamline, render more effective, and modernize the party apparatus and mass democratic organizations and called on party organs at various levels to promote and maintain debate and information among militants and cadres on the national, regional, and international situation.

In a brief, off-the-cuff speech to close the third Central Committee session, Party Chairman Joaquim Chissano pointed out with satisfaction that there existed a unity of purpose among Central Committee members which had rarely been seen before. He said and we quote, those who doubted the cohesion of Frelimo Party ranks are now convinced that the Frelimo Party continues to be solid and cohesive and has the necessary strength and vitality to continue for many years, unquote.

Renamo Welcomes Adoption of Multiparty System

MB1708054290 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0500 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Text] The Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] movement in Mozambique has welcomed plans by the ruling Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] party to adopt a multiparty system.

The Lisbon representative of Renamo, Mr. Manuel Frank, said that Renamo wanted to be consulted on all changes to the political system.

The Central Committee of Frelimo has formally endorsed the adoption of a multiparty system and a market economy. It proposed the opening of the general elections next year to other parties.

*** Isolation Exacerbates Manica's Problems**

90AF0455A Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese
8 Jul 90 pp 14-17

[Article by Alfredo Tembe]

[Text] Manica is continuing to sail in rough waters and the war is the fulcrum point of its suffering. Except for certain local districts along the Beira Corridor, Manica is experiencing almost total isolation: only by air or, once by way of Zimbabwe, has there been access to the other districts.

The inhabitants of the Machaze district, in the southern part of Manica Province, have already forgotten the very existence of many provincial facilities or organizations which heretofore served to orient the residents of that area of the country. The only organization still existing is the Provincial Directorate of Health [DPS], the only entity which still has access to the area in question.

Access by land is no longer possible. And it is only through means of small aircraft that the DPS, in cooperation with nonaffiliated doctors, succeed in reaching the area. Except for medication and an attempt by the DPS to ensure a minimum of basic health care, other products, such as food, clothing, and household appliances, are awaiting a better opportunity to reach the Machaze people.

In the northern part of the province, in the districts of Guro, Macissa, Tambara, and Barue, it is the same story. In Sussundenga, in the central part of the province, it is only by land and with a suitable escort that one can reach

this area, and in Mossurize access is achieved only by land via Zimbabwe. In short, there are many problems plaguing the provincial leaders. Moreover, according to the director of Manica's Provincial Planning Committee [PCP], this province does not have an administrative plan capable of organizing the people's affairs, the reason for this being the lack of funds. And due to the nonexistence of such an administrative plan, the province is faced with a number of projects with no apparent coordination and, hence, no promising outlook for the future: their only merit is to be set in motion and then they "die" by the wayside.

To avoid this phenomenon, we need to combine our efforts on behalf of projects involving every logical means at our disposal but precluding those which serve only to exacerbate the situation in the various districts. Be that as it may, Artur Canana, governor of Manica, is convinced that the provincial situation will improve. He based this conclusion on a number of visits he made to the various districts. For this reason, Artur Canana considers it important for Manica Province to receive continued support from international organizations operating in the province. This desire was expressed at a meeting held with Mary Macelis, regional director of UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] for southern and eastern Africa, who visited Manica Province from 3 to 6 June and assured not only a continuance but also an increase in the aid being provided by the organization she represents.

Espungabera: A Small Island

Many people in the Mossurize District, particularly in its headquarters, Espungabera, are wagering that almost all the problems affecting this district would be resolved if there were sufficient funds. And with regard to that insufficiency of funds, all eyes are turned toward the need for international support. In the visit we made, the major concern was apparently this lack of extraneous support. For example, a clinic started in 1987 in the village of Acordos de N'Komati is still awaiting completion due to the lack of funds. Moreover, because of this, a small hut may sometimes be used for the treatment of domestic animals (cattle, pigs, poultry) as well as people. The difference lies only in the designation of those responsible: one, a veterinarian, the other, a nurse.

The village of Acordos de N'Komati features corn as its principal crop and, according to Fabiao Morijo, its secretary, the only occupation of its 909 inhabitants is collective farming. It appears that not having anything in particular to do, since there are 73 men and 262 women, the rest of the population—574—is composed of children, 216 being in school, taught by five teachers.

The village of Acordos de N'Komati is only a part of the Mossurize District and has its own brand of problems. Elias Antonio, Mossurize administrator, asserts that of the 57,470 inhabitants recorded in the last and only census taken in 1980 (after independence), the district controls only 20,445 inhabitants, according to information compiled in February

of this year. Of this figure, 6,082 are in an emergency situation, 3,196 are repatriated from Zimbabwe, 1,520 are suffering from various ailments, and 1,366 fall under the category of displaced persons.

Elias Antonio believes that, despite the difficult security situation in the district—one in which it is impossible to travel more than five km from the northern part of the district headquarters (Espungabera)—some improvement in production is occurring in areas of relative tranquillity: from 200 head of cattle existing in 1987, the number decreased to 562 this year. With regard to education, despite the fact that 414 children of school age failed to attend school, attendance rose from 2,031 in 1987 to 2,781 this school year, 327 were listed under special education (children victimized by the war).

In the opinion of the Mossurize administrator, one of the principal difficulties facing the district is its isolation; but other problems are also plaguing his administration, such as the compulsive repatriation of the Mozambicans who fled to neighboring Zimbabwe. In view of this situation, even children are forcibly separated from their family members. In the "abandoned children's halfway house" in Espungabera, which houses 36, we found many who knew the whereabouts of their relatives across the border but had no way of reaching them. One of the apparent reasons is the massive infiltration of armed bandits headed toward Zimbabwe.

All Can Be Repatriated

The matter of repatriation is not exclusive to the district of Mossurize. Ricardo Guezi Carre, administrator of the Manica District, asserts that the same holds true for that district. "In the beginning, the repatriation of Mozambican refugees from Zimbabwe," says Ricardo Carre, "adhered to a pre-established program in coordination with a specific nucleus of refugees." And Manica, being a border district and transit point, always had prior knowledge of the individuals scheduled to be repatriated. But now, through lack of documentation or during the night, whether Mozambican or not, repatriation occurs. "We even had cases where Zimbabwean citizens were repatriated because they did not have the necessary documentation at the proper time," says the Manica administrator. In the opinion of the Mozambican authorities in the border area, it even appears that not having documents is synonymous with being Mozambican.

"The explanation for this situation," says the Manica administrator, "lies in the fear of increased raids by the armed bandits operating along the Zimbabwean border. But according to our understanding and in keeping with international norms and the charter of the Organization of African Unity [OAU] regarding refugees, only when the sovereignty of a state is jeopardized can compulsive repatriation occur. Let us hope that the dialogues which Manica's provincial authorities plan to carry on with their Zimbabwean counterparts may bear fruit in this situation."

Due to these acts of compulsive repatriation, the Manica District finds itself greatly harassed by the armed bandits. Machipanda, Manica City, Messica, and Vanduzi headquarters are some of the few areas where the situation is calm. In the remaining areas, activity is at a standstill. As a result, education and health are highly inadequate with regard to the needs of the people.

Ricardo Carre believes that of the 140,026 inhabitants (1980 census), 100,000 are under the control of the district authorities. Of this figure, 5,000 are displaced persons originating from the administrative post of Mavonde where the problems are more serious. And at the administrative post of Vanduzi, there are 85 "abandoned" children, housed in special groups for the purpose of rehabilitation. Of the total number of people in the Manica District, figures compiled by the District Directorate of Education [DDE] account for 16,148 students. The number of children not in school is said to be 1,094.

In addition to the shortage of schools in the districts which are capable of handling all individuals of school age, the Manica Province in general is lacking in teachers. And in the opinion of the director of the CPP, school construction should keep pace with the training of teachers. The only school in the province which specializes in education is the Teachers Training Center [CFP] which graduates only 30 teachers per year, not sufficient to satisfy the province's needs. Because of all these factors, it is ascertained that of the 200,000 inhabitants of school age, only 60,000 attend school.

This does not mean that the others have never attended school. In fact, Manica has only two high schools, and this is far from satisfying the needs of all the upper graduates. Moreover, there are no elementary schools capable of assuring skilled training outside the schools.

Returning to the Manica District, the local administrator believes that in the areas where there is relative security food production is meeting with good results. Last year, 4,800 tons of corn were marketed compared with a plan which called for 3,000 tons. And this year, the plan calls for 5,000 tons, a target which may be surpassed. As for cattle, the district is counting on 16,000 head.

These production levels in the Manica District and province as a whole may well be exceeded inasmuch as the land is fertile. We await only the reestablishment of peace which is so badly needed.

Swaziland

Daily Publishes Interview With Prime Minister
MB1708085290 Mbabane THE SWAZI OBSERVER
in English 17 Aug 90 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Obad Dlamini, by Phinda Zwane, OBSERVER reporter; date, place not specified]

[Text] [Zwane] It would appear as though political parties are slowly emerging from underground. Is there a

possibility in the future of lifting the ban on political parties in Swaziland? If not, what is Government doing to ensure that no political party break this ban?

[Dlamini] At the moment, it is rather difficult to predict the future in this regard. Winds of political change are blowing in many parts of the world, including Africa, and changes which, not long ago seemed unthinkable are currently taking place.

As regards your question on what government is doing to enforce the ban, I can only say that where the law in this regard has been breached, the country's law enforcement agencies have taken the appropriate action to ensure that the existing law is obeyed.

[Zwane] How did you feel when your office received a document from an organisation calling itself the "Swaziland United Congress (SUC)" in your capacity as prime minister of the Kingdom of Swaziland?

[Dlamini] I was somewhat astounded by the contents of that particular letter.

[Zwane] In view of what clandestine political organisations like Pudembo [People's United Democratic Movement] and the so-called SUC are seen, or believed to be doing, what is your forecast of the Kingdom's political stability?

[Dlamini] My prediction in this regard is that the Kingdom of Swaziland will continue to maintain its long tradition of peace and political stability in the future.

[Zwane] Reports from the recent OAU summit which you attended disclose that the Nigerian leader, Major [as published] General Ibrahim Babangida, frankly told the rest of Africa's heads of state: "African leaders have failed their peoples." Do you agree with his view? If not, what is your view on that?

[Dlamini] I am not quite sure if President Babangida was correctly quoted in these reports. However, I can only say that it is, of course, true that the track records of most African leaders, including Swaziland, show both successes in some areas and shortcomings in other aspects. This is, I think, a natural phenomenon. What we should try to do, as newly independent nations, is to strive for greater successes in the future by correcting our past mistakes, in the process of nation-building.

[Zwane] Political analysts, commenting on the recent OAU summit, feel that Africans have now had enough of one-party state rule and that the people now want change, respect for human rights and freedom of speech. Do you think this Kingdom would be in a position to adopt changes in this direction?

[Dlamini] As I have already pointed out that it is rather difficult to make predictions about the future at this point in time. However, we form part of Africa and, indeed, an integral part of the world community. As such it is not possible for us to remain static when the world community moves forward.

[Zwane] You give me an impression that you are an approachable person, somebody who listens to every question, or subject he is requested to attend to, unlike some of your predecessors. What is your attitude towards the press?

[Dlamini] I strongly believe in a free press because it tends to reflect public opinion on any particular issue, including aspects of Government performance. I believe that it is absolutely vital for a government to know the feelings and views of the people it serves if it is to be adequately responsive to their needs and aspirations.

A free press, therefore, helps government to keep its finger on the pulse of public opinion.

[Zwane] What are your dreams about the land of your forefathers that you would like to accomplish during your term of office as Prime Minister?

[Dlamini] First of all, I would like to successfully reduce unemployment in this country by generating more job opportunities for our people. I would also love to see greater progress being made in developing the economy of our rural areas so as to enhance the standard of living of our rural people.

[Zwane] Lastly, your excellency, what did you tell the other heads of state at the OAU summit about Swaziland's foreign policy? What was your contribution at that summit?

[Dlamini] With regard to Swaziland's foreign policy, I stressed, both in my address to the OAU and in our discussions, this country's strong conviction that political differences should be resolved through peaceful dialogue. We have always believed this to be the only way of achieving durable peace and harmonious co-existence among nations and peoples.

As to my own contributions to the summit, I can only say that I made my modest contribution to the collective search by African leaders for possible solutions to the many political and socio-economic problems besetting our continent.

Editorial Views Political System, Discussions

MB1708082890 Mbabane THE TIMES OF
SWAZILAND in English 17 Aug 90 p 28

[Editor's comment. "Broader consultations needed for Tinkhundla"]

[Text] Last week, His Majesty the King called the Swazi family to the Royal Cattle Byre at Ludzidzini where he spoke at some length about the need for a review of the Tinkhundla institution.

At the end of his speech, his majesty convened the Libandla, which is formed of all adult Swazis, to air their views in how the system can be modified and brought in line with the expectation of the people of Swaziland.

To place the need for discussion in its proper perspective (without adding to his majesty's speech) it is common cause that over the past three years since the 1987 elections, there has been a general uproar, mainly expressions of disaffection with the manner the Tinkhundla operate.

There have been numerous complaints, aired at various forums, including strenuous motions from the House of Parliament for a review of the system. Chiefs have complained. Business leaders. Students. Politicians....

Generally, the grievance with Tinkhundla is that it was created as a temporary structure on which a future permanent constitutional framework was to be built. No one has suggested that that structure be dismantled. No one is now. Everyone accepts that Tinkhundla is different from other systems, but it is the system that the Swazi people decided to try.

Most of the adults of today, were already of voting age when the Tinkhundla system as we know it was introduced. Many remember His Majesty King Sobhuza II saying that Tinkhundla were to be improved upon whenever such need became apparent.

But what has dismayed people over the years, has been the consistent aggravating denials by Indvuna Yetinkhundla [tribal council leader] Mndeni Shabalala, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, and his insistence that the system was perfect, when everyone said it was not.

For that reason, Mr. Shabalala so represented all the wrongs of the system, that he has, over the years, become a serious political liability. In any democratic system, which Swazis aspire for the Tinkhundla to be, people that are a popular irritation are removed, lest they tarnish the system they represent. Besides, political offices must be filled by election. If not, those who must hold the position, should do so for a specific period. It is obvious that no one would remain oblivious to the restiveness the issue was causing. Yet, it was a dilemma. In SiSwati, serious constitutional matters are the prerogative of the Monarch, with due counsel.

On the issue of modification of the Tinkhundla, His Majesty decided, wisely, that the best counsel is that which must come from the people themselves, in keeping with the Swazi belief, that a King is King because of his people.

The meeting in the kraal, will not be without its critics, some of them justifiable. However, the challenge is on all those, young and old, rich and poor, professionals and artisans, rural dwellers and townsfolk; educated and simple to go to the kraal, and contribute their views, otherwise, the rabble rousers keen on discussing irrelevant issues will win the day.

Those who will refrain from going to the kraal when they should, for whatever reason, must be aware that they will bear as much responsibility for whatever the outcome from the meeting at Ludzidzini, as if they attended.

While that is true, it is equally true that it is not everyone who can be freed to go and attend the proceedings at the

kraal. It is also true that many of those who are attending, could be the same people who are normally granted leave by their employers to attend to Royal duties.

—A lot of those who have not attended, are tied to their commitments, from which they can not be freed, and can only attend during their spare time, like weekends.

—Among these, are people who can contribute invaluable.

—His majesty asked for specific points to be discussed—the vehicle and the driver.

—So far, little critical analysis has been made of both. It could be because few people are informed enough about the Tinkhundla to be able to criticize it constructively. Besides, this is unlikely to be possible in a large group full of authority. That too may make people reserve important observations they fear would offend.

—Also, careful thought must be given to educating the people so that they can make decisions based on enlightened judgement.

—The example of the examination of a vehicle, you need to consider more than the view of the passengers. You also need technically competent people.

To design a vehicle for a specific purpose needs engineers.

—It is very important that the vital national consultation that his majesty has asked for, should not recommend a ship that will give us problems a few weeks after it is put to sea. There should be no need to hurry to finish.

—We appeal to the senior elders at Ludzidzini upon whom the responsibility to guide the consultation was placed, to consult further with a view to broadening the scope of the consultation, so that even institutions of Swaziland, like the University, and the Law Society be asked to contribute, so that little is overlooked.

—Those at the kraal, could also do well to appoint a secretariat which would record and interpret the points made so far, so that at the end of the consultation, the recommendations can be confirmed, point by point, before they are submitted for scrutiny to his majesty.

Zambia

* Government Funds Available To Buy Crops

90AF0498A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 5 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] The Government has released K250 million to commercial banks to help kick off the long-delayed marketing season blocked by lack of funds for cooperative unions to buy produce from farmers.

Prime Minister General Malimba Masheke in a ministerial statement to Parliament yesterday said the Bank of Zambia was not chairing weekly meetings with the Zambia Cooperative Federation to ensure all areas of need were met.

The delay in the marketing season was not caused by banks holding back cash but cooperative unions holding nine million 90 kg bags of maize stocks by the end of April 1990.

Banks, transporters and cooperative unions had agreed on a scheme to buy all crops and the now launched programme would ensure cooperatives serviced debts and sold old maize stocks.

The K250 million would be released systematically by commercial banks so that adequate liquidity was available to fund the whole scheme but within inflation control targets of the central banks.

The statement followed an order by Speaker Mr Fwan-yanga Mulikita last week after a point of order by Lundazi MP [Member of Parliament] Mr Dingiswayo Banda who asked if Government was in order to maintain silence on the delayed marketing season.

Bwana Mkubwa MP Mr Lawrence Phiri asked if it was not possible for the Government to review quotas given to banks as these were under pressure and could not operate properly because of credit squeeze, but learnt that "you can only lend what you have."

The Premier said before the squeeze bank managing directors found difficulties in knowing liquidity situation in a month but they could now know in two weeks.

Chipata MP Major Teddy Mbewe asked when the money was released and what date had been set for the marketing season.

The announcement of the maize producer prices marked the start of the season and the monies were released "ten days ago," Gen Masheke said.

The Speaker, Mr Mulikita will at a later date make a ruling on three related points of order raised by MPs at separate dates as the matters were "very involving."

Speaking when Mazabuka MP Mr Bennie Mwiinga asked if ZCCM [Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines] was in order as a parastatal owned by Zambians to heavily subsidise mealie meal for its employees when other Zimco employees of which ZCCM was a part were not enjoying such a privilege because of the coupon system, Mr Mulikita said two other points of order were raised.

Major Mbewe at the last sitting of the House raised a point of order on plans by ZCC to give a total of K40 million to some soccer clubs turning professional on the Copperbelt and questioned the wisdom of such a move.

Mr Mulikita would deal with the mealie meal subsidy question when dealing with the other points of order.

*** Coupon System Corrupt; Poor Not Served**

90AF0497A Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 10 Jul 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Corruption has, as often, destroyed the moral fabrics of the majority of developing countries. There are indeed some countries where this disease seems to have been legalised.

Zambia has slowly but surely entered this rotten "family." Economic problems as usual, have contributed to this fact but it is also true that the influence of desperate and therefore corrupt illegal aliens who come to the country, has played a major role.

There are many people who boast that they are in the money because of being involved in deals. These are the "clever Alecs" who find expensive hotel bars and restaurants comfortable places to visit. It is difficult for Zambians today to get service from public officers unless a deal has been clinched.

The coupon system which the Party and its Government introduced in 1988 has suffered a similar fate. Some people in charge of administering the system have either stolen the coupons or have demanded to be paid some money before the meal coupons could be issued to the poor man living in our shanty compounds.

President Kaunda was right on Friday when he pointed out that the distribution and administration of the coupons system is riddled with corruption and that this hindered the coupons from reaching the poor. This has actually been common knowledge to most Zambians.

Some workers who should have benefited from the facility have opted to buy mealie meal at high prices because of the difficulty in obtaining the coupons. That is what corruption can do.

If Zambia is not careful, corruption will open new doors. It might be difficult for example, to board a plane, catch a bus to Livingstone, Mongu or Chipata or to obtain a passport or driving licence if one does not give a "tip." This is already happening in some cases.

What will eventually suffer is the country as a whole which at the moment has been highly praised by foreign visitors for being a clean society. The Government cannot afford to have such a good reputation erased from the world map. Tourists like to visit decent people. We should remember that.

Corruption must therefore be eliminated in Zambia or its march towards the destruction of this country halted. The Anti-Corruption Commission should see to that.

We are aware that eradicating corruption is as difficult as the problem of fighting prostitution. But the commission should try.

* Party Secretary General Zulu Admits Errors

90AF0501C Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 9 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] Party Secretary General Cde Grey Zulu yesterday made a passionate appeal to leaders in Lusaka to help restore order in the capital city.

Cde Zulu said this at Nakatindi hall when he addressed Party leaders from all areas of Lusaka, including members of the Central Committee.

Cde Zulu called the meeting to discuss with the leaders the problems that Lusaka was facing.

"What happened the week ending 30 June in Lusaka was just a small disaster of what could befall the nation," he said.

"It will go down in the annals of history of this republic as a sad week," he said in reference to the looting and rioting that took place in Lusaka, Kabwe and Kafue.

It was a week in which the devil took an upper hand in the running of the affairs of the country. People ran amok, hatred came to the fore and people took the law into their own hands.

Some people had vendettas against the leadership in the Party and would like change to come but by any means, constitutional or otherwise.

Cde Zulu said there was need to discuss matters frankly and correctly. The Party welcomed constructive criticism within its ranks and anyone who blocked that was committing an offence.

Party leaders had a duty to explain to the people who celebrated the coup hoax that the country could have been in a very sad state today.

The Party and its Government had programmed the increase in the price of mealie meal to match with the increase in salaries and the value of the mealie meal coupons.

"Due to our own shortcomings we started the measures the other way round. Prices of mealie meal were announced first while the salaries were not announced as timed and the increase in the face value of the mealie meal coupons was not effectively publicised," he said.

To mitigate this the Government had decided that this month employees would be paid earlier so that they could buy necessary provisions.

Those in the low income bracket had not lost anything because the face value of the coupon had been raised by almost the same percentage as the price of mealie meal.

"You go and assure the people that they have not lost anything because of the increase in the price of mealie meal," Cde Zulu told the Party leaders.

Coupons once issued, should be distributed as early as possible to avoid misuse of the facility and corruption by certain individuals.

There were also many rumour mongers in Lusaka. Last week there were such rumours as Lieutenant Mwamba Luchembe had been killed, his wife Mary, had been attacked by rioters and that he (Cde Zulu) had run away on hearing of the coup hoax.

"Rumours create dispondency and fear in the minds of the people. Let us unite and discard hatred," Cde Zulu said.

On the referendum, Cde Zulu said the issue could not be postponed to a later date as there was no guarantee that whatever time chosen could be better or trouble-free.

* Talks Rather Than Fighting Recommended

90AF0501B Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 4 Jul 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Well all that is said is not wrong after all. "Chikomekome chankuyu mukati mulinyerere." (All that glitters is not gold) is a proverb which is currently correct in Zambia today.

There was a ridiculous announcement on Saturday that the army had taken over the Government in the country. The announcement made by a mentally deranged apostle of doom was proved to be false.

The Secretary General of the Party Cde Grey Zulu made this point clear when he told the nation that the statement on the attempted coup was the work of an undisciplined soldier.

Some misguided Zambians almost celebrated when they heard of the news. Who were these people? "Chikomekome chankuyu mukati mulinyerere?" Can such reckless people who acted like prostitutes impress any responsible citizens?

A prostitute has no hope in life apart from the money she gets from a frustrated customer.

What Zambians want today is to understand the realities of the situation in their country. Phantom operas should not be the order of the day.

The Party is ready to listen to people. Why should the Party members go for stones instead of discussions? Negotiations are better than bullets. This is the most important message that we can give you. Grievances are in the end best solved by negotiations.

There is no problem which has not been solved by negotiations. Violence is only a beginning but not an end. This might not be a palatable message to some of our countrymen but it is an important fact.

There can be many problems in a house but they will be better solved through discussions. A heavy blow at a wife's

head is not a solution. And the sons, daughters and grandchildren should advise their fathers instead of stoning them. This is supposed to be common knowledge.

Let us remember that it is great to be young. But we should not forget that "mau akulu akoma akagonela," "meaning wise sayings become clearer to one after some time." This generation has a serious responsibility of looking after the welfare of Zambia. It should not fail to do so by resorting to acts of hooliganism.

Every Zambian has a right to complain but the complaints be made through proper channels. When that is done the voice of reason will be listened to. No fight but talk. That is what will help the children. Have you got this message you elders?

* Starvation Reported in Kalomo District

90AF0497B Lusaka SUNDAY TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 8 Jul 90 p 7

[Excerpt] Kalomo district council will deliver 700,000 bags of maize to remote drought stricken areas of the district.

The move comes after reports that some people in areas like Simwatachela Sipatunyana, and others were selling their cattle at give away prices to enable them raise money to buy food.

Area governor Cde Zachaeus Siamasuku said in Kalomo that because of the drought in the district, the district council had decided to deliver and sell the maize to the affected farmers.

"As a district we are going to produce 700,000 bags of maize this year. And the district committee has made a decision that whatever is produced should be sold to the drought hit areas," Cde Siamasuku said.

He said although there were some parts of the district such as Mukuni, Musokotwane, Sekute, Kamba, Sipatunyana and Simwatachela which had no food, the council had taken measures to ensure that people did not starve.

He said some wards had sufficient food while others had none. The problem of starvation was not supposed to arise because the district had enough maize to distribute to affected areas. [passage omitted]

* Corn Exports Halted Pending Evaluation

90AF0497C Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 7 Jul 90 p 5

[Text] Exports of maize to neighbouring countries can only resume after a critical assessment of stocks by the ZCF, Minister of Commerce and Industry Cde Rabbison Chongo has said.

Exports of mealie meal which were suspended after erratic shortages of the commodity on the Copperbelt could resume.

Cde Chongo said mealie meal exports could resume because the situation on the Copperbelt had "stabilised."

He said there were enough stocks of maize in the country to support mealie meal exports.

"In terms of supporting mealie meal exports the maize stocks are satisfactory," Cde Chongo said.

Indeco was granted an export permit and was exporting mealie meal and not maize.

The Government imposed a ban on maize exports in March this year.

* Pay Increases Awarded University Lecturers

90AF0498B Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 5 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by Michael Andindilile]

[Text] The University of Zambia (UNZA), hit by a staff exodus because of poor conditions of service, has awarded lecturers hefty salary increments and allowances to stem the brain-drain.

Addressing lecturers at the Lusaka campus, Unza vice-chancellor Professor Kasuka Mwauluka yesterday outlined details of the new perks to be effected this month.

The new increments include car, house, non-practice allowances which have been awarded to all academic workers at Unza, Copperbelt University and National Council for Scientific Research.

Professors' new salaries would range from K167,964 to K183,252 whereas associate professors would get between K138,048 and K157,595.

Senior lecturers would earn between K116,592 and K144,768. Lecturers in Grade One would get from K104,700 and K121,500, Grade Two between K85,812 and K100,500 and those in Grade Three would be paid between K60,000 and K78,468 a year.

The new tax regulation would affect the salaries but only amounts exceeding K1,000 would be taxed 50 per cent.

Expatriates complained that their tax percentage had always been higher than that of the others, and the vice-chancellor said the issue had yet to be rectified.

Lecturers who would not be given a personal-to-holder vehicle would be entitled to K3,000 commuted car allowance every month. They would also be entitled to a car loan.

Deans of schools, the librarian, the medical officer in charge would get personal-to-holder vehicles.

Arrangements were being made to bring in new vehicles but Prof. Mwauluka said it would be after some time.

Supplementation for local staff would be classified in two levels which were yet to be clarified. One group would get K48,000 while the other K36,000 a year.

Senior doctors would get K48,000 while the rest would receive K36,000.

The non-private practice allowances for lawyers is pegged at K24,000 for seniors and K12,000 for others.

Lecturers without furniture would be entitled to K24,000 allowance a year. Water and electricity allowances remain at old rates.

Tax free loans for refrigerators and stoves would be offered.

The package was restricted to academic staff only. The one for the administrative, technical and other supporting staff was being worked out and there would be a meeting with the Government over the perks on Wednesday next week.

Lecturers would be assisted in procuring foreign exchange for subscribing to foreign associations and journals.

The university was also considering introducing the house ownership scheme to encourage lecturers to build their own houses.

*** Donated Czech Beef Deemed Radioactive**

90AF0498C Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 7 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] National Import and Export Corporation (NIEC) has rejected the Czechoslovak Government's claims that tinned meat donated to Zambia two years ago had no radioactive contamination and that it was tested and found to be radioactive immediately after arrival in the country.

The Czechoslovak Government has refused to accept back the consignment of 2,880 cases of the contaminated beef which will now have to be destroyed within Zambia as soon as a suitable site is found.

NIEC managing director Cde Patrick Chisanga in a Press statement said in Lusaka yesterday that the meat had been tested by the National Council for Scientific Research [NCSR] upon arrival in Zambia and was found unfit for human consumption because of the radioactive poisoning.

The consignment could not be put on sale immediately because it was not labelled. NIEC contacted the Zambia Bureau of Standards who advised that the meat be examined by NCSR.

According to the report by NCSR, the beef measured radioactivity although it may be below some countries' maximum permissible limits based on risk and cost effective analysis.

This meat, the report says, was likely to be contaminated with other radioactive matter which, if left to accumulate, resulted in the deadly disease, leukaemia.

Cde Chisanga said several meetings were held with the Czechoslovak embassy officials since July 1988 to resolve the matter but all the meetings had been inconclusive.

He said officials from the embassy had even toured ZCBC and Mwaiseni stores and it was agreed the consignment was well stored.

"It was clear from the foregoing that the presence of the disputed tinned beef from Czechoslovakia in NIEC group coldrooms is as a result of developments outside NIEC's immediate influence."

NIEC could not unilaterally dispose of the beef without approval of the Government and other relevant organs, hence the prolonged period the meat has remained in NIEC's custody.

He said recommendations have since been lodged with relevant Government authorities advising on possible options on how the condemned beef could be safely disposed of.

The Geological Survey Department and the Ministry of Health have been looking for a possible site near Lusaka to dispose of the meat without endangering people's lives.

Press secretary at the Czechoslovak embassy, Mr Denek Dobias said last week that the meat donated two years ago was free of radioactive contamination but got a bacterial infection in Zambia because of poor storage.

Mr Dobias had expressed surprise at Zambia's insistence that the meat was contaminated when "experts" had established it was safe following initial complaints to the Czechoslovak Government.

The scandal of the condemned meat was exposed last week after the food riots in the capital when 200 cases of the consignment stored at a NIEC shop in Mandevu was looted.

The rest of the consignment is stored at ZCBC Cairo road store, ZCBC distribution centre in Ndola, NIEC stores in Cairo road, Kabwata NIEC store and NIEC distribution centre.

*** Farmers Threaten Crop Switch Because of Costs**

90AF0498D Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 9 Jul 90 p 5

[Text] Farmers in Ndola's Kavu farming block have threatened to stop growing maize because of the high cost of inputs.

Chairman of Mukulungwe farmers Cde Thomson Chalubemba said unless substantial reductions were made in the cost of fertiliser, tractor hire, chemicals, labour and transportation, few farmers were willing to take up maize growing.

"Many farmers have switched to soya beans and groundnuts, saying these crops were quite manageable and profitable compared to maize," Cde Chalubemba said.

He said the trend was retrogressive because maize was the staple food of most Zambians, and unless the Government was willing to subsidise some inputs like fertiliser, few farmers on the Copperbelt would still continue with maize.

He appealed to the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF) to assist farmers with loans.

*** UNIP, Source of Stability**

90AF0501A Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 2 Jul 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Over the last 25 years Zambia has enjoyed unparalleled peace and tranquillity against a backdrop of deepening crisis in many African countries, including some neighbouring states that have been embroiled in political turmoil and conflict since their attainment of independence.

Consequently, Zambia is host to hundreds of thousands of refugees, political exiles and other displaced persons fleeing from their strife-torn countries where wars have been, and are still, raging, claiming million of lives.

Elsewhere on the continent, examples abound of nations that have lost some of their best brains in coups and counter-coups, civil wars and other conflicts.

The lost opportunities, indiscriminate slaughter of innocent people, and many other problems wrought by military tyranny, are well known to most people who have witnessed untold misery and irreparable harm in many an African nation.

Against this background of strife and instability in some neighbouring countries, Zambia stands out as a shining example of a country unscarred by tribal conflict or political turmoil. The country has, and continues to be, an oasis of peace.

Even as we witness some glimmer of hope in the sub-region following some positive developments, refugees are still pouring into Zambia to seek sanctuary here because of the prevailing political stability.

It is saddening to note that the cynics, in their malicious campaign, refuse to acknowledge all the positive developments that ought to be credited to the ruling party, UNIP [United National Independence Party].

Zambia has, in President Kaunda, a mature and experienced statesman without whose guidance the nation would have joined many others reeling from serious political instability.

It would be tragic if our country were to slide into tyranny of any form after such a long period of peace and stability, now the envy of all our foes.

Peace and tranquillity, like everything else, must be worked for. It cannot be guaranteed in an atmosphere fraught with suspicion, division, or in a country where people are split on tribal lines.

As we reflect over events of the past week, we hope all Zambians will remain rational and exhibit the same oneness and maturity which have welded our 73 tribes together since the country ascended to nationhood in 1964.

Any irrational or emotive conduct is a sure recipe for disaster which the nation will live to regret.

The Gambia**Taylor's Absence Due to 'Technical Reasons'**

AB1608192890 London BBC World Service in English
1830 GMT 16 Aug 90

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Hopes for a cease-fire in the Liberian civil war have been fixed on talks expected to take place today in Banjul involving President Jawara, General Quainoo, commander of the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] peacekeeping force, ECOMOG and rebel leader Charles Taylor. Everybody was gathered except Taylor, and his rebel movement has something of a reputation for not turning up or for late arrivals, and it seems that there has been another disappointment. From Banjul, Babacar Gueye telexed this report.

[Begin studio announcer recording] A statement released a short while ago by the ECOWAS secretariat said that due to technical reasons, Mr. Charles Taylor will not arrive in Banjul today as planned. In view of this, the statement said, the meeting with Mr. Taylor had been rescheduled for next Monday [20 Aug].

In another statement, the ECOWAS secretariat announced that a conference of all Liberian political parties and other interest groups is to be held in Banjul on 27 August. The statement said that this is in accordance with the communique issued by the ECOWAS heads of state summit early this month to the effect that such a conference should be held for the purpose of establishing an interim government for Liberia to which power should be transferred in a proper manner. The ECOWAS statement said that to this end, an invitation has been extended to President Doe's party, Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia, Mr. Prince Johnson's group, and all other Liberian political parties inside and outside Liberia.

Earlier today, an emissary arrived in The Gambia from Ghana with what was described as a special message to President Jawara from Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings. No details of the message were given. President Jawara himself held meetings this morning with the commander of the ECOWAS force, Lieutenant General Quainoo, and the ECOWAS executive secretary, Dr. Abass Bundu.

Meanwhile, it has not been disclosed here whether President Jawara has responded to a letter from Captain Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso accusing ECOWAS of acting outside its mandate in wanting to send a military force to Liberia. [end recording]

Ghana**PNDC Official, Opposition on Democratic Debate**

AB1608094890 London BBC World Service in English
0730 GMT 14 Aug 90

[From the "Network Africa" program]

[Text] Recently, the Ghanaian leader, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, threw open the debate on the next stage toward the return to democracy in the country. At about the same time, two fledgling parties, the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guard and the Movement for Freedom and Justice, the MFJ, called on the ruling PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] to lift the life ban on party politics and allow multipartyism to flourish in Ghana. The MFJ went further and said the local district assemblies that are currently operating in Ghana and which the PNDC government say are a first step toward democracy do not have the backing of the majority of Ghanaians. Francesco Isaka is the deputy PNDC secretary responsible for the district assemblies. In Accra, Ben Ephson put this to her:

[Begin recording] [Isaka] Well, it comes as a surprise to me that anybody at this time should say that the district assembly concept is not popular with Ghanaians or acceptable to them.

[Ephson] Why, madam?

[Isaka] We want first to just take a look at the election results. I would think that one way to determine if something is popular is to look at the turnout rate at an election. At the district assembly elections, 58 percent of the population—the voting population—turned out to vote. This is compared to about 18 percent which turned out to vote in the 1978 local council elections and 39 percent in the very recent elections in 1979. But I would like to say to these people who think that the assembly concept is not popular—it is for them to demonstrate with statistics like we are doing that it is not popular. It would seem to me that they have not even tried to go out and take a look at the working of the assemblies to even find out what is going on to even identify with the people who are in these assemblies. But they are very quick to criticize and say that the assemblies are not popular.

[Ephson] Some of the groups have said that, well, a way for the PNDC to really also put this belief that it is popular is for the PNDC to put the issue to a referendum—to a vote. What is the assurance to that?

[Isaka] Well, it [word indistinct] of interesting. People always think that referendums are just rig-proof, the surest and safest way to determine anything, and I do not believe that referendums are the best way to determine things. Right now, there is a discussion going on—a debate—on what the next step should be. I would like to invite these people to come out to these discussions, participate in them fully. They are always very welcome, and nobody is censoring anything that is said at these

debates. As a matter of fact, we even welcome written comments if people cannot come in, and do not insist that people have to identify themselves when they make contributions at these debates. After they have participated in those discussions, if they still think that the assembly concept is not popular from what they hear or see, in addition to what I have already challenged them to do—to go out into the rural areas, to go out to district assemblies—then we can talk about referendums. [end recording]

Well, it seems that the regional multiparty party debate is not open to all in Ghana. Just last week, the chairman of the MFJ, Professor Albert Edu Buahen, was called in together with his entire executives by the Criminal Investigation Department [CID] to answer some questions. They were each released on a million cedis bail and due to report to police headquarters in Accra this morning for the third time. Prof. Edu Buahen and his executives have still not been charged, and on the line to Accra, Carolin Dempster asked him whether he felt intimidated by the whole process:

[Begin recording] [Buahen] Not really, not really. I think all this that the CID is doing is normal criminal investigation work. This is how I see it. [Words indistinct] in the matter at the moment.

[Dempster] Do you feel yourself free to participate in the debates over multiparty democracy, over the district assemblies which is currently ongoing in the country?

[Buahen] Well, we wrote to them. In fact, we sent two of our members to the office and asked whether we could participate in the debate in Koforidua, and they told us that since we are not a recognized body and since we have not been invited, we will not be allowed to take part in that debate. We were told that we could go there as members of the public, but we will not be allowed to speak because we have not been invited to attend.

[Dempster] So, in fact even as a member of public, as an ordinary citizen, you cannot participate in this debate?

[Buahen] We were told that we have come there as observers and can listen to what is going on, but we will not be allowed to speak, yes. From the discussions two of the members of executives had with one of the senior officials of the commission, they say that only people and bodies invited to this are allowed to speak.

[Dempster] Can you tell me what kind of support or what extent of support the MFJ has right now?

[Buahen] Well, I have just come from Kumasi. I spent the weekend in Kumasi, which is about a hundred and sixty miles from Accra, and the support is tremendous, and I went around and people were really [word indistinct] visible and clear sign of relief that at long last, at least, a different voice is now being heard. [end recording]

Official Denies Democracy Discussions Restricted

AB1608111490 Accra Domestic Service in English
1300 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] The special assistant to the chairman of the National Commission for Democracy [NCD], Miss Joyce Aryee, has denied that certain individuals were prevented from participating in the discussions on the country's democratic process, held at Koforidua last week.

Reacting to an interview granted by Professor Edu Buahen and carried on the BBC Network Africa program yesterday, Miss Aryee said she was approached on the eve of the Koforidua seminar by the two persons identified as one Pratt and Akoto Ampaw. The mission of the two persons, she said, was to find out whether they would be permitted to attend and participate in the seminar. Miss Aryee said the two persons informed her that they were emissaries of a movement whose objective was freedom and justice.

Miss Aryee said she explained to the gentlemen that since the seminars were open to the public and not only meant for assembly members and identifiable bodies, they were free to participate in it. She further explained to them that it was not necessary to issue them with special invitation from the NCD headquarters in Accra as they sought to imply. This was because the arrangements and organization of the seminar were being coordinated at the regional level.

Miss Aryee said it is bewildering that Prof. Edu Buahen, who was not at the meeting, could grant an interview to the BBC to tell such falsehoods. On the statement by Prof. Edu Buahen that he and a handful of others were (arrested) and granted police bail without any formal charge, Miss Aryee said she wished the professor had been honest enough to tell the truth as it is. Miss Aryee said she had been made aware that the police requested statement from the professor after he and a few others, operating under the name of a movement, had issued a false statement claiming to have been arrested and detained by the Bureau of National Investigations, BNI.

She recalled that it was Prof. Edu Buahen himself who signed the statement later, apologizing to the BNI and admitting to the world that the story of the arrest and detention was false. The special assistant stressed that investigation being conducted by the police into the false allegation had nothing to do with their freedom to participate in the seminar.

Customs Arrests Nigerians With 8.8 Kg of Heroin

AB1608200890 Dakar PANA in English 1524 GMT
16 Aug 90

[Text] Accra, 16 Aug. (GNA/PANA)—Ghana customs officials, at the Kotoka International Airport in Accra, seized 8.8 kilograms of heroin from two Nigerian travellers, according to press reports Thursday [16 Aug] in the West African country. Customs officers were quoted as saying Owolaba Jones Akosiie, 43, and Sunday Chedu

Obidigbo, 26, were arrested in July. They had seven packets of the brownish substance concealed in a carton and covered with t-shirts, the reports said.

The Nigerians, both traders, arrived in Ghana on board a Ghana Airways flight in transit from Zambia. They told reporters that the stuff was given to them by a Nigerian student in Bombay, George Okeke, to be sent to Lagos. Obidigbo said Okeke paid his air fare, hotel accommodation, gave him 300 US dollars as pocket money, and promised to "see me" when he came to Lagos. Akosile said he met Obidigbo by coincidence and also stated that the same man gave them the stuff.

Nigerian drug traffickers have been using Ghana as a transit point in their drug trade.

Liberia

NPFL Spokesman Cited on Taylor's Car Accident

AB1708094190 Lome Domestic Service in French
0615 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Text] A spokesman of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia [NPFL], Mr. Tom Woewiyu, announced yesterday evening that the rebel leader, Charles Taylor, has been injured in a car accident. According to the spokesman, Taylor was not, however, seriously injured. He specified that the accident took place on a dirt road in Nimba County during heavy rains.

Taylor was scheduled to meet Sir Dawda Jawara, the Gambian president, in Banjul yesterday. This meeting has been postponed to next Monday [20 Aug]. This postponement was announced by the Economic Community of West African States in a communique citing technical reasons. Jawara has invited the three warring Liberian factions to take part in peace talks 27 August in the Gambian capital.

U.S. Helicopters To Rescue 350 Indians

AB1608194490 Paris AFP in English 1925 GMT
16 Aug 90

[Text] Freetown, Aug 16 (Aug)—United States helicopters will rescue about 350 Indians from war-torn Liberia on Friday [17 Aug], New Delhi's acting consul general said here Thursday. The humanitarian mission would take place from the heavily guarded U.S. Embassy compound in central Monrovia, where most of the Indians are already sheltered, said Kanhaya Azad.

The Indians are mainly small businessmen and their families who did not join the exodus of the once 7,500 strong Indian community who lived in Monrovia before the war. Only 461 Indians are still registered in Monrovia "but some of them may be in inaccessible," the acting consul said. He estimated that about 340-350 of them would be airlifted to a U.S. vessel off shore and then on to Freetown, the same route followed by 106 people of various nationalities on Tuesday.

A U.S. Embassy spokesman said the exact details of the rescue still had to be worked out "but it looks like tomorrow." Hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled Liberia by land and sea since the fighting started seven months ago. Mr. Azad expected at least half of the Indian evacuees to leave Sierra Leone by the weekend. About 75,000 Indians live in Sierra Leone.

BBC Views 'Grim' Situation of War Victims

AB1608182290 London BBC World Service in English
1615 GMT 16 Aug 90

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] While President Jawara and General Quainoo, commander of the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] peacekeeping force for Liberia wait hopefully in Banjul to talk to Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor about the cease-fire, the killing, dying, and suffering in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, goes on. With Samuel Doe hanging on to the bitter end and the rebels splitting into rival factions, the civilian population is bearing the brunt, with no power, no water, dwindling medical facilities, and many injured people cut off from help. We received this grim dispatch from the REUTER NEWS AGENCY in Monrovia.

[Begin studio announcer recording] Junior Toe is dying slowly of festering wounds in a stinking hospital store-room. He is one of nearly 40 badly injured patients at Monrovia's Roman Catholic Hospital waiting for deliverance or death. Around them, the battle for the Liberia capital rages.

Many are survivors of a massacre in a Monrovia church two weeks ago, when troops loyal to President Doe slaughtered 600 refugees from rival tribes. They have had no medical help since doctors from the Paris-based relief organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres [Doctors Without Borders], evacuated most of the hospital's inmates last Saturday [11 Aug]. The doctors said they would return as soon as they could for those left behind. Five days we have been waiting, one patient called out from his filthy mattress. They have not come back for us.

Groans and cries through the darkened entrance hall where the remaining patients, mostly men, were shifted on Saturday, ready for the promised convoy that would carry them to safety. Naked and unable to move, most are forced to lie in their own urine and excrement. There is no electricity and no water. They have no beds, just thin foam mattresses scattered in the stinking gloom.

One man rolled back his blanket to reveal an ugly weeping slash in his lower abdomen. He said that stitches from a bladder operation had worked their way open and urine now seeps from the scar. We are dying, he said, pleading for help. A man beside him pointed to his leg, gangrenous beneath the plaster cast. I can smell myself, he said calmly. I am rotting alive.

Half a dozen hopeless cases are lying in a nearby room waiting to die. Among them is Thomas Bengway, himself a patient, sharing a few meager supplies: tea, biscuits, and basic pain killers. Outside, armed rebels opposed to Doe were busy looting out houses full of food and drugs, which Bengway had no idea existed.

In a room close by the morgue, a French journalist found an awful baby, her face pinched with starvation. He and another journalist carried her to the relative safety of a nearby diplomatic compound where refugees set about nursing her back to humanity.

Back at the hospital, as the fighting closed in once more and gun fire rang out from surrounding fields, those who were left could only wait and nurse their hopes of rescue. [end recording]

Sierra Leone

ECOMOG Forces Assembled Outside Freetown

AB1608215890 London BBC World Service in English
1830 GMT 16 Aug 90

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] The multinational ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] force is assembled at its camps around Juwi, outside the Sierra Leone capital, Freetown. The soldiers are limbering up and awaiting the word to move out for Monrovia. Our correspondent, Elizabeth Blunt, has been to see how they are getting on.

[Begin Blunt recording] [Soldiers chanting slogans] Any time, anywhere, alpha, all the way. The men of the West African peacekeeping force already have their motto and

their white-painted helmets. That is a sign that they come for peace and not war. In the Guinean camp, soldiers were lining up for the tailor to have miniature Guinean flags sown on the sleeves of their uniforms—the way that the various national contingents will be distinguished. The Gambians were unfurling their brand new ECOMOG [ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] flag, featuring the brown and green circular symbol of the ECOWAS regional community.

At the biggest camp site where the Ghanaians and Nigerians are, rows of troop-carrier trucks and tankers all carry the same sign. So far, the Ghanaians and the Nigerians are the only ones who have needed to use their tents. They have a large and bustling camp full of military equipment on the site of a half-built teachers' training college.

The Guineans and The Gambians are in a nearby school and the Sierra Leone Police Academy, and the Sierra Leoneans themselves in the barracks at Benguema about six miles further away. Separate camp sites means that each group can suit their national taste. It was French bread and corned beef today for the Guineans, benachin rice for the Gambians.

So while the troops are keeping busy mostly with camp routine: pt [physical training], cleaning equipment, and sick parade for minor ailments such as [word indistinct], conjunctivitis, which seems to have hit the Guinea camp. But they also have been in the general principles before what they are going to be doing in Liberia: correct conduct at check points and on patrol, with special emphasis on the need to respect the civilian population and keep a clean locale for those who are tired or sick and in need of help. [end recording]

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